Eurasia Press & News
Viewing Turkey–Israel dynamics through a zero-sum lens risks fuelling strategic miscalculations and regional instability.
The post–7 October realignment in the Middle East has recalibrated threat perceptions and strategic opportunities for both Turkey and Israel. The recent ‘12-Day War’ has further accelerated this shift. While both Turkey and Israel seek to maximise influence in this fluid landscape, key indicators suggest that viewing Turkey–Israel dynamics through a zero-sum lens risks fuelling strategic miscalculations and regional instability. This could intensify competition across overlapping spheres of influence – from Syria and Iraq to the Eastern Mediterranean and the South Caucasus.
The characterisation of Turkey as the principal beneficiary of the recent Iran-Israel conflict – emerging unscathed while its two regional rivals engaged in direct confrontation – oversimplifies the pressures facing Ankara’s foreign and security policy. While Turkey has publicly escalated its rhetoric against Israel, this masks the complexity of its concurrent rivalry with Iran. Managing these relationships requires a hybrid approach that blends assertive public diplomacy, strategic trade considerations, and a robust counter-intelligence posture. Ankara’s response reflects less an opportunistic gain than a strategic balancing act that weighs long-term, interrelated perceptions of threat with regional aspirations. Once close allies now appear to be on a collision course – but it is crucial to discern what is real, what is calibrated for domestic audiences, and how much of the current tension may ultimately prove impermanent.
The Current State of Bilateral Relations
Despite efforts to rehabilitate ties between Turkey and Israel following President Isaac Herzog’s historic state visit to Ankara in March 2022, relations nosedived as Israel’s military action in Gaza intensified following the horrific Hamas attacks on 7th October 2023, triggering a rising civilian death toll rose and a humanitarian catastrophe there.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been one of the harshest critics of the current Israeli government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On 2 May 2024, Turkey announced full export and import restriction against Israel, citing Israeli refusal to allow Turkey to airdrop humanitarian aid. This came after an earlier export restriction imposed in April against Israel targeting 54 product groups, such as steel and cement.
Countering allegations that Azeri-sourced oil has continued to reach Israel via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the Turkish energy ministry has consistently denied that any oil tankers bound for Israel have left Ceyhan since the restrictions came into force last May. The Turkish Ministry of Trade also formally rejected claims that trade has continued in an official statement, describing allegations as ‘completely false’. For Israel, the narrative that Turkey–Israel relations persist covertly signals its imperviousness to Ankara’s declared trade embargo. Where engagement has been acknowledged by Turkish sources, it relates to technical talks held in Azerbaijan between the two sides to develop a deconfliction mechanism in Syria, after Israeli airstrikes there in March targeted three Syrian air bases that Turkish military officials were reportedly inspecting for possible use. This suggests that while political relations remain severely strained, channels of pragmatic interaction – particularly where third-party actors such as Azerbaijan or the United States have vested interests – endure. But the near-term rehabilitation of ties between Turkey and Israel remains highly unlikely.
On 13 June, Ankara condemned Israel for its aggression against Iran, calling it a blatant violation of international law, but did not escalate rhetoric further – likely to retain some diplomatic flexibility and avoid a direct challenge to the US. Domestically, Israeli military unilateralism is already emboldening Turkey’s own assertive defence posture, fuelling efforts to strengthen its indigenous military capabilities.
While Israel and Turkey diverge sharply in their visions for the region’s future security architecture, they share some objectives: limit the possibility of Iranian re-entrenchment in the region, particularly across Syria; and the refusal to tolerate hostile actors on their borders.
The Regional Alliance-Building Race
For Israel and Iran, the current pause seems to be an opportunity to reframe their post-war narratives and shore up regional allies as a form of strategic deterrence. Turkey could play a role in this equation as either a spoiler or sponsor as each side lobbies regional actors in a bid to counter the fallout of their diplomatic isolation. Ankara could leverage its diplomatic influence to challenge Israel’s efforts to re-engage with Arab states – particularly in light of recent signals suggesting Israeli overtures toward Syria and Lebanon under a broader Abraham Alliance framework. Given the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, however, and the firm stance of Saudi Arabia that normalisation with Israel cannot proceed without an irreversible step toward Palestinian statehood, Israel’s normalisation drive seems unlikely.
To counter escalatory rhetoric by some in Israel, Ankara is likely to underscore its strategic value to the US and European allies – as a NATO member, G20 economy, and (albeit stalled) EU candidate – by positioning itself as a regional actor capable of avoiding direct military entanglement while fostering space for diplomatic de-escalation.
Yet, Turkey’s opposition to Israeli military actions should not be misconstrued as alignment with or tacit endorsement of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Turkey’s relationship with Iran is complex. Both states perceive themselves as regional superpowers yet have avoided direct military confrontation since the signing of the 1639 Ottoman-Safavid accord.
