Eurasia Press & News
In an interview, Harith Hasan discusses Baghdad’s Development Road project, and sees obstacles ahead.
Harith Hasan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, and a resercher at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. His research focuses on Iraq, sectarianism, identity politics, religious actors, and state-society relations. He has just published a paper at Carnegie, titled “Iraq’s Development Road: Geopolitics, Rentierism, and Border Connectivity,” on the Iraqi project to build a port, road, and railway infrastructure in Iraq to connect the Persian Gulf to Türkiye and beyond. It is to discuss his paper, and the broader regional implications of the Development Road, in a context of growing regional competition, that Diwan interviewed Hasan in early March.
Michael Young: You’ve just published a paper at Carnegie on Iraq’s Development Road project. Why did you choose this topic and what do you argue?
Harith Hasan: This topic is important for two reasons. First, there is growing interest, both in the region and globally, in developing new routes for cross-border international trade, to the point where the Middle East today is an arena for geoeconomic competition between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and counter projects supported by the United States, including the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which recently gained prominence in light of the Gaza war and Ansar Allah’s attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea. In this context, interstate and interregional trade corridors are increasingly intertwined with geopolitical alignments.
Second, Iraq, like several countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Gulf states, is witnessing a shift in interest toward megaprojects and cross-border trade. After years of ethnic and sectarian divisions, the ruling elite is trying to look for new sources of legitimation, and here the idea of “development” is back again in the national discourse, but in a different way from the period of populist, socialist developmentalism during the 1960s and 1970s. The new model is more inclined toward open markets, integration into the global economy, and the expansion of service sectors. The Development Road is also tied to what has finally become a widespread belief that Iraq needs to diversify its economy and sources of income away from a complete reliance on oil revenues.
MY: What are the main obstacles to the project inside Iraq, and outside? In your judgment, given these obstacles, what are the chances that the project will be implemented?
HH: There are many obstacles to the fulfillment of the Development Road that suggest Iraqi ambitions may be inflated. These include rampant corruption, mismanagement, and the attempts of ruling groups to capture the state and its resources in ways that fragment state institutions and inhibit the government’s ability to orchestrate smooth planning and implementation. Also, the factional nature of Iraqi politics and the country’s frequent fluctuations facilitate short-term calculations, which tend to sideline long-term projects.
Even with Iraq receiving $8–9 billion per month from oil exports today, thanks to the rise in oil prices, there are doubts about the state’s ability to finance and implement such a megaproject, especially given the level of corruption prevailing nationally and the direction of resources to finance an ever-larger public sector and public subsidies. The obstacles also are tied to the potential for insecurity and instability in Iraq, which could chase away investors or countries seeking to benefit from the Development Road. And, perhaps most important, Iraq will have to find a place for itself in the midst of regional geoeconomic and geopolitical rivalries, as competing trade connectivity projects are being put forward. These include, as I noted earlier, China’s BRI, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, as well as Iran’s ambitions to become a platform for transregional trade.
MY: How likely are leading Gulf states to support Iraq in ensuring the Development Road project succeeds, particularly given Iran’s considerable influence over Iraq? Which Gulf states are more likely to help in this regard, and why?
HH: Currently, Qatar seems to be the main Gulf state interested in helping to advance the project, partly due its dire experiences during the blockade imposed on it by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in 2017–2021, which led the Qatari leadership to consider alternative routes for trade. Also, Qatar has strong ties with Türkiye, its main regional ally before and during the blockade. Türkiye supports the Development Road enthusiastically because it serves as a shortcut to the Gulf and meets Ankara’s ambition of being a hub for global trade connections.
The UAE is also a potential partner, especially as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has sought its help in managing the Faw port, which represents the cornerstone of the project. This could work well with the UAE’s interest in expanding its presence in Iraq and sustaining its status as a key global player in managing or controlling ports. However, the UAE may also be less inclined to participate in the project because of the potential of Faw port to become a rival of its own ports, and because of the influence of Iran-allied armed groups in Iraq that are hostile to the UAE. More importantly, given the attention surrounding the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor during the Gaza war and the possibility of a second Trump administration in the United States, the UAE may prefer to wait before committing to such project.
Finally, Kuwait considers the Faw port to be a competitor of the Mubarak al-Kabeer Port it is building on Boubiyan Island, whose construction sparked tension between Iraq and Kuwait. Some of this was related to the maritime borders dispute between the two countries, but it was also due to Iraq’s view that the Mubarak al-Kabeer Port would harm the prospects of the Faw port. These disputes led to the suspension of work at the Kuwaiti port for a time, but in July 2023 the government announced a resumption of work there.
MY: The Development Road comes at a time when China is pushing its Belt and Road Initiative. In what way are the two projects contradictory or complementary, particularly as Iraq was a major recipient of Chinese funds allocated to the BRI?
HH: Iraq’s place in the BRI has raised major questions at home, where observers and activists have wondered whether the Development Road is linked to, or separate from, Beijing’s aspirations. In 2021, Iraq emerged as the largest beneficiary of Chinese allocations to the BRI, receiving $10.5 billion out of a total of about $60 billion. Before that, Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government had agreed with China to establish a joint fund in which the value of 100,000 exported Iraqi barrels of oil per day would be used to pay for Chinese loans and investments in reconstruction and development projects in Iraq. Indeed, the “turn toward China” has become part of the political rhetoric of some Iraqi political factions, especially those close to Iran, which have presented this as a means of confronting U.S. hegemony.
However, in practice, Iraq does not occupy a key position in Chinese plans to benefit from regional connectivity projects. Beijing’s widely proposed land route passes through Central Asia and Türkiye, not through Iraq. Therefore, the Iraqi government has portrayed the Faw port as a complementary project, providing a new sea route that can also serve China and emerging economic powers in Asia, presumably shortening the time period, and costs, of trade with Europe. But even here, Iraq faces fierce competition from neighboring countries. Some of them are more established in international trade, port management, and shipping, such as the UAE, and some of them have the ability to disrupt Iraq’s plans to implement the Development Road, such as Türkiye, Iran, and Kuwait.
MY: How do you think such transnational infrastructure and connectivity initiatives will affect Middle Eastern borders in the future? Will they turn border areas into zones of collaboration, or will they lead to heightened competition between states?
HH: The fact that rival geoeconomic connection projects are being put forward in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East suggests that, instead of achieving their stated goal of promoting economic integration and cooperation, these projects may in fact exacerbate political antagonisms. Iraq has a long history of border disputes with most of its neighbors, and in Iran’s and Kuwait’s case these have triggered wars and invasions. Therefore, efforts to increase the economic value of border zones through new ports and road networks could aggravate latent tensions and lead to further conflicts. That may be another reason why the great aspirations surrounding the Development Road might never be met.
