Eurasia Press & News
Washington brokered an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 aimed at opening a transit corridor through the South Caucasus. The new agreement replaces the original Zangezur Corridor plan with the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).
Unlike the model preferred by Azerbaijan and Turkey, TRIPP will function under Armenian law, be built and managed by a US-led consortium, and provide Azerbaijan with a transit route to its Nakhchivan exclave. In return, Washington has indicated that it will offer security assurances for Armenia against possible Azerbaijani aggression, while Baku is expected to move toward joining the Abraham Accords.
The peace deal comes after years of conflict that began with the 44-day war in 2020, when Azerbaijan, using Turkish and Israeli drones, retook large areas from Armenia in the disputed region known to Armenians as Artsakh and to Azerbaijanis as Nagorno-Karabakh. Under Article 9 of the 2020 ceasefire, Armenia was required to allow Azerbaijan a land link to Nakhchivan through Armenia’s Syunik province, with Russian border guards providing oversight. Armenia resisted, fearing the corridor would give Azerbaijan and Turkey unregulated access across its territory. Azerbaijan responded with a 10-month blockade of Karabakh, while Russia, preoccupied with Ukraine, offered little protection.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan violated the ceasefire and launched a rapid offensive against the self-declared Republic of Artsakh, which functioned as the ethnic Armenian administration in Nagorno-Karabakh. A Russian-brokered ceasefire on September 20 required the disbanding of the Artsakh Defense Army and ended the region’s de facto autonomy. By January 2024, the breakaway government dissolved, and more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians were forced to flee to Armenia. Facing military pressure and minimal external support—France offering rhetoric from afar and India supplying arms without altering the balance—Armenia was pushed toward compromise.
Tehran’s contradictory stance and unfulfilled promises
Iran’s position on the conflict has been inconsistent. In 2020, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei voiced support for Azerbaijan, declaring that territories seized by Armenia should be returned. In contrast, in April 2025, Iran and Armenia conducted their first joint military exercise near Norduz, where the borders of Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave meet. Led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the drills aimed to send a message against Azerbaijan’s advances into Armenian territory. The choice of location recalled a 2022 IRGC exercise in the same area, during which its forces built a temporary bridge over the Aras River in a three-day show of force near the Azerbaijani border.
In May 2024, Khamenei told Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan that Iran was highly sensitive to border issues involving Armenia. Later, IRGC member and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf assured his Armenian counterpart that Tehran would oppose any attempt to alter regional borders. Later that month, the IRGC and Azerbaijan’s military held a joint military drill in the vicinity of Karabakh.
Why the Islamic Republic opposes TRIPP
On August 9, Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Khamenei, vowed to prevent the US-brokered deal from going forward and argued that it runs counter to the security of the South Caucasus. The next day, IRGC political deputy Yadollah Javani condemned the agreement, accusing Armenia and Azerbaijan of siding with Washington, London, and NATO at the expense of their regional neighbors. Javani likened their actions to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision to invite NATO into Russia’s security sphere before the Ukraine war.
For Iran, the final version of TRIPP averts the immediate danger of losing its overland connection to Armenia and, by extension, Europe. The deal preserves Tehran’s access to the Caucasus, the Black Sea, and European markets without full dependence on Turkey or Azerbaijan, an important safeguard against geopolitical isolation.
Nevertheless, TRIPP presents serious long-term risks for Iran. A US-controlled corridor bypassing Iranian territory would diminish Tehran’s economic leverage and strategic relevance in regional transport projects. Europe’s pursuit of alternatives to Russian gas could make Azerbaijan and Turkey, now directly linked, more attractive energy partners. The corridor could also undercut the International North–South Transport Corridor’s value, particularly if it’s connected to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Increased Turkish and Azerbaijani influence in the South Caucasus might embolden separatist or ethnic movements inside Iran, while reliance on Turkish transit could give Ankara political leverage. These dynamics would weaken Iran’s control over trade routes and reduce its bargaining power with Washington and Europe.
Iran’s reaction to TRIPP reflects deep concern over the long-term presence of foreign powers in the South Caucasus and the shifting regional balance it may produce. While officials have called for regional coordination, Tehran’s ability to shape outcomes is constrained by sanctions, economic weakness, and limited influence over Armenia’s decisions. Yerevan appears motivated by security and economic gains from US-backed development, despite Iranian opposition. A heavy-handed response by Tehran could also damage relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the latter closely aligned with Israel. The gap between Tehran’s rhetoric and its limited means reveals a regime trying to project resolve while steering clear of isolation or an unwinnable confrontation.
