Iran Update, May 22, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

A visit to southeastern Iran by a senior Iranian officer illustrates Tehran’s security concerns over anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran. Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri inspected air, naval, land, and air defense forces in Sistan and Baluchistan Province from May 21 to 22.[1] Bagheri stated during his visit that “takfiri groups”—a term used by Iran to refer to Salafi-Jihadi organizations like Jaish al Adl—threaten the security of Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[2] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi armed group that has historically targeted Iranian security personnel and infrastructure in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Iran has taken steps to target anti-regime militant groups following an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[3]

Bagheri may have also met with air defense and naval units to discuss new Iranian operations planning for the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz and threats to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Bagheri previously traveled to southern Iran on May 12 to discuss new deployments to the Nazeat Islands as part of a new Iranian operational concept for attacking vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.[4] Likely Iranian and Iranian-linked vessels have behaved abnormally in and around the straits in recent days after his visit by issuing distress calls and harassing merchant vessels.[5] Bagheri could have discussed similar issues during this visit. Senior Iranian officials also expressed concern about US B2 Spirit stealth bomber deployments to Diego Garcia in March 2025, which Iranian officials appeared to interpret as a threat to Iran’s nuclear facilities.[6] Several Iranian officers have traveled throughout Iran to inspect air defenses in April and May 2025, which CTP-ISW assesses is a part of Iranian preparations to defend against an Israeli or US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Recent Iranian statements suggest that key Iranian leaders are considering moving nuclear material to unspecified “secure” locations to protect nuclear material from a strike after recent leaks about a potential Israeli strike. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser and former Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani suggested on April 10 that that Iran could transfer enriched uranium to “secure locations” if the United States and Israel continue to make military threats.”[7] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened on May 22 that Iran will take “special measures” to preemptively protect its nuclear facilities amid recent Israeli threats to strike Iranian nuclear facilities.[8] Araghchi and Shamkhani‘s statements indicate that Iran is considering moving enriched uranium specifically. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently able to monitor Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles stored in declared sites. Iran appears to be responding to widespread leaks about a potential impending Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.[9]

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Security Perceptions: A visit to southeastern Iran by a senior Iranian officer illustrates Tehran’s security concerns over anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran. The officer was probably meeting with air defense and naval units to discuss new Iranian operations planning for the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz and threats to Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Iranian Nuclear Program: Recent Iranian statements suggest that key Iranian leaders are considering moving nuclear material to unspecified “secure” locations to protect nuclear material from a strike after recent leaks about a potential Israeli strike. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently able to monitor Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles stored in declared sites.  

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian Defense Ministry showcased Iranian defense equipment at the 12th International Exhibition of Arms and Military Machinery (MILEX-2025) in Minsk, Belarus, on May 22, likely as part of an Iranian effort to promote and sell its weapons systems.[10] The exhibition included 150 companies from Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India. Iranian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Brigadier General Reza Talaei Nik met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko on the sidelines of the exhibition. Senior Iranian officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, have repeatedly stated that Iran aims to export military capabilities to ”friendly” countries.[11] The Iranian Defense Ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements.[12] Iran’s efforts to increase its military and defense exports come amid the US ”maximum pressure” campaign aimed at driving Iranian oil exports to zero.[13] Iran may seek to increase its military exports to offset the effects of US sanctions, though these exports cannot replace the loss of oil revenue. The Iranian Defense Ministry reportedly showcased more than 50 military systems at the MILEX-25, including drones, rockets, and loitering munitions.[14] Iran separately has begun efforts to establish a military drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[15]

The Iranian rial appreciated from 827,500 rial to one US dollar on May 21 to 843,000 rial to one US dollar on May 22.[16]

