Eurasia Press & News
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where politics often resembles an endless electoral campaign, a small community of fact checkers has become accustomed to working under pressure. Echoes between Sarajevo and Kyiv
“When we started fifteen years ago, there was little reaction”, says Amina Izmirlić Ćatović, a researcher and fact-checker at Istinomjer [Truthmeter], the first political fact-checking platform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
“Now, when we publish, politicians respond immediately”, continues Amina, “an editor even threatened us. We called the police, but nothing happened”.
The local organisation Zašto ne [Why not], which runs Istinomjer, has become a regional leader in tracking and debunking misinformation. Its team works on everything from political statements to historical distortions and foreign propaganda – an effort that increasingly resembles what Ukraine’s own information watchdogs have been doing since the Russian invasion in 2022.
Both countries are facing the same problem: how to preserve democratic accountability in an environment saturated with manipulated information and public distrust.
Echoes between Sarajevo and Kyiv
Like Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a conflict-affected society still dealing with the legacy of war and fragile institutions. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war on Bosnian territory but left the divisions in the country along the ethnic lines, with competing narratives about history and identity. This fractured structure has made the country vulnerable to disinformation both domestic and foreign.
“There is still no political accountability, even though many years have passed since the end of the war”, explains Amina Izmirlić Ćatović. “Every year we have crises. We talk about war and conflicts. But in reality, people in BiH live and function, work together, and life goes on. Politicians create tensions during election periods and artificially worsen relations between communities. The use of misinformation is set to continue”.
In Ukraine, similar patterns have played out on a larger scale, as Russian disinformation campaigns have targeted public opinion since long before the 2022 invasion.
According to Sarajevo analysts, the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina as far as it concerns fragmented media and identity-based manipulation offers a cautionary case study. The local media scene mirrors the country’s political divisions. Independent outlets exist, but party- and ethnically-affiliated media dominate the landscape.
“The private TV stations usually align with their ethnic communities”, says Minel Abaz, a Bosnian journalist and media analyst. “For example, Hayat TV, which is Bosniak-owned, had taken an explicitly pro-Palestine stance in reporting on Gaza. There was no hate speech, but the reporting reflected the message that fit their audience. It is usually like that with private television”.
Public broadcasters face their own challenges.
“On the state level, we can sometimes see a Serbian guest who is a genocide denier and a homophobe”, explains Abaz. “It is presented as balance, as if both sides deserve equal time, but it gives legitimacy to denial”.
The result is a fragmented information ecosystem where trust is low and audience often chooses outlets that confirm existing biases. Social media amplifies the problem.
“TV news is still the main source of information”, says Amina Izmirlić Ćatović. “Facebook is also popular, especially among older people. Younger people are on Instagram and TikTok, and that is why we use Facebook so much – to reach those who still consume most of the political news there”.
Another aspect that the information landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina has in common with that in Ukraine is the spread of Russian disinformation.
“There was a lot of misinformation about the Russian war – blaming Ukraine, spreading stories about Nazi regimes and biolabs”, explains Izmirlić Ćatović. “A part of the population supports Russia’s claims. In Republika Srpska, you can hear narratives very similar to those of the Russian media. These narratives find an audience because they align with political grievances here”.
The overlap is not accidental. Serbian-language media outlets often rebroadcast or republish content from Russian state agencies like Sputnik and RT.
“It is not just about Russia”, explains Minel Abaz. “It is about identity politics. Messages are shaped to reinforce existing divisions”.
Checking power, one claim at a time
At Istinomjer, the daily work of verification is methodical.
“When we detect false statements published by the media or made by politicians, we track down the source and check it against reliable data”, explains Amina Izmirlić Ćatović. “We cite all our sources. We try to be transparent so that readers can clearly understand how we reached our conclusions”.
The team’s coverage extends from domestic politics – including debates on electoral law and constitutional reform – to social and cultural misinformation.
“We cover topics related to EU and NATO integration, social and economic issues, and manipulations of historical facts”, says Izmirlić Ćatović. “We also monitor disinformation about women and LGBT groups, and the influence that Russia and Serbia exert on the media”.
Over time, the audience has changed.
“When we started, there was silence”, explains the researcher. “Over the last five years we have received a lot of feedback – both positive and negative. At least people are engaging. It is a kind of progress”.
Three decades after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, memories of it remain embedded in everyday life and in political discourse.
“It is not just about the anniversary of Srebrenica or the Dayton Agreement”, says Minel Abaz. “War is still part of public discourse. The media and politicians use it as a reference point, sometimes to justify current divisions”.
The constant return to the past has created what some scholars describe as “permanent crisis politics”.
“Bosnia and Herzegovina is always on the brink of war – if not actually, then rhetorically”, says Lejla Salihagić Batrićević, a researcher and editor at WestBalkanNet . “This sense of instability makes people anxious, and it keeps them dependent on political leaders who promise to protect their group”.
The same mechanism – the use of fear and nostalgia – fuels disinformation.
“It is the easiest way to manipulate people”, adds Salihagić Batrićević. “When everything is framed as an existential threat, facts become secondary”.
Media literacy as defense
In response, Zašto ne and other civic organisations have expanded their work beyond fact-checking to education.
“We want to build citizens’ critical skills”, says Amina Izmirlić Ćatović. “Fact-checking alone is not enough. People need to learn to verify information on their own”.
The organisation regularly partners with schools and NGOs, and is now preparing events with UNESCO for Media Literacy Days in BiH. The goal, explains Amina, is to promote a questioning culture.
“We cannot expect democratic accountability if we do not demand it”, claims the researcher.
Still, progress is uneven. The political gridlock and declining youth engagement create fertile ground for apathy.
“The same politicians have been in power for twenty-five years now”, says Izmirlić Ćatović. “Young people are not interested in politics. They do not believe that politics can change”.
Minel Abaz agrees.
“There are various opinions on the possibility of a new conflict”, says Abaz. “We always talk about war, but in everyday life people collaborate. The real division is between those who still believe that politics matters and those who have given up”.
For observers interested in European security, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a revealing case: a small country, with limited resources, yet exposed to the same information threats as bigger countries, and often with greater intensity. The tools developed in BiH to track misinformation, teach media literacy and engage sceptical audiences could serve as a model elsewhere.
Ukraine’s experience, in turn, offers a glimpse of how disinformation can evolve into direct aggression. Analysts in BiH often point to that trajectory as a warning.
“We saw what happened in Ukraine”, says Amina Izmirlić Ćatović. “Disinformation prepared the ground for war. Here, it is still mostly just words. But words can be dangerous too”.
For now, Bosnia’s battles are fought online and in public discourse – a quieter form of warfare, but one with long-term consequences.
“What is happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a unique case”, says Lejla Salihagić Batrićević. “It is test of whether fragile democracies can survive in a world where the information itself is a battlefield”.
