Eurasia Press & News
ISIS has been witnessing a new surge in its activity inside Syria since the change of the former regime in December 2024, taking advantage of the fragility of the transitional authority and the overlap of its structure with different factions. Despite intense international strikes, the group has been able to carry out qualitative attacks and has begun to reposition, amid security and political complications facing the interim government. The scene is becoming increasingly dangerous with the emergence of more radicalized groups and the erosion of divides between regular forces and militant militants. On the other hand, the international community linked the support of the new government to its seriousness in combating terrorism and extremism, which poses a structural challenge to its security institutions and internal alliances.
ISIS’s activities have escalated significantly in the Syrian arena since the regime’s change in December 2024, as confirmed by frequent reports of the arrest of active cells affiliated with the organization, as well as attacks against the security forces and the army of the interim government. This was accompanied by a clear escalation in the organization’s speech, in which he openly declared his hostility to the new authority and his rejection of its conciliatory rhetoric with the West and the international coalition. However, this escalation cannot be explained only as a traditional return to the organization in the wake of the chaos, but it seems to reflect a qualitative shift in ISIS tactics, based on exploiting the fragility of the transitional authority, and the overlap of its structure with armed factions and groups. These complex dynamics contribute to creating a suitable environment for the organization’s repositioning and expansion of its activity, and put the interim government in front of a very complex challenge, not only about its ability to respond to the threat, but also its ability to control its alliances, and rebuild clear security institutions of loyalty and identity, capable of confronting terrorism without being penetrated or surrounded by gray incubators that are difficult to distinguish from the opponent itself.
Signs of the return and expansion of ISIS
ISIS has regained its field activity significantly following the regime change that took place in December 2024, as the following months witnessed an increase in the organization’s attempts to carry out attacks, amid heavy attempts to contain it. On January 11, 2025, the security services of the interim government managed to thwart a dangerous scheme targeting the shrine of Sayyida Zainab, one of the prominent religious symbols of the Shiite community. This was followed by a series of security operations that led to the arrest of the leader of the organization, “Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi”, and then the dismantling of cells belonging to him in the province of Daraa on February 18, and in the city of Sanameen on March 6, to the arrest of another cell in the city of Aleppo on May 17, which witnessed a suicide bombing that resulted in the deaths and injuries of security men belonging to the interim government. In mid-May, the group was able for the first time to carry out two simultaneous attacks targeting security forces and the army, one in Deir ez-Zor and the other in Sweida province. In parallel, ISIS continued its activity in the areas controlled by the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), where the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented about 60 attacks by the organization between January and mid-April 2025.
These incidents, especially those in the areas of the interim government, coincide with a clear hostile position announced by the organization towards the new authority, manifested in his first video statement issued on January 25, in which he attacked the speech of Commander-in-Chief Ahmed al-Sharaa, and considered it subject to the conditions of the international coalition. In a subsequent statement issued on April 20, ISIS escalated its tone, threatening Sharia from joining the “International Coalition Against Terrorism.” In fact, the interim government faces a complex security and political dilemma in its dealings with the organization, as the latter exploits the fragile and differential composition of the new authority, which includes factions and components that carry some intellectual convergences with ISIS. The group has exploited this gap, and its official Al-Naba bulletin in mid-May called on foreign fighters — joined by a number of militants — and HTS elements dissatisfied with government policies, to defect and join it. This call comes after incidents of defection within the extremist movement in the Syrian arena, which led to the emergence of new takfiri entities, such as the “Ansar al-Sunna Brigades”, which share with ISIS its hardline vision of the interim government, although it differs with it in the nature of targets and action tactics.
Regional and international response to ISIS’s potential risks
Regional countries and international actors have moved directly in the wake of the change of the former regime to prevent ISIS and other terrorist organizations from exploiting the security vacuum and benefiting from the state of political chaos in Syria. The response has taken various and varied ways, including pre-emptive and preventive military strikes, the intensification of security and intelligence coordination, and the formation of specialized action committees to combat terrorism among the countries of the region, especially the neighboring countries of Syria. The United States began its first steps the day after regime change, when U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) carried out focused air strikes, targeting more than 75 ISIS targets and positions in central Syria, including training camps, command centers and weapons depots, and using B-52 fighter jets and bombers. This was followed by the US military carrying out airstrikes on ISIS camps on December 16, and then on December 19, a US raid killed one of the leaders of the organization in Deir ez-Zor, and targeted in 23 trucks loaded with weapons for the organization in Deir ez-Zor. In late December, France entered the line of operations in its first strikes against the group since the regime change, targeting weapons depots and an ISIS command center in the eastern countryside of Homs
In a related context, the region and Syria’s neighboring countries in particular witnessed rapid moves in the face of the potential dangers of ISIS, as the Riyadh conference on January 12, 2025, included discussions on supporting Syria in the fight against terrorism. In February 2025, the neighboring countries of Syria, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq, in addition to Syria, formed a four-way security alliance to combat terrorism, which led to the formation of a regional coordination center to combat ISIS, which included the coordination of military operations and the exchange of intelligence.
On the other hand, Western countries, led by the United States, have put the new authority’s seriousness in the fight against ISIS, a condition for establishing relations with it and lifting sanctions on Syria. France has mortgaged its relations with the interim government and its support for its transitional path with a set of files, including the fight against extremism and terrorism, and this was addressed at the Paris conference on Syria on February 13, 2025. The German Foreign Ministry announced in May 2025 that its support and cooperation with Syria is conditional on the seriousness of the interim government in the fight against terrorism. The list of conditions presented by the United States to the interim government in April 2025 included taking effective measures against terrorist organizations and combating extremism to lift sanctions on Syria. Although Washington partially implemented this lift in June 2025, it stressed that this does not represent a retreat from its demand, which means that it is a test step to be built on according to the extent of the commitment of the new government to the requirements, which fall within the fight against terrorism and extremism.
