Bottom Line Up Front
The Trump administration’s air strike campaign against the Houthis is degrading the group’s missile and drone capability, but has failed to force the group to capitulate.
By targeting Houthi officials, the U.S. strikes have begun to cause significant civilian casualties, prompting criticism from U.S. and global organizations.
Yemeni forces want to try to advance on the ground against the Houthis, taking advantage of the U.S. strikes, but appear ill-prepared for a major ground offensive.
Gulf Arab rulers are concerned that escalation against the Houthis might provoke Houthi retaliation and derail the steady improvement in Gulf-Iran relations.
In mid-March, President Trump ordered a campaign of sustained and intensive air strikes on Yemen’s Houthi (Ansarallah) movement. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth pledged an “unrelenting” campaign until the group stops attacking vessels in the Red Sea, explaining: “This campaign is about freedom of navigation and restoring deterrence. The minute the Houthis say, ‘We’ll stop shooting at your ships, we’ll stop shooting at your drones,’ this campaign will end.” In separate social media and other announcements, Trump added that the strikes were also intended to deter and pressure the Houthis’ main state backer, Iran. Trump has threatened military action and deployed U.S. military assets in an effort to compel Iran to negotiate new limitations on its nuclear program, and those talks are underway.
The escalation against the Houthis has yielded mixed results to date. According to regional diplomats and U.S. officials, the multiple precision strikes each day, targeting a wide range of Houthi-controlled installations, have degraded the movement’s arsenal of Iran-supplied missiles, armed drones, and unmanned surface vessels. U.S. aircraft have also targeted Houthi commanders, weapons specialists, port operations, and energy assets. According to regional officials, the U.S. attacks have not only eliminated Houthi weaponry and reduced the group’s revenue but also deprived the Houthis of some of the expertise they need to assemble and operate sophisticated arms and technology provided by Iran.
However, the U.S. effort has not, to date, caused the movement to capitulate and announce an unconditional halt to its attacks on commercial shipping or U.S. and allied naval vessels in the Red Sea, or on Israel. The Houthis have launched several missiles at Israel since Tel Aviv, in concert with a return to combat in Gaza, began blockading the flow of humanitarian aid to the enclave on March 2. The Houthi launches have not caused any significant damage to date. The group also has claimed to target U.S. aircraft carriers in the region, although without striking the heavily defended vessels. And, the Houthis have continued to announce that their air defense assets have downed U.S.-armed MQ-9 Reaper drones over Yemen. However, the frequency of overall Houthi attacks has diminished markedly since the U.S. strike campaign began.
The expanded U.S. target set has, as expected, come with significant costs to Yemeni civilian lives. The United Nations assessed that casualties (both those killed or injured), tripled from February to March – to a total of 162. Another source, the Britain-based watchdog organization Airwars, assessed that the UN figures included between 27 and 55 Yemeni civilians killed in March, and the estimated toll in April to date is believed to be much higher. A U.S. strike two weeks ago on a fuel depot in the Yemeni port of Ras Isa killed more than 70 people, according to Houthi leaders and local news reports. The U.S. Defense Department announced the Ras Isa strike was necessary “to eliminate this source of fuel for the Iran-backed Houthi terrorists and deprive them of illegal revenue that has funded Houthi efforts to terrorize the entire region for over 10 years…This strike was not intended to harm the people of Yemen, who rightly want to throw off the yoke of Houthi subjugation and live peacefully.”
