Eurasia Press & News
US President Donald Trump left for Saudi Arabia, on his first official foreign visit, and his visit to the Arab Gulf countries comes at a crucial time where the impact of regional changes intersects with the priorities of US policy, and the visit highlights Gulf-US cooperation in vital files such as Iranian politics, the Palestinian issue, and Arab-Israeli relations, where the Gulf countries lead the scene as a key supporter of peace efforts, while Trump seeks to focus on calming conflicts and reducing the US military in the region.
The Middle East is awaiting the arrival of US President Donald Trump on a visit that will last until May 16, 2025, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. It comes in a turbulent regional context, amid fundamental shifts and intersectionality in international political, security and economic files. Given the priorities and directions of the Trump administration’s second, the overall context of his visit, and the features of the transformations in the region, the visit is likely to involve strategic results that contribute to defining the milestones of the next phase, and work to shape the roles and balances between regional powers, giving it a strategic dimension beyond the nature of his first visit to the region in 2017, the results of which were focused on the economic level.
Trump Tour: Political Economy Files
US President Donald Trump will begin his first foreign visit to the Gulf countries, for the second time, after Saudi Arabia was his first foreign destination during his first administration in May 2017. As the two visits intersect in the advanced economic relations between the Gulf countries and the United States, especially as Gulf countries rushed to reveal their investment and economic plans with the inauguration of Trump as president, Saudi Arabia announced a four-year plan, including investments of $ 600 billion, a candidate for increase, and the UAE announced investments worth $ 1.4 trillion over a decade. The Gulf countries play an important role in the success of the Trump administration’s monetary policies, specifically in the oil prices that Trump has asked Saudi Arabia and OPEC to reduce, by increasing production and reviewing OPEC Plus’ decision to reduce production by 2 million barrels per day since October 2022.
In fact, lowering oil prices is a pivotal factor in Trump’s monetary plan, along with its pressure on the US Federal Reserve to lower interest rates, which leads to lower commodity prices and increased movement of producers and consumers, and in the end supported the growth of US industries, which the Trump administration believes will gain additional momentum after imposing tariffs on the countries of the world. In this context, the goals of the OPEC+ countries intersected with Trump’s financial agenda, as eight countries agreed on a gradual plan to raise their oil production, starting with an increase of 411 thousand barrels in June 2025.
Moreover, oil prices are intertwined with the geopolitical conflicts, especially in the Russian-Ukrainian war, where Washington views Russian oil imports as a source of funding for the war, and Trump links price reductions to increased pressure on Moscow, to push the Russian-Ukrainian talks towards positive results. Saudi Arabia hosted the first round of U.S.-sponsored talks between the two countries on March 23-24, and meetings between Russian and U.S. officials in February 2025
It can be said that the three Gulf countries succeeded in maintaining Russian-Ukrainian channels of communication throughout the war, through their roles in the exchange of prisoners, including the UAE mediation in March 2025, which resulted in the release of about 350 prisoners from both sides, and the Qatari mediation in February 2025, which re-reunited a number of Russian and Ukrainian children with their families. In fact, the three Gulf states have gone through wide challenges, foremost among which is the adherence of the administration of former US President Joe Biden and European countries to sanctions imposed on Russia, and support Ukraine militarily as a priority to pressure to stop the war. But with U.S. President Donald Trump pressuring both Russia and Ukraine to stop the war, the war is likely to see an imminent breakthrough, given several indications, including: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal on May 10, 2025, to negotiate directly with Kiev without preconditions, after two rounds of indirect talks in Saudi Arabia (March 23–24, 2025), and Turkey (April 15–16, 2025).
Trump Tour: Context and Priorities
Trump’s visit to the three Gulf countries comes in a changing regional context, in which those countries, along with Washington, play a pivotal role, whether in the file of the war in the Gaza Strip, the change in Syria, or the transformation witnessed by Lebanon. It is true that the Gulf countries and other Arab countries opposed US President Donald Trump’s proposals on the displacement of the people of the Gaza Strip in January 2025, and presented an alternative plan that includes the gradual reconstruction of the Strip while retaining its residents, and was adopted at the Arab summit held in Cairo in early March 2025, but Washington’s ability to adjust the changing regional landscape without returning to the Gulf countries, Egypt and Jordan is very difficult and unusual in America’s policies towards the Middle East.
