Key Takeaway: Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors failed to mount a coordinated military and political campaign against the United States in response to the US and Israeli air campaign in Iran between July 12 and 24. Suspected Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched multiple one-way attack drones attacks targeting US positions across Iraq, but these attacks did not represent a coordinated military and political campaign like CTP-ISW observed the militias execute after the October 7 attack. The militias did not claim any attacks, which suggests the militias may have suffered a lack of discipline among lower-ranking fighters or passively allowed fighters to conduct unsanctioned attacks. The political wings of these militias attempted to pressure Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to adopt policies which would restrict US and Israeli freedom to operate in Iraqi airspace, but these efforts focused on long-term solutions like air defense acquisition or symbolic measures in parliament. The Sudani administration continued to engage with the United States and NATO to discuss future partnerships, despite these efforts. The Iraqi militias and their political wings previously tried to combine well-coordinated political and legal maneuvers, information operations, and military attacks to force the United States from Iraq in 2023-2024.
Suspected Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted multiple one-way drone attacks targeting US positions across Iraq between June 12 and 24. An unidentified US official cited by the Wall Street Journal on June 24 stated that unidentified fighters launched two one-way attack drones at US forces stationed at Erbil International Airport.[i] The US official stated that unidentified fighters also launched at least five one-way attack drones at US forces at Baghdad International Airport and Ain al Asad Airbase.[ii] The US official assessed that the drones originated from inside Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to launch an attack campaign targeting US forces in the region if the United States entered the Israel-Iran War, but they did not conduct a well-coordinated or major campaign compared to their attacks on US forces during the October 7 War.[iii] Multiple militias condemned US and Israeli strikes in Iran, but did not claim any attacks. Unidentified US officials cited by the New York Times on June 22 reported that US military and intelligence officials observed indications that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were preparing for attacks on US forces.[iv] The fact that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias did not claim any attacks suggests that the militias may have suffered from a lack of discipline among lower-ranking fighters who attempted to independently launch drone attacks on Israel. Militia leadership may also have allowed fighters to conduct the attacks without publicly sanctioning the attacks.
Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors exerted political pressure on Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to adopt policies that would restrict US and Israeli freedom to operate in Iraqi airspace. Iraqi parliamentarians, primarily members of the loosely aligned pro-Iranian Shia Coordination Framework, held a “consultative” session on June 17 to express solidarity with Iran and call on the Iraqi federal government to take measures to end Israeli violations of Iraqi airspace.[v] Parliament failed to meet the quorum necessary for an extraordinary session on June 17, with only 140 parliamentarians in attendance out of a total of 329 parliamentarians.[vi] Quorum requires at least two-thirds majority, or 220 parliamentarians, to be present to hold a session. Parliamentarians affiliated with Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is comprised of a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, expressed support for Iran during the consultative session and called for popular demonstrations across Iraq. Protesters demonstrated in Baghdad and Khadimiya on June 21 in solidarity with Iran following calls from Shia nationalist cleric Moqtada al Sadr and other Shia politicians to protest Israeli operations in the Middle East.[vii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously leveraged their political wings to advance policies favorable to the militias. The militias’ political wings inaccurately portrayed US self-defense strikes on militia positions in Iraq between October 2023 and February 2024 as ”violations” of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi federal government to remove US forces form Iraq, for example.[viii]
Iranian-backed Badr Organization member Moeen al Kadhimi stated that Iraq must become militarily self-sufficient and called on the Iraqi government to review contracts with partners, including Russia, to purchase advanced air defense systems.[ix] State of Law Coalition member Mohammed Hassan Radi al Shammari called on the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Ministry on June 17 to diversify Iraq’s arms supplies and modernize its air defense systems.[x] Badr Organization member Mahdi Taqi Amerli similarly called on the Iraqi federal government on June 18 to rapidly develop air defense capabilities to prevent US and Israeli freedom of operation in Iraqi airspace.[xi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba called on the Iraqi government on June 19 to permit the PMF to establish a no-fly zone over Iraqi airspace for US and Israeli aircraft and permit the PMF to intercept Israeli jets or missiles that enter Iraqi airspace.[xii]
