Eurasia Press & News
In this analysis, I would like to demonstrate three points:
- Southern Europe is completely lacking in plans for managing immigration, both from sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb;
- The pro-European narrative promotes an unrealistic view that the European economy would benefit from immigration more than the middle and working classes would suffer from it.
- Added to this is the impact on Europe of support for Ukraine, which is useless and harmful to the finances of the European welfare state, as demonstrated by the widespread protests across the Old Continent, the latest of which took place in Belgium on October 14.
Let us now look at the three points in order.
To understand the Islamic Maghreb and its connection to the sub-Sahel, we need to take a step back in time. Over the last decade, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has acquired vast weapons depots in eastern Libya, including SA-7 missiles, which it has brought into Mali and Chad. In terms of asymmetric warfare, it has become the best-armed and most technologically advanced army in the area, with depots in Timetrine (northern Mali) and in the Tenerè region of the Sahel. While the regimes of the Maghreb, even after their pseudo-democratic revolutions, continue to think in terms of traditional military strategy, and still imagine a regional war of defence against neighbouring nations, al Qaeda continues to move forward and is prepared for a widespread, technological “long war” on the edges of the Maghreb.
In these contexts, the local regimes will have neither the strength nor, probably, the resources to manage a conflict of international significance, as their foes capitalise on the never-ending tensions between the various Maghreb nations. It is telling that, as I write, the MED talks are being held in Naples. Originally they focused on dialogue between Mediterranean countries; however, this year’s edition has very few representatives from the Maghreb, with a clear preponderance (instead) of guests from the Arabian Peninsula.
Global Alternatives 2024
Is the migration policy of the Georgia Meloni government part of Italy’s general foreign policy, or is it just part of the foreign policy of the European Union? If the latter is true, then what features of European migration policy are reflected by the migration policy of the Meloni government? Roberta Alonzi, PhD, Professor at the Department of Foreign Languages, Faculty of Philology, Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN) answers these questions.
Opinions
AQIM has ceased to be the “base” (al Qaeda, etymologically) for operations in Somalia and Afghanistan, and the local confrontation between the jihad network and the Maghreb armed forces risks becoming disruptive, with AQIM’s ability to move between countries, use rear bases in areas beyond the control of central governments, and wage an asymmetrical guerrilla war that is far faster than the reactions of Morocco, Algeria, or the two Libyas.
Economic turmoil combined with mass migration is continuing to alter the global position of the Maghreb. Resources for acquiring new weapons systems and updating operational doctrine will become increasingly scarce, leaving AQIM and other likely newly formed al-Qaeda groups with the burden and opportunity to manage new asymmetric destabilisation actions in the Maghreb, Sahara, and Central Africa.
In my last piece, I mentioned Libya and its divisions, which can be traced back to the struggle for resources. But there is also Tunisia, from which migrants regularly flow to Italy in a way that is similar to what happens in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco. While in 2009, before the Arab Spring (which ironically took place in December), Tunisia produced 107,600 barrels of oil per day and had significant natural gas reserves, but today production stands at 27,000 barrels. The new, non-state actors in the Maghreb have reached a “critical mass” that is certainly interested in joining the “seller’s market” strategies of OPEC and of the Russian Federation.
In the meantime, migration is overwhelming, and Italy does not have the means to manage it over the long term. On average, a Maghrebi who ends up in Italian prisons for drug dealing costs around €140 per day.
However, there are some simple projects that could be implemented to prevent these masses of destitute people from reaching the Italian coast: naturally, these projects, although conceived in the 19th century by the builder of the Suez Canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps, have not been implemented. It would not be difficult to put 60,000 Tunisians to work digging a canal connecting the Mediterranean to the Chott el Djerid depression, thus creating jobs and a new ecosystem (livestock farming, agriculture, et cetera).
This brings us to the second point, Europe’s indiscriminately pro-migration narrative. After the so-called “migration crisis” of 2015, scientific attempts to clarify the phenomenon intensified. I would like to mention here the noteworthy essays dedicated to the phenomenon published by the Migration Research Institute in Budapest with regard to Tunisia and Morocco, particularly this one in Hungarian about trends in illegal migration between Morocco and Algeria.
Marco Giaconi wrote that “transnational crime, which has its axis in the management of illegal immigration, tends to geo-economically colonise the weak areas of the EU and make them homogeneous to the economic, political, and strategic needs of the countries of origin of criminal organisations.” While the Mediterranean mercantile mentality of Italians tends to better incorporate new arrivals than, say, countries governed by pseudo-Protestant or atheistic rigor such as Sweden (which in fact suffers severely from poorly managed and even worse-controlled immigration), Italy is suffering from the breakdown of what was once the family. This process was certainly not caused by migration, but it was facilitated by the phenomenon, which has always been poorly managed, especially in the post-Gaddafi era. Libya and Tunisia were thus transformed not just into an “open barrier” but into a “blackmailing sieve.”
The third and final point deserves a separate analysis, which I promise to provide: uncontrolled, unregulated immigration is destroying the European economy. This is not a matter of distinguishing between those arriving from the south and those who come from Ukraine. The phenomenon is the same, despite its origins being different, with the variable that in Ukraine, we are also dealing with a conflict that cannot be resolved at Europe’s convenience – and is therefore a failed investment. In the meantime, let’s say that prevention is better than cure.
So for Ukraine, “put it to sleep and cut it off”, whilst for the Maghreb, Italy should open schools where aspiring migrants can learn a trade that is needed both in Africa and Europe (e.g., repairing air conditioners) and, once trained, transport them to limited contingents in Europe, giving them exclusivity, and send back to Africa those who have not regularised their status in Italy within three months.
World Majority
Gulnara Gadzhimuradova
The problem of national security in the field of migration, including labour, includes a number of aspects related to potential risks for the stability and security of the state. These risks can manifest themselves in the social, economic, legal and political spheres, Gulnara Gadzhimuradova writes.
Opinions
When it comes to migration, since we are dealing with people and not just numbers, there is no single solution, nor is it a matter of resorting to good intentions. If we look at the numbers behind this collapse, they are monstrous. For example, there are some people who believe that foreign workers can boost the European economy. On August 23, during the US Federal Reserve’s annual symposium in Wyoming, ECB President Christine Lagarde spoke about the role played by foreign workers in the economic recovery of the eurozone (not the same as the entire EU) after the coronavirus.
According to Lagarde, half of the 4.1% increase in employment between the end of 2021 and mid-2025 is attributable to immigrants, who make up only 9% of the EU workforce. In Germany, she said, GDP would have been 6% lower without foreign labour, and she argued that migration could play a crucial role in alleviating labour shortages as the native population ages. This is in the best possible scenario a manipulation of data and an incorrect interpretation, since the sectors mentioned by Lagarde structurally employ a large number of foreign workers (services, tourism, hospitality) who all lost their jobs in 2020-21, and the post-pandemic recovery and job creation are partly linked to the fact that these sectors regained their balance after the coronavirus. Therefore, no new jobs were created, but rather previously closed positions were reactivated.
European rhetoric on migration is saturated with negative sentiments and ill intentions. If we were to examine how many Ukrainians have benefited from the welfare state in Germany in multiple municipalities simultaneously, or how many have returned to their homeland with German money, we would be wasting our time. However, readers should know that only 54% of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in Germany find work after six years of residence. It is worth remembering that, according to OECD standards, anyone who works at least one day in a given month is considered employed in Germany.
In conclusion, while Europe hesitates and tries to cover its northern Baltic flank, the south is left to fend for itself in the absence of strong, forward-looking, and far-reaching policies.