During his first administration, Arab states were part of Trump’s orientation in the region, especially with regard to the Palestinian issue. Opposition to Jordan and Egypt has hindered the pursuit of Trump’s peace plan, known as the “Deal of the Century,” while multilateral action has been instrumental in deterring Israeli policies. The Abraham Accords between the UAE, Bahrain and Israel in September 2022 prompted the latter to suspend its plans to annex the Jordan Valley, according to the joint statement of US President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, then Crown Prince, following the agreement. While these positions reflect Washington’s adherence to multilateral policies regionally, they also illustrate some of the U.S.-Israel differences. Washington is seeking to translate the recent regional transformations and the outcome of the war in the Gaza Strip and the secondary fronts into regional-level strategic political gains, especially those related to Arab-Israeli relations, the expansion of normalization agreements, and the acquisition of concessions from Iran on its nuclear program.
But unilateral Israeli moves are counterproductive to Israel’s regional acceptance, the U.S. presence in the region, and puts Washington in the middle of a vicious cycle of attrition that Trump seeks to narrow down, while Israel expands it. Israel is also trying to impose its visions for the future of the region by military force against its opponents and show power against the rest of the countries of the region. The war in the Gaza Strip resumed on March 17, 2025, after it reached a ceasefire agreement with Hamas on January 19, 2025, which was supervised by Donald Trump before his inauguration. On May 4, 2025, the Israeli cabinet approved a plan to expand operations in Gaza. The signs of this divergence have emerged in the U.S. preliminary agreement with the Houthis to halt the mutual attacks on May 6, 2025, the outcome of which does not include Israel. The disparity also emerged in U.S. negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, of which four rounds were held in April and May 2025, despite Israeli pressure to launch a decisive military strike against Iran’s nuclear program. This disparity has cost the US administration itself, as the clash between the supporters of the negotiations and the supporters of the military strikes has escalated, leading to the dismissal of National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, and threatening further cracks within the administration.
Intersection of U.S. Gulf Interests
The importance of Trump’s visit to the three Gulf states comes in view of what those countries, along with other Arab countries, can present to the Trump administration’s broad program locally, internationally and regionally. While domestic and international issues have been discussed in the past, the three countries have the status and potential to contribute to the most important issues for the Trump administration toward the Middle East: Iranian foreign policy, its weapons nuclear program, Arab-Israeli relations, especially in the framework of economic and military cooperation, and U.S. policies toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These three issues are related to each other, and while the war has achieved what can be achieved in the region, from the reduction of the role of armed entities without states, and the decline of Iran’s presence and influence in the region, the region is currently on the cusp of a reshaping of the balance of power and its future features. In fact, while the Gulf states and the region are watching Israel’s moves and trying to assert their influence and dominance, they also recognize that Israel’s continued support for this, and Washington’s support for it, will eventually clash with its requirements and perceptions. This directly affects files such as the Saudi normalization with Israel, which now includes the files of normalization with Syria and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia maintains its position in linking normalization with Israel to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, and in September 2024 launched an international coalition to implement the two-state solution. In addition to the pivotal role of the Gulf and Arab states on the next day of the war in the Gaza Strip, whether in the equations of security or reconstruction, the UAE has identified the establishment of a Palestinian state as a condition for supporting the “day after” of the war, including its readiness to join a multinational force in the Gaza Strip, according to UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan on September 14, 2024.
