Eurasia Press & News
The United Nations Security Council on Monday approved a US-drafted resolution endorsing President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan for the devastated Gaza Strip.
Authorising an International Stabilisation Force (ISF), a transitional administration, or ‘Board of Peace’, which would oversee reconstruction, while also referencing a “pathway” to Palestinian statehood, the resolution provides a legal mandate for Washington’s post-war vision.
But nearly five weeks after the ceasefire went into effect, all major parties – Israel, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) – have aligned in so far resisting the transition to phase two of the truce deal, despite publicly advocating for its success.
This standoff reflects a counterintuitive reality: each actor faces political, military, and security costs that phase two would impose, making the indefinite extension of the current arrangement preferable to formal progression.
Israeli officials cite the recovery of remains as a prerequisite; Hamas shows no readiness to disarm; and the Palestinian Authority has failed to meet reform conditions necessary for international approval of its return to governing Gaza.
“The delay in implementing phase two came under the pretext of bodies, with Israel refusing to move to phase two without completing what was agreed in phase one,” Israeli affairs analyst Esmat Mansour explained to The New Arab.
“Israel is deliberately delaying, and (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu is comfortable with this delay because he fears the political repercussions of this transition, which would involve the return of the Palestinian Authority in some form to Gaza and Israeli withdrawal commitments.”
The result is a de facto consensus among opposed actors to maintain the status quo, a rare convergence of interests that obscures whether the plan will proceed, collapse into renewed military operations, or if alternative arrangements might eventually reshape Gaza’s political architecture.
“Netanyahu’s government does not want to move to phase two because it entails obligations that would pull the government into political discussions,” Mansour continued.
“In the current situation, Netanyahu can manoeuvre between his coalition partners and claim he is not making concessions to Hamas. Moving to phase two would expose the complexities of the agreement and reveal that Hamas still exists in Gaza.” The analyst emphasised the strategic advantage Israel sees in prolonging the first phase indefinitely.
“Israel is trying to extend phase one, and it is also hoping to create a fait accompli that would exempt it from the requirements of phase two, putting Hamas and the factions before a choice. The longer this situation drags on, the more comfortable it is for Netanyahu.”
The Israeli PM faces internal political constraints, as any transition would require commitments on the Palestinian Authority’s reinstatement in Gaza and Israeli military withdrawals, concessions that could fracture his coalition government.
Mansour also pointed to what he described as a broader temporal calculation.
“Israel is also banking on Trump losing interest in the Gaza issue and a new reality on the ground forming that would exempt it from any commitment,” he said.
Hamas’s position
Yet Israel is not alone in its intransigence. Hamas has shown no genuine readiness to disarm or relinquish governance, according to analysts, while simultaneously lacking a concrete plan for doing so.
The Palestinian Authority, meanwhile, has expressed theoretical willingness but has failed to meet reform conditions demanded by the Trump administration and international mediators as prerequisites for governing Gaza.
“The Palestinian Authority has been asked to undertake specific reforms that it has not completed,” Mansour noted. “The bottom line is that all parties are dodging the obligations of phase two, and their interests have converged around doing exactly that”.
He elaborated on the paradox this creates. “It’s not just Israel that is unprepared to pay the price of phase two. Hamas is unprepared and has no readiness to hand over its weapons or plan for it. Israel is also unprepared and doesn’t want it to happen quickly or at all,” he said.
Mansour stressed that this convergence reflects genuine constraints each actor faces. “Each party faces different pressure points, but all benefit from avoiding the commitments that phase two would impose.”
Contested scenarios
Analysts are divided on whether this deadlock will hold or trigger alternative outcomes.
Mansour does not dismiss a return to large-scale military operations, noting that Israel possesses sufficient military capacity and an expanding target bank, while Hamas has demonstrably lost any conventional military capability.
“Despite this, the American and regional positions make this option the last resort, but it cannot be ruled out at all, because Israel’s subsequent objectives of disarming Hamas, including its tunnels, and removing it from Gaza governance remain in place and it is working to achieve them by all means – if not through negotiation, then by force,” Mansour stated.
However, Sami al-Astal, a professor of political history at Al-Aqsa University in Gaza, takes a different view.
He argues that American and international pressure to avoid renewed conflict remains strong enough to drive phase two forward, despite the obstacles.
“The Trump administration will push with all its strength not to go backwards, and mediators are making efforts to find compromise solutions regarding Hamas’s disarmament and its withdrawal from governance,” al-Astal stated.
“The American proposal, backed by Arab and Muslim mediators, will form the first steps toward transitioning to phase two.”
He acknowledged that genuine difficulties ahead “could explode at any time”, but mediators, foremost among them America, will not accept this happening, largely due to the consequences for Israel if it continues its genocidal war, which engendered global hostility and mounting legal and political pressure.
Israel’s military contingency plan
The Israeli Broadcasting Authority reported that the military is preparing a contingency plan for Hamas’s disarmament should the ceasefire plan fail. An Israeli source told Kan News that “the question is not whether Hamas will be disarmed, but who will do it”.
This suggests that Israeli security planners are hedging against an indefinite political stalemate by preparing military alternatives, though international and regional political positions may constrain their implementation.
Al-Astal acknowledged that Israel remains “the primary beneficiary of marking time” and has no appetite for political concessions regarding Gaza or the broader Palestinian question. Yet he emphasised that Hamas must recognise this dynamic and demonstrate flexibility, as Gaza’s civilian population bears the cost of prolonged uncertainty.
“The occupation is the first beneficiary of staying in place and does not want to pay any political dues regarding Gaza or the Palestinian cause as a whole, and Hamas must understand this and provide the necessary flexibility because those who pay the price are the people of Gaza,” he said.
He noted that phase two may be delayed, but it is expected that no major military development will occur that would lead to the cancellation or Israeli rejection of the Trump plan itself, Al-Astal argued, “especially as Hamas is more committed to it as a means of saving Gaza from genocide and returning it to life”.
He cautioned against expecting a full-scale war comparable to the October 2023 offensive, but suggested that a stronger, more destructive version of the Lebanese model of striking anytime, anywhere, remains within the realm of possibility.
“The Lebanese model is closest but in a stronger and more destructive form, given Gaza’s significant weakness compared to Lebanon,” he said.
