Eurasia Press & News
The first 100 days of Donald Trump’s second presidency appear to have permanently re-defined European security. In response, politicians in Brussels and other European capitals have doubled down on the importance of unity amidst on-going uncertainty. There is an emphasis on operating in a calculated and strategic way to maximize the potential of the EU and its member states.
Essentially, EU enthusiasts see the profound changes imposed by the Trump administration as a way to resurrect enthusiasm for the European project. Even though many leaders have demonstrated maximal courtesy in their engagements with President Trump and in their public statements, it is a broadly accepted fact that the EU has no choice but to look for alternatives.
In recent weeks and months, the EU has stepped up the intensity of its engagements with the ‘East’. In this context, by ‘East’, one primarily means two groups of countries. Those associated with the EU’s long-term ‘Eastern Partnership’ programme, which includes the three South Caucasus countries, but also Central Asian ones, engagement with which carries as much geopolitical value as it does economic, given the simultaneous rise of Chinese influence in the region.
Hence, even though, in practice, the European Union has lacked consistency in implementing its pledges, the underlying mission that is uniting Brussels with its most influential member states appears to be the desire to upgrade vital existing partnerships that will help off-set the impacts of a weakened transatlantic alliance. This is already observable in practice, with the EU rapidly re-visiting several of its relationships in response to a geopolitical alteration as major as the foreign policy re-direction pursued by the Trump Administration.
However, before the EU re-engages such countries and upgrades or re-defines its cooperation frameworks, it must address some of its previous failures which caused significant damage to its reputation. This, first and foremost, applies to Azerbaijan, a country towards which EU institutions have for too long demonstrated insincerity and double standards, approaches that are in theory contradictory to the EU’s founding principles.
Azerbaijan-EU relations: unsolved matters
After Azerbaijan liberated its territories in 2020, the EU could not effectively seize the unique momentum for peace failing to positively impact the emerging security architecture of the South Caucasus. It failed to foster momentum for normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan after the ending of the Armenian occupation of the Karabakh region. Quite the contrary, some of the EU policies deepened mistrust between the sides and diverted the peace track away from its most crucial substance. This includes the regular supply of military aid to Armenia, both via the European Peace Facility but also on behalf of individual member states like France, and also the establishment of a border mission, the aims and operations of which remain extremely vague and generate profound concern in Azerbaijan.
Most notably, anti-Azerbaijani remarks by Josep Borrell, the EU’s previous High Representative for Foreign Affairs, have on more than one occasion steered antagonism and mistrust in the region, creating a sense of disappointment given the country’s determination to transform the region into one of mutually beneficial cooperation rather than confrontation. Moreover, some specific EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, have shown disregard for both the country’s territorial integrity but also the principle of non-interference into domestic affairs, adopting resolutions that contradict reality.
Azerbaijan, however, appreciated the good offices and mediation efforts of the former European Council President Charles Michel between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Brussels format of the peace talks was very effective as the negotiations within this format played a critical role in Armenia’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to meet via Michel’s mediation until the intervention of the French President Emmanuel Macron that spelled an end to this format in October 2023.
The realities on the ground have changed since then. There is no need for any mediation from the third parties, including the EU. Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed on the draft of the peace treaty, and they seem to be on the right path towards resolution of the remaining disputes. The EU’s support to these bilateral efforts would positively contribute to the peace efforts in the South Caucasus. It is widely accepted in the South Caucasus that cooperation with the EU in various spheres, particularly the economy, connectivity, and energy is critical for peace and prosperity of the region.
A much-needed reset
Nevertheless, on April 25, Kaja Kallas, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, visited Azerbaijan and met with President Ilham Aliyev. This development was met with great enthusiasm in Baku and is one that possesses a wide array of implications for the parties involved but also the South Caucasus more generally. The constructive nature of the discussion, as reported by the Azerbaijani side, has instilled fresh optimism for a new page in EU-Azerbaijan relations. After all, the economic foundation of the relationship is undeniable, with both sides benefitting from extensive ties in the energy sector and beyond. Azerbaijan currently supplies gas to eight EU member states and has played a key role in helping the European Union diversify its energy portfolio amidst its on-going confrontation with Russia at the heart of which is an attempt to end reliance on Russian gas.
However, episodic and one sphere-oriented cooperation does not align with Azerbaijan’s foreign policy strategy. To the contrary, a key condition upon which Azerbaijan enters bilateral and multilateral agreements is the guarantee of reciprocity on behalf of its partner and, crucially, the feeling that the country’s input, which is consistently reliable, inclusive and forward-looking, is valued sufficiently.
There is hope in Azerbaijan that Kallas’ visit will help reset the nature of the relationship, helping eliminate counter-productive attitudes that are slowing down the normalization track and showing insensitivity to Azerbaijani interests. This is arguably as essential as the technical aspect of the visit which focused on accelerating the on-going negotiations between the sides on an updated cooperation agreement, of which 90-95% оf terms have been agreed upon. There is an expectation that with a renewed spirit, a reasonable expectation to have given the initiative demonstrated by the new High Representative, will help intensify negotiations and undo years of a stagnating partnership.
Beyond one country: geopolitical calculations
That said, Kaja Kallas’ trip to Azerbaijan, despite its importance for EU-Azerbaijan relations and the South Caucasus, should not be viewed in isolation from the EU’s broader recent geopolitical steps. The recently held EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand was a confirmation that the EU is well aware of the importance of engaging ‘the East’ more broadly if its foreign policy is to survive the current geopolitical pressures. This strategic decision came almost immediately after the Trump administration began to implement its ‘go at it alone’ approach, altering the essence of the transatlantic relationship and pushing the EU to adopt forward-looking measures that reduced its reliance on Washington.
The decisions adopted during the summit, the holding of which was announced in February 2025 (almost a month after Trump’s inauguration), was a confirmation of this. The EU had engaged in the region previously, but the hosting of a formal summit demonstrates a desire to institutionalize relations with countries that are becoming increasingly relevant in the on-going geopolitical ‘tug of war’. The announcement of a 12 billion euros worth investment package, known as Global Gateway, the renewed focus on the region’s raw materials and establishment of official dialogue on climate issues confirms that Central Asia and the South Caucasus have been identified as essential strategic pillars if the EU is to take matters into its own hands amidst the intensifying confrontation between Washington and Beijing and re-build its foreign policy agency.
An essential caveat
Despite its economic might and status as a primary example of regional cooperation, the EU’s global reputation has taken a hit. Its approach to Azerbaijan is a perfect illustrator of this. A country that has tirelessly defended basic principles of international law (which should in theory be echoed by the EU given its portrayal as a ‘normative power’) and has proven to be a reliable partner in a moment as critical as the aftermath of the Ukraine war, feels consistently under-appreciated. Even though this might speak of a deeper issue at the heart of the organization, described occasionally as ‘excessive supranationalism’ that infringes on national sovereignty, the EU has failed to act fairly and reciprocally in a situation as legally straightforward as the one between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
By correcting past mistakes in its engagements with countries like Azerbaijan, the EU has a unique opportunity to turn a page and make a significant contribution to peace and stability in its Eastern Neighbourhood. Given Azerbaijan’s now unalterable role in a series of projects that will define the EU’s future status as a geopolitical actor, including the Middle Corridor, demonstrating greater sensitivity and appreciation of Azerbaijani interests is fundamental. Azerbaijan long championed this format of conducting relations, based on unwavering mutual respect and comprehensive rather than episodic engagement. If the EU decides to mirror this approach, it would have made a huge step towards re-earning the trust of its Eastern neighbours.
