Eurasia Press & News
The US Senatorial model can pave the way for constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina that satisfies European human rights law and the concerns of the fractious parties. Instead of abolishing the country’s House of Peoples – the Senate-like upper chamber designed to protect collective rights – a Trump Plan could change the way its members are elected. As in each US state, voters in each Federation Canton will directly elect a set number of representatives to the state-level House of Peoples or Senate. Voters in Republika Srpska would follow suit, also directly electing their ‘Senators’.
Under a Trump Plan, no longer would these representatives carry an ethnic identifier, or be selected through cumbersome, cascading parliamentary exercises. The existing demographic distribution across the Federation cantons would, informally, ensure that the numerically fewer Croats will choose ‘their’ representatives.
Crucially, the Trump Plan would introduce a high threshold in the House of Peoples (or Senate) to elect the country’s new prime minister, the most powerful position in the reformed government apparatus. The steep threshold would protect the smaller Croats from being swamped by Bosniak votes, as is currently the case within the country’s tripartite presidency.
This practice, in which the larger Bosniak polity has repeatedly chosen the Croat member of the presidency, has damaged the goal of moving Bosnia and Herzegovina towards a civic state – underscoring the fears of Croats and Serbs about the dangers of a majoritarian model.
Echoing past reform bids, the Trump Plan would transfer virtually all powers from the presidency, allowing for a single, symbolic president who would have to appeal to voters across the country to win office. Trump could incorporate descending thresholds or other mechanisms to prevent endless obstruction of the formation of a new government.
Political parties and civil society would have their say on the Trump Plan – within limits. Seizing the urgency of the current crisis – and the failure of past bids for consensus – the Trump administration would present the final package in take-it-or-leave-it fashion.
Trump could deal with spoilers through his trademark bombast, backed up by coercion. If Dodik balks, continuing to promote secession, the US and its allies would back Bosnian institutions to execute the warrant for his arrest. Other Serb parties could blame Dodik for creating the conditions for American-sponsored constitutional reform.
NATO, which bombed the Bosnian Serb Army in the run-up to the Dayton negotiations, could address residual Serb insecurities. In the past, Serb leaders, including Dodik, recognized that joining the Alliance bolsters internal as well as external security.
There would be no need for Trump to discard this fundamental truth simply because Dodik is now in Putin’s pocket. The US president and real estate magnate could also drive through a deal on defense property, a longstanding obstacle to advancing Bosnia’s NATO path. Serb antipathy toward NATO would soon diminish along with fears of renewed fighting.
The Trump Plan would spur the EU from its slumbering, let-the-Americans-handle-it posture. Recognizing Washington’s determination to move forward with a Bosnia breakthrough, French President Emmanuel Macron could offer to again formalise the agreement in Paris, as was done shortly after the original Dayton Agreement was signed in 1995.
Macron could achieve the long-sought closure of the Office of the High Representative by persuading his EU colleagues to delegate sanctions powers over Bosnia to the EU’s foreign minister-equivalent. No longer would pro-Russian EU leaders or weak-kneed member states stop the EU from swift punishment of brazenly recalcitrant Bosnian figures. The US, of course, would retain its own sanctions powers in Bosnia and the region.
As for lithium, the Trump administration could apply lessons from the EU’s stumbles in Serbia. Fierce public opposition has thwarted every effort to convince the Serbian public of the benefits of mining lithium. The Trump Plan would include a mechanism for meaningful citizen oversight, drawn – unlike the Dayton model – from across the ethno-national divide. Financial incentives and investment deals would, naturally, infuse the Trump approach – and inspire Bosnian citizens to stay in their depopulating country..
Although the stakes are smaller in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Ukraine or Iran, so are the obstacles. No party has a nuclear weapons program, massive fossil fuel reserves or dominant army. A flawed, war-ending agreement is the main driver of stasis. If he and his team invest their energies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Trump can succeed where his predecessors failed or gave up altogether.