It is noteworthy that the Gulf-American rapprochement on the future of the region and the Palestinian issue has become more homogeneous than compared to the Israeli-American position. Washington has created a parallel path with the participation of Arab countries, such as Washington’s announcement on May 6, 2024, of the merger of the Office of Palestinian Affairs with the US Embassy in Jerusalem. It was followed by Reuters’s May 7 signaling of discussions to establish an interim U.S. administration in the Gaza Strip with the help of Palestinian technocrats, and then Hamas’s announcement of the release of U.S.-Israeli soldier Idan Alexander on May 12 after negotiations with the U.S. administration, coinciding with Trump’s visit to the region. In addition to Riyadh’s arrangement for a meeting between Hussein al-Sheikh, who was appointed deputy Palestinian president on April 26, and Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Whitkov in January 2025 as part of the procedures to enable the Palestinian Authority to manage the Gaza Strip, and Hussein al-Sheikh, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, on his first foreign visit after his appointment on May 8, 2025. In addition to the Gulf and Arab role in other important files, including Syria and Lebanon, in which Washington relies on multilateral work with countries with which it has strategic relations, especially Turkey, Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia also plays a role in rearranging relations between Syria and Lebanon, where in March 2025 it sponsored an agreement to demarcate and coordinate the common border between the two countries. Qatar plays a contributing role to financial stability, providing Damascus with a monthly grant of $29 million to finance the salaries of public sector employees, after it received a U.S. exemption from sanctions. The Arab Gulf countries are integrated into a single vision on the unity of Syria; the UAE received the Sharia on April 13, 2025, and despite Abu Dhabi’s denial of what was quoted by the site “France 24” quoted three informed sources to Reuters, that the UAE has opened an unannounced channel of communication between Israel and Syria focused on security and intelligence files, but the Syrian Interim Government aims to reduce tensions and calm Israeli concerns
Expected Results of the Visit
The results of the visit will be closely related to the priorities of the US administration, domestic and international, and those related to the Middle East, whether in its repercussions on the economic and financial messages that Trump will provide to the Americans, or in Trump’s orientations calling for peace and reducing the US military character in exchange for focusing on American protectionism. This means breakthroughs in ongoing conflicts, whether on the European continent or the Middle East and the Far East. While Israel contradicts these trends by trying to push the Trump administration’s program towards its narrowest limits, the three Gulf states can and seem ready to take the initiative in supporting it at various economic and political levels.
Thus, the economic dimension of the visit, including contracts, investment promises, defense and arms deals, will occupy a large part of Trump’s post-visit focus. But unlike his first visit to his administration, which was based on the economy, the three countries will provide Trump with what he needs to market, especially in light of the temporary setback he suffered after his decisions to raise tariffs on the countries of the world, which compounded fears of the entry of the US and global economy into recession, and then face a wave of demonstrations against his policies in several US cities during April 2025.
On the other hand, Trump will be required to provide positions and declarations commensurate with the requirements of those countries, whether in the US position on Syria, or related to the war in the Gaza Strip, or the general Palestinian issue. It is clear that the US move on the war in the Gaza Strip has accelerated before Trump’s visit, as it was announced that there are direct negotiations between Washington and Hamas, during which the US envoy, Steve Whitkov, presented a proposal for a partial deal to release 10 prisoners in exchange for a 70-day cessation of hostilities, during which a final deal is negotiated. The proposal received initial Israeli approval, which was the direction of the delegation of Israeli negotiations to Doha on May 13, 2025, in conjunction with the program of Trump’s visit to the region, which means that Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire from Saudi Arabia seems possible. In general, the size of these positions and declarations is not only revolved around the trends of these events, but is based on the Gulf States’ balance of their political and diplomatic effectiveness in the face of Israeli military and escalatory measures, and limits the results of their unilateral actions and even puts political costs on them.
In fact, the most prominent thing that the visit can produce is the return to the region before October 7, 2023 in terms of peace, reconciliation and calm paths, with a fundamental difference: a decline in the roles of armed groups and entities below the countries, especially Iran’s proxies, and thus the reduction of Iranian foreign policy, which was characterized during the first Trump administration by escalation against the United States and the countries of the region. This trend would embarrass the Israeli government and its president, Benjamin Netanyahu, hinder the plans of his extremist ministers, and put them in a confrontation with the Israeli interior.
Finally, not all the results of the visit may be announced, but it will be an important occasion in reversing the regional trend towards the perpetuation of conflicts, and the development of Arab-American mechanisms in the files of wars and factors of instability, whether in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon or Syria