The Sudani administration has continued to engage US-led International Coalition and NATO in Iraq despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors to end these partnerships. Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji and Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir Shammari held separate meetings with the commander of NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), Major General Christophe Hintzy, on June 25 and 26 to discuss planning and capacity-building programs for the Iraqi Security Forces.[xiii] Araji reaffirmed Iraq’s interest in building a long-term partnership with NMI.[xiv] International military coalitions like NMI and Operation Inherent Resolve support the Iraqi Security Forces in a non-combat role through intelligence, logistics, training, and equipment to enable Iraqi counter-ISIS operations. The Sudani administration has continued to seek military cooperation with the United States and other Western countries, however. NMI launched a “high-level political dialogue” with the Iraqi federal government in August 2024 to build on long-standing cooperation.[xv] The Iraqi Defense Ministry also signed a contract on June 25 with Vectrus Systems LLC, a US defense contractor, for base support services for Iraq’s F-16 program.[xvi] Maintenance for Iraqi F-16s was previously provided by Lockheed Martin, but repeated Iranian-backed Iraqi militia mortar attacks forced Lockheed to evacuate its maintainers in 2021.[xvii]
Nine Iraqi Federal Supreme Court members rescinded their recent resignations on June 30 following disputes about the court’s proceedings.[xviii] Nine Iraqi Federal Supreme Court members resigned on June 19, reportedly due to unspecified “government pressure” regarding multiple court cases.[xix] An informed source told Iraqi media on June 19 that the members resigned in protest against Chief Justice Jassim Mohammed Abboud’s handling of conflicts between the Federal Supreme Court and the Court of Cassation about judicial authority and previous rulings.[xx] An unspecified court official cited by Western media on July 1 stated that the Federal Supreme Court judges accused Abboud of undermining the court’s independence. Abboud is affiliated with State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki and the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[xxi] TCouncil, which is led byZaidan.[xxii] The Federal Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Council have had previous conflicts, including when the Supreme Judicial Council rejected a Federal Supreme Court decision in February 2025.[xxiii] An unspecified court official told Western media on July 1 that Sudani and Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani rejected Abboud’s requests for the Iraqi federal government to discuss the dispute with legal and constitutional experts.[xxiv] Abboud submitted his resignation, citing “health concerns,” on June 23.[xxv] Sudani nominated Deputy President of the Court of Cassation, Ibrahim Hussein, to replace Abboud on June 30.[xxvi]
Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced on June 29 that it could disqualify candidates involved in electoral fraud from participating in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xxvii] IHEC began vetting candidate lists on June 27 after the candidate registration period closed on June 26.[xxviii] This announcement comes after various actors have leveled electoral fraud and corruption accusations against Shia Coordination Framework members, including members of Sudani’s electoral coalition.[xxix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework parties have engaged in various forms of electoral fraud, including by buying votes, in past elections and in the lead up to the November 2025 elections.[xxx] These same Iranian-backed Shia parties have also weaponized various electoral laws to try to sideline political rivals.[xxxi]
Unidentified actors conducted separate drone and rocket attacks targeting the Baiji Oil Refinery in Salah al Din Province and the K1 Airbase near Kirkuk International Airport on June 30.Unidentified fighters launched at least 10 drones at the state-owned al Sumoud Oil Refinery in Baiji, Salah al Din Province, on June 30.[xxxii] An unspecified security source reported on July 1 that Iraqi air defenses shot down one drone near the refinery.[xxxiii] The Iraqi Oil Ministry stated that the attack did not disrupt operations at the refinery.[xxxiv]
Unidentified actors launched four Katyusha rockets at K1 Airbase near Kirkuk International Airport on June 30.[xxxv] Three of the rockets landed inside the K1 Airbase and the fourth landed in a residential neighborhood.[xxxvi] Kirkuk Governor Rebwar Taha claimed that Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militants carried out the rocket attack.[xxxvii] No group has claimed responsibility for either attack.