Eurasia Press & News
In early September, the first combat use of Ukrainian long-range Flamingo cruise missiles was reported . Three missiles struck an FSB border base in annexed Crimea. The Flamingo is the first heavy long-range missile produced directly in Ukraine. It is capable of carrying up to a ton of explosives. Since 2014, the Ukrainian missile industry has undergone a major transformation from a small post-Soviet facility into a center of international defense research and innovation. Successful launch of serial production of the Flamingo and similar projects could transform Ukraine into a leading European missile power, but this requires stable funding and support from allies, according to Fabian Hoffmann, a defense policy researcher at the University of Oslo (Norway).
Since 2014, Ukraine’s missile industry has undergone radical transformation, transforming from a modest post-Soviet production facility into a makeshift hub for international military cooperation and increasingly ambitious domestic developments. Despite a full-scale Russian invasion, limited Western aid, and the transformation of its industrial capacity, Ukraine has managed to develop systems capable of making it, if not a leader, then one of Europe’s leading countries in missile and unmanned weaponry.
Among recent Ukrainian developments, the Flamingo cruise missile has generated the most interest due to its size, range, and warhead weight. Considering other projects, such as a modification of the R-360 Neptune anti-ship missile for land-based targets or the development of the Sapsan short-range ballistic missile, it can be assumed that Ukraine intends to offset Russia’s advantage in long-range heavy weapons. The key question is whether the Ukrainian military-industrial complex can maintain this pace, increase production, and effectively influence the course of the war.
Historical context
Ukraine’s pre-war missile industry was characterized by uneven development and structural dependence on imported components. Until 2022, design bureaus such as Pivdenne, Pivdenmash, and Luch provided the technological foundation, but production volumes remained limited. The Vilkha guided missile entered service in 2018, and the Neptune anti-ship cruise missile achieved initial operational capability in mid-2021, just a few months before the Russian invasion.
Ukraine’s pre-war missile industry was characterized by uneven development and structural dependence on imported components.
The Sapsan short-range ballistic missile program stalled in the development phase due to funding uncertainty and other complications. Despite these difficulties, Ukraine retained its skilled personnel and legacy industrial capacity, although dependence on Russian components and supply chain disruptions after 2014 remained significant obstacles.
The 2022 invasion forced the industry to improvise. Russia likely targeted missile industry centers from the outset, attacking facilities like the Pivdenmash plant in Dnipro, which produced rocket engines, liquid fuel, and other components. Simultaneously, Ukraine began adapting existing systems, primarily the Neptune anti-ship cruise missile, for strikes against land targets. However, the first confirmed reports of Neptune use on the ground only emerged in August 2023, highlighting the challenges the industry likely faced early in the war.
Thus, Ukraine’s long-range weapons capabilities were initially heavily dependent on foreign aid. Deliveries of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles from the UK, France, and Italy, as well as ATACMS short-range ballistic missiles from the US, were significant but had little impact. Western ammunition stockpiles are finite, and political constraints prevented their use against high-value targets in Russia. Germany’s refusal to supply TAURUS missiles further emphasized the need to shift to domestic production.
By the end of 2023, Ukraine had begun implementing an ambitious plan to increase production of its own missiles and drones. The long-range UJ-26 Bober, An-196 Lyutiy, and AQ-400 Scythe UAVs , as well as the Ruta and Peklo missile drones, were commissioned and produced in significant quantities. The range of these systems exceeded that of their Western counterparts, but this was offset by the fact that they carried relatively light warheads and operated at moderate speeds.
Warhead weight rarely exceeded 100 kg, sometimes less than 10 kg, and the terminal velocity was insufficient to penetrate fortifications. These models could attack Russian strategic targets, but they often lacked the power to cause serious damage, allowing the enemy to repair damaged facilities relatively quickly.
Flamingo’s Exit
This background explains the excitement that arose when Ukraine unveiled its new Flamingo cruise missile in mid-August. It is powered by a Motor Sich AI-25TL turbofan engine, typically used in L-39 jet trainer aircraft. According to available data, this engine provides a range of up to 3,000 km, theoretically putting all significant Russian targets west of the Urals within reach. More importantly, the missile can carry up to 1,150 kg of explosives. If these characteristics are accurate and Flamingo production can be scaled up, it will be the first indigenously produced heavy missile system in Ukraine’s arsenal.
The Flamingo is essentially a copy of the FP-5 missile, developed by the British-UAE company Milanion Group and first unveiled at the IDEX 2025 defense industry exhibition in Abu Dhabi. Localization of production and assembly is being handled by the Kyiv-based Fire Point. The published specifications of the two missiles are virtually identical, and publicly available data indicates that the localized version was developed in collaboration with Milanion. The extent of Ukraine’s contribution to the project’s development and component production remains unclear. Detailed information about the supply chain and origin of the missile’s subsystems, with the exception of the engine, is not publicly available.
The first experience with the Flamingo missile was mixed. In early September, three missiles struck a Russian FSB post in Armyansk, in northern Crimea. Only two reached their targets. One fell 100-200 meters from the building, while the other did hit it and caused significant damage, although it likely deviated from its intended coordinates by 10-40 meters. Nevertheless, the strike likely met minimum expectations and also highlighted areas for improvement.
