The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip was achieved at a time when Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” which it leads are facing significant challenges at home and in the region, especially in light of the weakening of the axis and the consequences of the “12-Day War” between it and Israel and the United States in June 2025.
Senior Iranian officials expressed support in principle for the ceasefire agreement and claimed that Iran had supported every initiative aimed at ending the war over the past two years. However, they expressed doubts about Israel’s commitment to abide by the agreement. In addition, the officials stressed that the decision on the ceasefire was made exclusively by Hamas without any involvement from Tehran. Iran also rejected the invitation to participate in the peace summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, claiming that it could not participate with those who attacked it during the “12-Day War.”
Iran’s state media portrayed the end of the war as a strategic victory for Hamas and the Palestinians, who succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back at the top of the global agenda, and as a severe defeat for Israel, which did not achieve its goals and was weakened militarily, economically, socially, and internationally.
Before and after the ceasefire, senior officials and media outlets in Iran stressed that, despite the challenges and pressures facing the Islamic Republic and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, Tehran has no intention of abandoning its allies. They emphasized the importance of continuing the “resistance” and Iranian support for it. At the same time, Iran continues to deliver aid, including weapons, to its proxies in the region, including the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
In the ITIC’s assessment, the end of the war in the Gaza Strip is not expected to bring about a significant change in Iran’s policy or put an end to its efforts to expand its influence in the Palestinian arena and to continue providing aid to Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations. In Tehran’s assessment, Hamas’ continued presence in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria may also provide it with future opportunities to rebuild the movement’s capabilities and preserve some of Iran’s influence, despite the operational, logistical, and financial constraints that limit Iran’s continued support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations. At the same time, Iran is expected to continue its support for the other components of the “Axis of Resistance” in the region, first and foremost Hezbollah, which is in the midst of a recovery process despite the IDF’s attacks and the demand for the organization to disarm, and the Houthis, who are taking advantage of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to continue acquiring weapons and improving their offensive capabilities.
Eurasia Press & News