The Houthi resilience, coupled with mounting civilian casualties, confronts Trump officials with a decision whether to escalate or pursue diplomatic options that might persuade the Houthis to alter their behavior. The Sultanate of Oman, which hosts a Houthi representative office, along with Qatar, the UN, and other global mediators, argues for a political solution to the Yemen conflict as a viable pathway to end the Houthis’ attacks. The Omanis and other mediators believe any solution should build on the ceasefire achieved between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces in April 2022 that expired in October but has held informally. Some advocate a formula for unifying Yemen similar to that advocated by UN mediators in Libya, where UN officials are pressing rival factions to form an interim government of national unity, followed by national elections. Gulf leaders also view the U.S.-Iran nuclear talks as an opportunity to extract a firm pledge from Iran to cease its arms and technology supplies to the group. Other sources say influential U.S. elected officials close to Trump argue for de-escalation, warning of engaging in an “endless war” with the Houthis, in the process depleting U.S. weapons stockpiles that might be needed in the event of a conflict with China.
However, a wide range of press reporting indicates some Trump officials are pushing for escalation against the group. Trump, as an early action of his second term, restored the Houthis to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), suggesting the Trump team sees little room for diplomacy with the group. In mid-April, the Wall Street Journal reported U.S. officials are “open” to supporting a ground operation by “local forces” in Yemen – a reference to units of the ousted but still internationally-recognized Republic of Yemen Government, a separatist, UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), and various other militias operating on the western coast. CNN and other media have been reporting since March that the anti-Houthi factions were trying to assemble a force of 80,000 fighters to retake Hodeidah Governorate, which is crucial for the Houthis economically. The province is home to the ports of Hodeida and Salif, the Ras Issa fuel terminal, and additional key military infrastructure used by the Houthis in their Red Sea attacks.
The ports receive up to 80 percent of Yemen’s imports, providing crucial economic resources to the Houthi regime, and serve as the main entryway for Iranian arms and technology supplies to the group. However, there are no indications that an anti-Houthi force of the size necessary to achieve these objectives has been assembled, to date. Any Yemeni force seeking to advance on the port would also require U.S. naval and air support and intelligence, and probably also a supply of U.S. arms. U.S. officials have told the Wall Street Journal that no decision to back an anti-Houthi ground offensive has been finalized, nor are U.S. officials participating in any planning by the anti-Houthi groups. However, the paper reported that U.S. private contractors are providing advice to Yemeni factions.
Other experts assess that assuring Western security requires not only capturing Hodeidah but also retaking the capital, Sanaa, and eventually pushing the Houthis to their northern base of Saada. Bloomberg has reported that anti-Houthi forces and their Gulf backers, primarily the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have proposed a broader, multi-front attack that includes Yemen’s west coast as well as efforts to retake Sanaa. However, few, if any, military observers or U.S. officials consider the anti-Houthi forces capable of succeeding on that scale, even with substantial U.S help. In addition to their logistical and combat deficiencies, anti-Houthi forces are deeply divided – splits that hindered their past Saudi and Emirati-backed ground action against the Houthis. The Republic of Yemen Government forces are supported primarily by Saudi Arabia, whereas the UAE has backed the STC, whose power base is in Aden. The UAE also supports several militias operating on the west coast, commanded by Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, vice president of the Yemeni government’s ruling Presidential Leadership Council. Saleh is said to control the National Resistance Force, the Southern Giants Brigade, and the Tihama Resistance militias that collectively field more than 50,000 fighters based in Taiz governorate, according to Bloomberg.
The Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, remain opposed to Houthi rule in Yemen but have sought to extricate themselves from the Yemen war in order to focus on their respective economic diversification programs. Both Gulf states do not want to provoke the Houthis to the point where the group resumes its missile and drone attacks on Gulf infrastructure targets. Nor do they want to antagonize Iran, with which the Gulf states have been improving relations. Yet, the U.S.-led degradation of the Houthi missile arsenal has diminished Gulf state concerns about Houthi retaliation, giving Saudi and UAE leaders more confidence to try to support efforts to end Houthi rule in Sanaa. U.S. officials have told journalists that the Emiratis advanced the proposal to try to recapture Hodeidah. Still, Gulf state support for major ground action against the Houthis will likely depend on whether Trump officials are willing to assure Gulf leaders that it will support the Yemeni offensive until it succeeds.