The main problem with the Flamingo is likely production capacity. Fire Point currently claims to assemble one missile per day, but plans to increase production to over 200 units per month. These projections appear overly optimistic due to potential difficulties with engine supply. Nevertheless, a stable production of 30-50 missiles per month will ensure Ukraine a reliable supply.
Other heavy rocket projects
Fire Point’s ambitions extend beyond the Flamingo. At the MSPO-2025 International Defense Industry Fair in Kielce, Poland, the company unveiled ballistic missile designs with ranges of 200 and 855 km. These developments place Fire Point in direct competition with projects such as the Long Neptune, Sapsan, and Korshun. This indicates further intensification of competition in Ukraine’s missile industry for resources and future development opportunities.
The Long Neptune is a modification of the R-360 Neptune missile with a claimed range of 1,000 km. In March 2025, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced successful testing and the use of the new development in combat, but this information remains unconfirmed. In late August, the press published the first images of the Long Neptune. The missile’s rear and front sections, which house the engine, warhead, and guidance system, are generally similar to the basic Neptune version, but the middle section is wider and longer, likely allowing for additional fuel to be carried to increase its range.
The model is believed to be equipped with an inertial guidance system . The presence of terminal homing remains unconfirmed, but is likely. The missile likely retains the 150 kg payload of the baseline Neptune model, placing it at the bottom of the Ukrainian heavy missile program. However, combined with its high subsonic terminal velocity, it still possesses significant striking power.
The Sapsan is a mobile, single-stage, solid-fuel ballistic missile with a nominal warhead weight of 480 kg and a range of up to 500 km, although unconfirmed reports suggest the latter figure may be significantly greater. Development of the Sapsan began in 2006. The export version of the missile, the Grim-2, has been funded by Saudi Arabia since 2014.
The development of an export version of the Sapsan missile has been financed by Saudi Arabia since 2014.
Since the outbreak of full-scale war, the status of the Sapsan missile remained unclear, but in mid-June 2025, Ukrainian media reported the completion of combat tests of the missile in May and the commencement of serial production. However, publicly available information on the deployment and use of the Sapsan remains limited. In mid-August, Russia claimed to have struck targets associated with the program, but the actual consequences of these attacks are unknown.
The Korshun is a subsonic cruise missile based on the Soviet Kh-55, planned to be launched from land, air, and sea. Open sources have reported a warhead weighing approximately 480 kg and a range of 700 to 1,000 km, although it may be longer. Of all Ukraine’s legacy missile projects, the Korshun is the least well-known. In January 2025, the Ukrainian press classified it as a program that had not entered production. There is no confirmed information about the Korshun’s serial production or combat use—other missile projects are apparently a priority.
At this stage, it’s unclear whether the Flamingo will become the primary missile system in Ukraine’s arsenal, whether priority will be given to upgrading one of the existing designs, or whether entirely new developments will emerge. However, it’s clear that Ukraine is on track to expand its arsenal with one or more heavy missiles. However, all of the aforementioned projects are significantly more expensive than light missiles and long-range drones. If Ukraine can’t resolve the funding issue on its own, foreign support will become increasingly important.
How will new projects affect the course of the war?
If Ukraine deploys heavy missile systems, their effectiveness will depend on two factors: production volumes and Russia’s ability to counter new threats. Increasing production will require establishing reliable supply chains, distinct from those used for light missiles and UAVs, and this could be difficult without stable funding. However, even a small number of heavy missiles will complicate Russia’s position. The deployment of the Flamingo, with its 3,000-kilometer range, will force Moscow to reallocate its air defense systems accordingly, regardless of whether the production rate is 20 or 200 missiles per month.
Even a small number of heavy missiles will complicate Russia’s position.
Russia will likely be unable to fully neutralize the impact of these systems, even if their production remains limited. Moscow lacks sufficient air and missile defense capabilities to protect its entire territory. For several months, Ukraine has been conducting a relatively effective campaign to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses, systematically targeting Russian radars and launchers. This has likely created gaps in Russia’s integrated air and missile defense system. The increased number of potential attack vectors, coupled with Ukraine’s growing production of light and heavy missiles, as well as UAVs, will further complicate Russia’s defense.
Of course, this doesn’t mean that Ukraine’s future long-range strike campaign will necessarily be wildly successful. Much will depend on Ukrainian intelligence, which must promptly identify and exploit suitable attack vectors. However, the question is not so much whether the new systems will be able to penetrate Russian defenses as a whole, but how many of them will be able to hit their targets. Once Ukraine is able to deploy a significant number of heavy missile systems on a permanent basis, it will likely intensify the damage to Russia’s critical oil and gas infrastructure, which is already under constant attack by existing means.
To achieve this goal, foreign funding for Ukraine’s missile industry is becoming increasingly important. Germany has already allocated €400 million to support Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities, although, at least publicly, this funding has been limited to long-range drones and light cruise missiles. Future support from Germany and other European states could and perhaps should extend to systems like the Flamingo, designed to replace Western cruise missiles that are either not supplied at all, like the TAURUS, or are no longer being delivered to Kyiv due to depleted stocks, like the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG.
