Eurasia Press & News
America and Israel Can Build a New Regional Order
Five decades ago, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin established the principle that Israel would not allow any country that calls for its destruction to acquire nuclear weapons. And beginning on June 13, it made good on this pledge. Over nearly two weeks, Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities in a campaign it dubbed Operation Rising Lion, seriously damaging dozens of sites across the country. Israel had bombed nuclear reactors before—in Iraq in 1981 and in Syria in 2007—but the Iranian program is much more sophisticated than either Iraq’s or Syria’s was. Its facilities are dispersed, deeply fortified, technologically advanced, and shielded by defenses and deterrence mechanisms, including missile arsenals and proxy forces across the Middle East. Israel’s success is thus a formidable military achievement.
Yet despite its sophisticated program, Iran was on the back foot. Over the past year, many of its proxies and partners, including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, had been decimated or entirely defeated. Iran’s own air defenses were shown to be insufficient. That is partly why Israel, along with the United States, was able to launch the world’s first-ever attack against an advanced, multilayered, and well-protected nuclear program. It also marked the first time the United States helped Israel carry out the Begin Doctrine with force.
More important, it set the scene for diplomacy in the Middle East. With Tehran weaker than it has been in ages, Israel and Washington now have a chance to secure a robust nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic—the best way to permanently end its nuclear program—and perhaps an even more comprehensive political settlement that could reshape the entire region.
THE TIME IS NIGH
Israel’s decision to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities stemmed from a convergence of two factors. The first was simply the mounting threat Iran posed. According to Israeli military intelligence analysts, Iran had been advancing toward a nuclear device and planned to significantly expand its arsenal of ballistic missiles from 3,000 to 8,000 within a few years. Iran had already translated its vision to destroy Israel into concrete plans and operational orders and had funded Hamas, which carried out the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel. The Islamic Republic had also launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel in April and October 2024. After decades of proxy warfare, the two countries came to blows in a direct and open confrontation.
The second factor was Iran’s temporary weakness. Israel, through months of airstrikes and a ground campaign, had severely degraded the Islamic Republic’s most important ally, Hezbollah. The Assad regime, another loyal Iranian friend, had collapsed. And Iran’s air defenses had proven vulnerable during Israeli strikes in 2024. Israel also timed its June attacks on Iranian facilities to coincide with the end of the 60-day window U.S. President Donald Trump had set for nuclear discussions.
As a result, early June was the perfect time for Israel to go beyond the covert action and one-off strikes it had conducted before. The core objectives of Operation Rising Lion were to inflict significant and long-term damage on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, to create the conditions for a better nuclear agreement, and to further degrade Iran’s network of regional proxies. Israel also hoped that the attack would destabilize the Iranian regime, potentially facilitating its collapse, and persuade Washington to act, thereby demonstrating the United States’ commitment to preventing Iranian nuclearization—although these were not formal goals.
Israel destroyed roughly 80 percent of Iran’s air defense batteries.
To achieve its primary aims, Israel began its operations with a precision decapitation strike that killed approximately 20 high-ranking military commanders—including Hossein Salami, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the architect of Iran’s missile strategy; and Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of the armed forces—and over a dozen senior nuclear scientists. Israel then flew more than 1,200 sorties, destroying roughly 80 percent of Iran’s 130 air defense batteries and achieving air dominance over Tehran—one of the most extraordinary accomplishments in the history of aerial warfare.
Israel also thoroughly damaged key Iranian nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Arak; Tehran’s broader nuclear and missile industrial base; and the country’s military infrastructure, such as the headquarters of the IRGC and its Quds Force. In total, Israel dropped more than 4,000 precision-guided munitions on Iran, striking distances as far as 1,400 miles from Israeli bases. The campaign underscored the advantages of high-precision, intelligence-driven, real-time airstrikes on a massive scale.
