Eurasia Press & News
In recent weeks, protesters in cities across northeastern Syria have taken to the streets to condemn the violence in the Druze-majority province of Suweida and call for justice.
Over 800 people were killed in the southeastern province last month during clashes between Druze factions and government-backed Bedouin forces.
“Kurds see themselves as natural allies of other minorities,” such as the Druze, Mutlu Civiroglu, a Kurdish affairs analyst, told The New Arab.
“The recent events have deepened the fear among the Kurds…many people believe that they’re going to be next,” after the Alawites and the Druze.
The events in Suweida were preceded by the coastal massacres in March, during which hundreds of civilians of the minority Alawite sect were killed by government forces.
Many Kurds view their fate as tied to that of their Druze brethren as minorities within Syria’s borders, with similar demands.
As the dust settles in Suweida, what will be the impact of the most recent sectarian violence on northeastern Syria?
A shared ‘fate’
“The fate of Suweida and the fate of the northeast are tied, mostly in the fact that both of them have been acting outside of the government with some degree of autonomy, and the government is trying to curtail that,” Alexander McKeever, a researcher focused on northern Syria, told TNA.
If a settlement is reached in either northeastern or southeastern Syria, it could have an impact on the other, he explains.
Northeastern and southeastern Syria enjoyed significant autonomy from the central government during the country’s 14-year civil war – a status that has been maintained since the Assad regime was toppled last December.
Both Kurds and Druze have their own security forces. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by the United States (US), control northeastern Syria, while an array of Druze factions control southwestern Syria.
“Their future is connected because Kurds have similar demands – they want a decentralised country,” Civiroglu says. The Kurds are “publicly saying that Syria cannot be like before, the prewar Syria, where the centralised government, Damascus, decides everything”.
Damascus has repeatedly stated that it opposes any form of decentralisation, saying it “reject[s] any attempt to impose a partition or create separatist cantons under the terms of federalism or self-autonomy,” a key demand of the Autonomous Administration, the SDF’s governing entity.
The Autonomous Administration, meanwhile, has reiterated its view that decentralisation is the only way forward.
Mazloum Abdi, the chief of the SDF, affirmed last Tuesday in an exclusive interview that decentralisation is the “best solution for building the state after 14 years of civil war,” adding it “does not mean partition”.
While he declined to clarify whether decentralisation would be administrative or political, he described “shared authority between the centre and the provinces”.
Another key demand of the Kurds, like the Druze, is that they not be forced to surrender their weapons and be able to maintain a degree of autonomy in the security realm. However, whether the Syrian army would maintain the SDF’s command structure or integrate individual fighters remains a key sticking point.
In Tuesday’s interview, Abdi acknowledged “different perspectives surrounding the mechanism for integration,” even within the SDF itself.
The SDF has other disagreements with Damascus as well. Elham Ahmad, the Autonomous Administration’s foreign relations co-chair, recently criticised Damascus for its “unilateral measures” in forming a government, drafting the constitutional declaration, and now appointing a parliament, without “consultations, neither with us nor with other Syrian components or parties”.
Syrian and international organisations alike have raised concerns over the concentration of presidential power and lack of judicial independence.
The SDF’s negotiating position
On 10 March, a landmark agreement was reached between Damascus and the SDF to integrate the latter’s military and governance institutions into the central state.
While several high-profile meetings have taken place since, the talks have stalled in recent months. After the latest events in Suweida, the 25 July meeting in Paris was postponed but is slated to be rescheduled “as soon as possible”.
In the cities of Aleppo and Jaramana, where Kurds and Druze have significant populations respectively, agreements were reached for the joint deployment of their forces alongside Damascus’ general security forces.
These areas are to serve as a blueprint and litmus test for the integration of other areas under the central government’s control.
The latest events in Suweida, however, are likely to change the SDF’s negotiating position. Increased fear among the Kurdish public has led to heightened pressure on the SDF to adopt a firmer stance vis-a-vis Damascus, Civiroglu says.
“The SDF is trying to find a balance in terms of answering the criticism of the people” for being “too soft in their demands” and “trying to address the needs of their allies, like the US [and] France”.
The latest events will make the Autonomous Administration embrace further demands for decentralisation and federalism, he says.
The SDF “likely see Suweida as a positive because the government looks weak and it seems like the government can’t enter areas outside of its control where there are minorities without a lot of abuses or violations occurring. This will only encourage the SDF to bargain harder,” echoes McKeever.
“Kurds want to integrate into the Syrian state with their own identity, with their own culture, with their own military power, with their own political system, but what Damascus understands from integration is Kurdish submission,” Civiroglu adds.
The events in Suweida appear to have lightened US pressure on the SDF. As recently as 10 July, prior to the violence in Suweida, US envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack said, “in all of these countries [in the Middle East], what we’ve learned is that federalism doesn’t work,” adding, “there is only one road and that road is Damascus”.
After the events in Suweida, on 22 July, Barrack did not rule out federalism, saying, “if they end up with a federalist government, that’s their determination, and the answer to the question is, everybody may now need to adapt”.
However, Natasha Hall, a senior associate at the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), says the US ultimately “want the option of withdrawing and they certainly don’t want to support an unsustainable force for the foreseeable future”.
She added: “They probably see a negotiated settlement between Damascus and the northeast as more advantageous than the alternative.”
The US has withdrawn a quarter of its troops from the country, bringing the number to 1,500 personnel, despite reports of an increase in attacks by the Islamic State.
Plans have been drafted by the US Department of Defence to withdraw the remaining troops, although a date has yet to be announced.
While the deadline for the implementation of the 10 March agreement is set for the end of the year, Civiroglu says it is unlikely the two sides will be able to reach an understanding by then.
“When the distrust has deepened and when the fear has deepened…it’s harder to find common ground.”