The dynamic of complexity and the threat between power and terrorism
Despite the preventive strikes carried out by the United States and the international coalition to combat terrorism, along with regional and international efforts to contain the extremist threat, ISIS succeeded in regaining part of its field momentum and was able to carry out its first operations in May 2025, in a sign that reflects the organization’s attempts to reposition and plan future attacks.
On the one hand, this escalation comes in a very complex context, where the political and security environment is characterized by a high degree of entanglement, especially in light of the fragility of the institutional, security and military structure of the interim government, which is formed by a wide spectrum of armed factions with different backgrounds, ranging from moderate factions and those that intersect intellectually, albeit to varying degrees, with hardline currents. This indirect overlap between some components of power and extremist ideology may create a gray environment, which gives terrorist organizations a margin of maneuverability and penetration, and complicates the task of establishing stability and imposing effective control on the ground.
On the other hand, the interim government faces a double challenge, between building confidence with the international and Western community in particular, and lifting permanent sanctions on them by extension, and facing internal vibrations due to the investment of terrorist organizations in the discourse opposing openness to the West, and the extent of its reflection on the delicate balance within the wings of power, especially with regard to foreign fighters and extremist factions, such as the Nour al-Din Zinki Movement and the Sham Legion. There are increasing indications of the ability of ISIS and other terrorist organizations to operate and recruit, as the interim government becomes more open to the West, especially in its relations with the United States on the one hand, and its non-anti-Israel rhetoric. A day after the meeting between interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and U.S. President Donald Trump during his visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2025, a security crackdown targeting foreign fighters’ headquarters in Idlib and Hama has been reported. Despite the denial of the incident by the Syrian Interior Ministry, it is perhaps an indication of messages warning foreign fighters and other extremists not to take a stand on the transformation of Syria’s international relations, or to warn them against responding to the ISIS call for these fighters a few days ago to announce and deny the incident.
Moreover, despite the absence of clear indications so far of explicit opposition by the hardline factions within the structure of the interim government towards its political discourse or external openness, which allows it in practice a greater margin for action in the areas of security coordination and intelligence exchange with neighboring countries and the international community, and strengthens its image as a serious authority in the fight against terrorism, this apparent stability hides behind a more complex problem. The conceptual separation between “terrorism” and “extremism” remains a central dilemma for the interim government, with the international community focusing on the need to address both as a condition for continued political and diplomatic support and openness. While the Government demonstrates a relative commitment to counterterrorism in its security sense, countering manifestations of ideological and intellectual extremism remains more complex.
While terrorism has traditionally manifested itself in reactions to the interim government’s policies related to international relations, especially toward the United States and Israel, extremism reveals its deepest face within Syria’s social structure. Not only does it oppose the rhetoric of openness or reconciliation, but it is clearly reflected in hostile attitudes towards minorities and, in some cases, through active participation in abuses and abuses in their areas of presence. This pattern of violent, anti-multiplic extremism has produced profound shifts in the structure of terrorist discourse, with new violent groups emerging that are essentially ideologically rejecting the “other” and a major driver of their attacks. The most prominent of these groups is the Ansar al-Sunna Brigades, which was established in February 2025 and since its inception, raised the banner of opposition to the interim government and President Ahmed al-Sharaa, against the backdrop of what it described as a “reconciliatory discourse” towards religious and community minorities. The group has adopted several bloody attacks targeting religious and civilian components, most notably the bombing of the Church of St. Elias in Damascus on June 22, 2025, which represents a double escalation in the nature of the targeting, from the conflict with the authority of ISIS, to the conflict with the community itself for other terrorist and extremist organizations.
In the context of the overlapping complexities faced by the Syrian Interim Government in the fight against terrorism and extremism, a more serious crisis is manifested at the operational level, represented in the erosion of the border between the regular security and military forces and the extremist armed elements that may have penetrated these formations or integrated with them in chaotic conditions outside the framework of command and organized control. This problem was clearly manifested during the events of the Syrian coast between 6 and 10 March 2025, as reports showed that armed elements from outside the official formation of the security forces and the army engaged in combat operations independently and without central coordination. This pattern was later repeated in Sweida, when accusations were made against elements believed to be affiliated with ISIS that they had committed field liquidation against members of the Druze component, without the security services being able to intervene or distinguish between them and the regular forces, as a result of wearing crews and equipment similar to those used by the army and the official security, according to the US special envoy to Syria. This interference in the theatre of operations undermines the State’s ability to control military actors, weakens the credibility of the interim Government in front of its international partners, and gives terrorist and extremist organizations additional ability to maneuver and disguise under the guise of authority.
Finally, despite the Syrian Interim Government’s practical and intelligence efforts to pursue ISIS cells across the country, the advanced reading clearly shows that the fight against terrorism and violent extremism requires a broader and deeper approach, not limited to a security response, but proceeds from within the structure of the authority itself, and requires a careful review of the alliances of the interim government, especially with the extremist factions in its ranks, and foreign fighters. What also indicates that the rehabilitation of the army and security forces should not be limited to the organizational aspect, but should include the construction of a clear military doctrine, which clearly distinguishes between the state and the faction, and between soldierhood and ideological affiliation, whether in thought or in appearance or in field practice.