Israel also destroyed nearly 1,000 of Iran’s approximately 2,500 ballistic missiles and over 200 of Iran’s 450 launchers—another incredible military achievement. Consequently, the number of salvos Iran launched against Israel dropped dramatically over the course of the war, from roughly 100 missiles per day at the beginning of the conflict to an average of just 12 at the end. Israel displayed clear defensive superiority, with its multitiered missile defense architecture—including the Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems—performing impressively against high-speed, heavy warheads. With help from the U.S. military, including its Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, Israel successfully intercepted 86 percent of the nearly 600 Iranian missiles aimed at its territory and 99.5 percent of the 1,000 unmanned aerial vehicles sent its way. Effective early warning systems allowed Israeli civilians to take cover. The Israeli public followed instructions, sheltered promptly, and avoided widespread panic.
Over 40 Iranian warheads did strike Israeli territory, mostly in major cities such as Beersheba, Haifa, and Tel Aviv. These strikes resulted in the death of 29 people, over 3,000 injuries, and damage to buildings that has left over 15,000 Israelis homeless. But as devastating as these losses are, they are a fraction of what the Israeli military had predicted. Moreover, Israel landed roughly 100 times more missiles and bombs on Iran than Iran did on Israel.
THE JURY IS OUT
Evaluating the success of Israel’s operation against Iran’s nuclear project, however, is more an art than a science. It relies on a mosaic of intelligence sources—satellite imagery, diverse sensor data, signals intelligence, cyber surveillance, human assets, and field samples. Any good assessment must look beyond the damage done to individual facilities and examine the cumulative, systemic impacts on a highly complex, multidisciplinary, and multiphase nuclear project.
So far, analysts are divided in their assessment of the effects. Immediately after the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran ended, arguments erupted over the outcome. Trump declared that Iran’s nuclear facilities, particularly those struck by U.S. forces, had been “totally obliterated.” In contrast, a leaked preliminary assessment from the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency suggested the assault had delayed Iran’s nuclear program by just a few months. The Trump administration dismissed these claims as politically motivated, and senior U.S. intelligence officials stated the program had suffered “severe” damage. Ultimately, the central questions analysts must answer have less to do with what Iran has lost and more with what it still possesses, what it chooses to do next, and what pathways remain for stopping its nuclear breakout—either through diplomacy, coercion, or prevention.
The Iranian regime, for its part, has a broad spectrum of options. At one end, it could return to negotiations. At the other, it could dash for a nuclear bomb. Its ultimate response might also fall somewhere in between: Tehran, for example, may attempt to conceal materials and nuclear components while publicly engaging in fruitless talks. Iran might attempt to drag out such discussions, hoping for leadership changes in Israel and the United States while it quietly advances its program in ways that it can portray as civilian. Iran has already suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, accusing the IAEA of complicity in the strike. It may even withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty altogether, which would be a clear sign of escalation.
In the immediate term, however, Tehran will have to choose how to allocate its limited resources. The reconstruction of its nuclear program, missile forces, air defenses, infrastructure, and regional proxies will all compete for limited funding. Iran will likely prioritize rebuilding its missile and air defense capabilities, reducing vulnerabilities to Israeli intelligence, and adapting to the advanced warfare deployed against it. It may also prepare more effective options for retaliation, in case it is attacked again.
Iran must assess the damage to its nuclear program—especially to its centrifuges and stockpiles of enriched uranium—and decide whether to hide its residual assets for use in the future or try to build a nuclear weapon, whether it be an advanced device or a rudimentary one.
A BETTER DEAL?
No matter how successful the strikes against Iran were, diplomacy remains the preferred way to permanently end Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Other strategies, such as more military action, come with higher risks and costs. Washington knows this, as well, and it is again pursuing talks with Tehran. Its goal is to reach an agreement that forces the Islamic Republic to end uranium enrichment on its soil and allows for intrusive and verifiable inspections. To succeed, U.S. officials should make sure negotiations have a deadline and should credibly threaten to attack again if Iran doesn’t strike a deal in time, on American terms. The United States and Israel must coordinate with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—signatories of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which can trigger snapback sanctions—to influence Iran’s decisions, prevent nuclear or military escalation, and set the conditions for a good and sustainable agreement.
