Eurasia Press & News
We must look at how the war has reshaped Moscow’s concept of international relations and global power projection if we are to appreciate Russia’s changing geopolitical strategy in the post-Ukraine war era.
Since the beginning of the war with Ukraine, Russia’s strategic thought has radically changed, as Russian policymakers realized that conventional alliances between the West are no longer an option. Russia’s own push toward what Putin describes as a “multipolar world order,” a system meant to reverse Western hegemony and provide alternative centers of world power, has been hastened by the war.
Shifting military doctrine, shifting the economy away from the West, and forging new alliances mainly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are all part of this strategic turn.
Russia has embarked upon large-scale reform and modernization of its defense framework because of the conflict exposing manifest weaknesses in its defense system. Russia’s “pivot to Asia” policy gained traction owing to Western sanctions, enhancing relations with China, India, and other non-Western economies. As a counter to Western-dominated institutions like the G7 and NATO, Russia has stepped up promoting institutions like the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the BRICS.
Russian military strategists have recognized that the country’s defense needs to be radically reformed to enable it to keep up with the demands of warfare in modern times.
Compelling weaknesses in Russia’s military strength have come to light as a result of the conflict against Ukraine, especially in areas like integrated command systems, electronic warfare, and guided weapons.
Moscow has responded by undertaking widespread military reforms designed to enhance logistics, improve coordination among the various branches of the armed forces, and drive forward through technology. As key elements of Russia’s new military doctrine, the defense establishment has given top priority to the development of cyberwarfare capabilities, advanced air defense systems, and hypersonic missiles.
Reducing reliance on Western markets, technologies, and financial systems is the main objective of Russia’s post-war economic policy that officials refer to as “economic sovereignty.”
The policy is best exemplified in Moscow’s approach in North Africa, where Russia wants to increase trade, investment, and security relations across the region. The plan includes utilizing Russia’s hydrocarbon resources, defense equipment exports, and farm produce to forge new business relationships. Russian businesses have stepped up efforts to build supply chains not reliant on Western infrastructure by targeting cooperation with Global South nations that have been neutral in the war in Ukraine.
The focal point of Russia’s institutional approach is building and strengthening non-Western international institutions.
With Russia itself leading the push for BRICS expansion and the evolution of alternative financial institutions, the BRICS group has stepped to occupy center stage in this policy. One element of this policy is the BRICS New Development Bank, which issues development lending directly to organizations controlled by the West, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. As a counter to NATO in Eurasia, Russia has also deepened its relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia is seeking to build a non-Western international order through these organizations. Throughout and after the Ukraine war, Russia has routinely used its strategic partnerships as geopolitical tools.
It stepped up energy cooperation with China and India after the first Western sanctions in 2022, diverting gas and oil exports from European markets. Moscow gave the creation of alternative energy transportation corridors via China and Central Asia the highest priority following the Nord Stream pipeline blasts. By providing food security deals with nations that are facing agricultural difficulties, Russia has taken advantage of its status as one of the world’s largest grain exporters to increase its influence in the Middle East and Africa.
The Kremlin has also used arms sales and military cooperation deals as an instrument of influence, especially in Africa, as Russian contractors and military advisers have increased their presence.
Russia threatened to curtail energy supplies to hostile countries and has gone ahead and done it to a number of European countries in response to various spikes in global tensions. Russia’s preparedness to use food security as a geopolitical tool was evidenced by the blocking of grain export agreements with Ukraine.
As an economic liberal policy of warfare against Western economies, Russia has even coordinated with its OPEC+ partners to corner oil prices globally. More importantly, Russia has started demanding payment in rubles or other currencies for various energy exports, unsettling the US dollar’s monopoly in global trade.
There are, however, a few key hurdles to the success of Russia’s post-war strategy.
West’s response to Russian aggression has bolstered NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe, imposed unprecedented packages of sanctions, and provided Ukraine with military aid. These measures have inflicted huge economic costs on Russia and restricted its access to financial markets and future technologies. Despite this, energy exports to Asia have helped to partly offset losses of European markets and validated the success of Russia’s policy of diversifying allies.
Russia’s second institutional approach could be said to be very much on the rise, especially among those countries looking to wean themselves off Western-dominated structures, as evidenced by the widening of BRICS membership and the increased interest among countries of the Global South. The immediate present consequences of the war in Ukraine are only one aspect of Russia’s grand strategic vision for the long-term.
Putin is convinced that success in the larger geopolitical struggle would initiate the process of overthrowing an international order that has tainted Russian interests and diminished its global standing. The formation of a multipolar order where China, Russia, and other developing nations are a counter to Western domination is part of the blueprint.
To eventually compete with or substitute Western-dominated institutions, the policy is to long-term develop alternative financial, technological, and security networks. Geopolitically outside of Europe, issues of concern to Russia in the future are complicated Middle Eastern relations, competition with China for Central Asia, and difficulty with maintaining relations with post-Soviet countries.
Russia’s ability to be able to sustain economic growth even while it is sanctioned, advance its technological capabilities beyond what is available from Western sources, and form enduring alliances with other nations that support its vision of another international order will be key to its success in its post-war program. With consequences that will determine global geopolitics for generations to come, the plan marks a paradigm shift in Russian foreign policy away from collaboration with the West and towards competition with it.
