Eurasia Press & News
A fierce standoff between Syrian security forces and a French-led jihadist battalion has reignited questions about the future of foreign fighters in post-war Syria—and about whether President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s government is turning against the very elements that once underpinned its military ascendancy.
The Harem Operation
France, in a series of meetings with senior Syrian officials—including President Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani—has consistently raised concerns over foreign combatants of French origin. Damascus, eager to prove its commitment to the July 2025 counter-terrorism cooperation agreement signed with France and the United States, has responded with a decisive campaign to dismantle the French battalion known as al-Ghuraba (“the Strangers”) and to arrest its leader, Omar Diaby, better known as “Omar Omsen”.
The operation began abruptly in the early hours of Tuesday, 21 October, when General Security forces surrounded the French fighters’ encampment near Harem in Idlib governorate’s countryside. By the following morning, they had begun attempts to storm the site. Officials claimed the move followed multiple complaints from residents of the nearby al-Fardan camp, including reports of serious violations culminating in the alleged abduction of an eleven-year-old girl, Maimouna Firstay, by a group led by Omsen.
According to government sources, negotiations were initially sought to secure Omsen’s voluntary surrender. When he refused, barricading himself inside the camp and using civilians as human shields, security forces initiated the assault.
The Omsen File
Omar Diaby—born in Senegal and raised in France—was radicalised during a prison sentence before travelling to Syria in 2013. There, he founded the al-Ghuraba battalion, operating initially in the Latakia forests and attracting scores of French jihadists. A charismatic figure and prolific propagandist, Diaby became known as the “spiritual guide” of French foreign fighters in Syria.
His notoriety earned him global attention: in 2014 the UN Security Council listed him among individuals linked to al-Qaeda for his leadership of al-Ghuraba and his coordination of European recruitment networks. The following year, the U.S. State Department designated him a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.” After years of activity under various jihadist umbrellas, including Jabhat al-Nusra and later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), he was detained by HTS in 2020 and held until 2022—an early indication of rifts between his faction and Syria’s dominant Islamist leadership.
Omsen has denied the Syrian government’s accusations, calling the child-abduction case a “fabrication” and alleging coordination between French and Syrian intelligence to dismantle his group. He claims that the raid aims to detain French nationals for eventual extradition to France under the guise of a humanitarian rescue.
The French-Syrian-U.S. Dimension
The current crackdown must be seen within the framework of the 25 July 2025 tripartite agreement between Damascus, Paris, and Washington. That accord outlined cooperation on counter-terrorism, the repatriation of foreign fighters, and the prevention of extremist threats emanating from Syrian territory. ForSharaa’s transitional government—keen to gain recognition and economic assistance—demonstrating compliance with Western security priorities carries both political and diplomatic value.
Analysts suggest that Syrian authorities intend not only to neutralise al-Ghuraba but also to hand over Omsen to French custody at a later stage. Such a move would symbolically affirm Syria’s re-entry into international legitimacy while helping France defuse domestic criticism over its “lost jihadists”—a group of radicalised citizens who travelled to Syria between 2012 and 2016.
French intelligence agencies remain deeply concerned that remnants of these networks could attempt to re-activate cells inside France or target European interests abroad. Several individuals with prior contact with Omsen have been arrested in France in recent months, reportedly while preparing to join him in Syria.
Ripple Effects Among Foreign Fighters
The Harem operation has sent shockwaves through Syria’s remaining foreign-fighter communities—particularly Uzbek and Turkestani contingents, many of whom fear they will be next. Some have publicly expressed solidarity with the French fighters and even joined them in combat, raising the risk of a broader confrontation in northern Idlib.
If the clashes persist, they could erode the Syrian government’s fragile security gains. Foreign fighters remain a significant military force in the northwest, and their alienation could re-ignite dormant insurgencies. At the same time, prolonged fighting could undermine the remnants of HTS, whose power once rested heavily on the same foreign elements now under siege.
A Delicate Balancing Act
Domestically, Sharaa faces a complex calculus. His government’s legitimacy partly rests on its ability to deliver stability while projecting an image of ideological moderation and international cooperation. Yet the purge of foreign jihadists risks alienating some factions that were instrumental in the regime’s survival during the later stages of the civil war.
Observers warn that the crackdown could inadvertently bolster the Islamic State’s narrative. IS media have already framed the Harem raid as proof that the new Syrian leadership—like HTS before it—betrays foreign fighters once their utility fades. The group may seek to recruit disillusioned veterans from these battalions, offering them refuge and renewed purpose.
From Jihadist Commander to State President
The irony is not lost on Syrians: Ahmad al-Sharaa, once known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, built his career within the same jihadist networks he is now dismantling. Since taking office, he has pursued a gradual strategy of “nationalising” the insurgent movement—transforming local militias into security forces loyal to the new Syrian Republic and eroding the influence of transnational ideologues.
His challenge today mirrors that of his own transformation: can a man once defined by global jihad now convincingly lead a nation striving for legitimacy in the eyes of both its citizens and the international community?
The Question Ahead
Whether the Harem operation succeeds or spirals into wider conflict will be a crucial test for Sharaa’s leadership. If he manages to neutralise the French battalion without igniting a broader insurgency, he will have proven that Damascus can police its own revolutionaries and meet its counter-terrorism commitments.
If it fails, however, the episode may expose the enduring fragility of Syria’s security landscape—and the contradictions at the heart of a government still haunted by the ghosts of its own past.