Syria

Recent criminal incidents underscore the challenges faced by the transitional government and Druze forces in maintaining security in Suwayda Province. Local armed groups have engaged in “repeated” incidents of theft and other various criminal activities in Suwayda in recent days.[17] An armed group stormed Suwayda Governor Mustafa Bakour’s office on May 21 to demand that Bakour release a relative that security services had detained on vehicle theft charges.[18] Bakour ordered the relative’s release under duress, and the Men of Dignity and Mountain Brigade—two prominent Druze militias—intervened to engage the local group and move Bakour to safety.[19] Suwayda’s three most prominent Druze sheikhs announced that they instructed local Druze militias to reinforce local police forces in order to improve law and order in response to the incident.[20] Druze leaders and the Syrian government agreed on May 1 to allow Suwaydawi-led police forces to operate under Damascus’s Interior Ministry as part of a security compromise following tensions over attacks on the Druze community in Jaramana, Sahnaya, and Suwayda.[21] Many of these police units do not appear to have been activated at this time.

The government’s reliance on prominent Druze militias to resolve a security incident involving the governor and the need to deploy these militias across the province to bolster police presence suggests that the police forces that do exist are limited in capability, undermanned, and therefore ineffective.[22] A Men of Dignity leader deployed outside Suwayda’s Criminal Security building on May 22 complained that the government has not provided local police institutions with any logistical support or equipment since the May 1 agreement.[23] Druze factions’ deployments and the lack of a strong police presence also suggest that Damascus may be facing challenges in integrating Druze fighters into security forces or coordinating between different new units. The May 1 agreement did not explicitly require the main Druze factions in Suwayda Province to disarm and join state security forces.[24]

Syrian Kurds and some Druze are taking political and military action due to distrust in the government. Democratic Union Party (PYD) leader Aldar Khalil announced in an interview with Kurdish media on May 22 that the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) will represent the Kurdish interests in upcoming negotiations with Damascus.[25] The PYD’s military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), is part of the SDF. Khalil said that the AANES delegation intends to negotiate with Damascus over the structure of Syria’s system of government, army, and possible amendments to the Syrian Constitutional Declaration.[26] Kurdish political parties, including the PYD and rival party Kurdish National Council (KNC), recently issued a unified political position and called for a federal Syrian structure that would create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria in late April.[27] Khalil’s summary of Kurdish priorities ahead of upcoming talks is consistent with the post-Assad positions of Kurdish groups on autonomy and decentralization. The Kurdish groups remain very concerned about the concentration of power around Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and the government’s de-prioritization of Kurdish security and rights.

A new Druze faction known as the “National Guard Forces” recently formed in Suwayda Province, likely due to continued distrust between some Druze and local Sunni communities and the government’s continued security challenges.[28] The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied any connection to the group on May 19.[29] Syrian activist Malik Abu Khayr told UAE-based media on May 19 that Druze leaders founded the National Guard to “lead the security and military scene in Suwayda” after recent attacks on the Druze community in Jaramana, Sahnaya, and Suwayda Province.[30] Abu Khayr called on Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra to ”end the control of jihadist groups that attack [Suwayda] city.”[31] Abu Khayr is likely referring to the likely Sunni militias that continued to conduct attacks targeting Druze populations in Suwayda Province since the Jaramana-Sahnaya tensions ended on May 1.[32] It is unclear how this group is tied to Abu Khayr, who has led the Suwayda-based political party and armed group Hizb Liwa al Souri from France since 2021.[33] Hizb Liwa al Souri’s military wing also focused on protecting Suwayda Province from external threats, such as Iranian-backed militias and ISIS.[34] The National Guard Forces may be formed from some remnants of Hizb Liwa al Souri’s military wing, given Abu Khayr’s knowledge of the group. Abu Khayr also claimed that prominent Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri’s son founded the group, but a Syrian media outlet said that it could not confirm this detail.[35]