Israel and Washington, however, shouldn’t stop at Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Iran’s current weakness and the weakness of its proxy network present a rare opportunity to create a whole new regional order. Israel’s military campaign against Iran has, specifically, opened the door to expanded peace and security across the Middle East—including a possible resolution in Gaza, the release of Israeli hostages there, and broader peace with Israel’s neighbors—all within a framework of durable security arrangements that neutralize Iran’s many threats.
For such a grand bargain to work, Iran would have to forever give up uranium enrichment and plutonium production and allow intrusive inspections from the IAEA. Tehran would also need to significantly curb its missile program—in accordance with the Missile Technology Control Regime framework—and its satellite launch program, which serves as a cover for the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Usually, the side that loses a conflict takes more lessons from it than the side that wins.
The United States, meanwhile, must lead the orchestration of any nuclear deal or new regional architecture. Israel will need to end the war in Gaza, exile Hamas leadership, and begin reconstruction and disarmament of the territory. Hamas will need to release the remaining hostages in a single phase, give up its weapons, and allow itself to be replaced by a technocratic Palestinian administration.
A grand bargain could also include Israeli security arrangements with Syria and Lebanon, in which Damascus and Beirut commit to neutralizing armed groups in their territory, including Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, Palestinian militant factions, and offshoots of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS. These agreements must preserve Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and Israel’s freedom of action against evolving threats. The goal would be for such cease-fires to gradually progress into armistice agreements, nonbelligerency treaties, and ultimately full-blown peace accords.
Any grand bargain should be backed by nimble frameworks in which like-minded powers, led by the United States, monitor compliance. Such a mission could be inspired by the Multinational Force and Observers, which has successfully supported the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty for decades. Alternatively, direct bilateral peace frameworks (like the one Israel has with Jordan) could prove effective. Both models are better than the large, multilateral UN-backed security frameworks such as the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, which has consistently failed in its mission.
But a grand bargain can only work if Israel and the United States align their strategies. The United States must allow Israel to confront emerging threats and strengthen the region’s security architecture. Israel, meanwhile, must help the United States shift its focus and resources toward higher-priority theaters, such as the Indo-Pacific.
THE RIGHT FORMULA
Should Tehran and Washington agree to a deal—even one that covers just nuclear issues—the military campaign would be a successful illustration of Trump’s doctrine of “peace through strength.” But at the very least, the June strikes demonstrated that a coordinated military operation can disrupt nuclear proliferation in the short term. That is especially notable because the United States had previously refrained from intervening militarily to prevent China or North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons.
For years, experts have cautioned that any confrontation with Iran risks igniting a regional war, destabilizing global energy markets, and drawing U.S. forces into a lengthy conflict. Yet none of these outcomes has materialized. A precise Israeli strike, reinforced by a credible American deterrent, seems to be the right formula. The assault on Iran also offers a case study in how a capable U.S. ally can assume the bulk of the responsibility for its own defense, with the support of Washington.
The U.S. and Israeli operations against Iran also have implications for great-power competition. They affirmed that the United States’ and Israel’s systems are superior to Iran’s, many of which are made by Russia. Washington showcased impressive flexibility and a clear willingness to project force, despite its aversion to risking prolonged conflict. The United States stood firmly by its ally and led a successful, targeted strike, sending a message across the globe: the U.S.-Israeli alliance is alive and well and capable of delivering results. The operations also underscored that China and Russia remain minor players in the Middle East.
China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia will no doubt study how Israel and the United States gathered intelligence, countered Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities, suppressed air defenses, and targeted Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists. Israel and the United States, therefore, must not rest on their laurels. Usually, the side that loses a conflict takes more lessons from it than the side that wins. But Israel and the United States must learn from their strikes, too, and anticipate how Iran will adapt. This was the first direct war between Iran and Israel—and likely not the last.
Operation Rising Lion eliminated real and immediate threats while showcasing the extraordinary military capabilities of Israel and its ally. Yet the most consequential achievement of the operations may lie ahead: the opening of a historic window for a comprehensive political settlement that could reshape the Middle East. Negotiating from a position of strength, the United States and Israel must seize the moment to establish a stable regional order, close the door on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and reinforce their alliance for decades to come.