A Turkish journalist reported on May 21 that Israel and Turkey continue to discuss the “Palmyra line” and that Israel may be “amenable” to Turkish deployments north of Palmyra, Homs Province.[36] Israel conducted airstrikes on two air bases near Palmyra in March and April 2025 that Turkish military teams had planned to visit ahead of planned Turkish construction at the bases.[37] Turkey and Israel reportedly established a de-confliction line in April 2025 to prevent future misunderstandings or military incidents between Turkey and Israel in Syria.[38] A Turkish journalist for Middle East Eye, citing an unspecified source familiar with Israel-Turkey negotiations, reported that the Israelis are ”comfortable” with the deployment of Turkish infantry and armor to Syria.[39] Israel is reportedly more concerned about Turkey’s deployment of air defense and radar systems in Syria, particularly near Palmyra.[40] Two unspecified sources previously told Middle East Eye in early April that Turkey planned to possibly deploy Hisar and S-400 air defense systems at the base.[41] The Hisar-A and Hisar-O systems are Turkish short- and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, respectively.[42] The S-400 is a longer-range system that can engage targets up to 400 kilometers.[43] Turkey does not appear to have attempted to install air defense systems at Syrian bases since Israel struck the bases in March and April 2025.[44]

The General Security Service (GSS) conducted an extrajudicial killing of two alleged ISIS members in Idlib Province, on May 21. GSS forces arrested two alleged ISIS members accused of killing a MoD officer in the town of Kafar Sajnah, Idlib Province.[45] Footage posted on May 21 appeared to show members of the GSS beating the two alleged ISIS members after the GSS detained the ISIS fighters.[46] The GSS members executed the two alleged ISIS members and posted images of the dead ISIS fighters on social media.[47]

The Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed al Bashir and Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar signed an energy agreement on May 22.[48] The agreement stipulates that Turkey will export six million cubic meters of gas and one thousand megawatts of electricity to Syria per day.[49] Bashir said that energy infrastructure to facilitate the energy imports into Syria will be operational by the end of the year.[50]

Iraq

Former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al Halbousi’s Progress Party announced on May 22 that it will run unilaterally in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[51] Halbousi and Khamis al Khanjar, a long-time Halbousi rival, reportedly agreed in early May 2025 to compete in the elections together or form a post-election alliance.[52] Halbousi’s party could still join Khanjar’s after the election, however. Khanjar and Halbousi‘s other historical rivals are members of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, which formed in early January 2025 and has explicitly supported long-held Sunni political demands.[53] This announcement could indicate that the Halbousi-Khanjar agreement failed. CTP-ISW assessed on April 28 that Halbousi may be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework to unseat current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, who has also long opposed Halbousi.[54] Halbousi’s party could form a post-election alliance with Shia Coordination Framework parties to accumulate more power. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis conducted two separate ballistic missile attacks on Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on May 22 as part of the Houthi campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel.[55] The IDF intercepted both missiles.[56] Some international airlines have temporarily suspended flights to Israel through mid-June 2025 due to concerns of Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport.[57]

The Houthis also claimed two separate drone strikes targeting unspecified Israeli targets in Tel Aviv and Haifa on May 22.[58] The Houthis said on May 19 that they would target Haifa Port in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes on Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen.[59] Haifa is a key Israeli economic hub and port of entry. The Houthis could theorize that attacks on Haifa support their objective to economically isolate Israel in retaliation for its operations in the Gaza Strip by damaging the Israeli economy.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Unspecified Hamas and Arab officials confirmed that Israel killed Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Mohammed Sinwar on May 13. The Wall Street Journal quoted the officials on May 22, who stated that Sinwar was attending a meeting with other senior Hamas commanders at the time of the strike.[60] The sources confirmed that Hamas’ Rafah Brigade commander Mohammed Shabana was also killed in the airstrike. Shabana had served as the Rafah Brigade commander since the beginning of the October 7 War.[61] Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al-Din Haddad is one of the frontrunners expected to replace Mohammed Sinwar.[62] Haddad is the only surviving Hamas brigade commander who was alive at the start of the war.[63]

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.