Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 10, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

ISW-CTP’s satellite imagery partner has expanded its imagery restrictions to include Iran and will now delay the release of all satellite imagery from the region by 14 days. ISW-CTP will be unable to confirm strikes or assess damage at sites using satellite imagery from this partner for at least 14 days after a strike occurs. We are exploring other options and methods to confirm strikes and will continue to confirm strikes where possible.

Key Takeaways

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 10 that US forces destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian mining efforts are part of a broader Iranian effort to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to try to impose a cost on the Gulf states and the United States. Iranian efforts to mine the Strait of Hormuz will also likely further hinder Iran’s ability to export oil, including shipments to China, the largest importer of Iranian oil.
The Iranian regime is expanding securitization efforts amid the ongoing conflict, which likely reflects the regime’s paranoia about US-Israeli infiltration and signals a shift to prioritization of counterintelligence. The regime similarly prioritized regime security following the June 2025 Iran-Israel War and arrested hundreds of individuals in the days after the conflict as part of a broader effort to strengthen internal control and expand securitization measures.
The combined force targeted Iranian internal security institutions in western and northwestern Iran. Refer to the graphic below to see key Iranian internal security sites that have been struck since the start of the war.
The combined force continues to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq to limit the ability of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States and Israel.
Hezbollah claimed 29 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and 3:00 PM ET on March 10. Hezbollah’s 29 claimed attacks are the highest number of claimed attacks in a 24-hour period that ISW-CTP has observed since the start of the conflict.

Toplines

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 10 that US forces destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait of Hormuz.[1] Iranian mining efforts are part of a broader Iranian effort to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to try to impose a cost on the Gulf states and the United States. CBS News, citing unspecified US officials, reported on March 10 that Iran may be preparing to deploy naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz.[2] The officials added that Iran is using small craft that can carry up to three mines each. US President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social on March 10 that the United States wants any mines that Iran placed in the Strait of Hormuz “removed immediately,” though he added that the United States has “no reports of [Iran] doing so.”[3] Trump also threatened military consequences “at a level never seen before” if Iran fails to remove any mines it has placed.[4] Iran previously laid mines in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War to disrupt international shipping and impose a cost on Iraq and its allies.[5] The United States launched an operation in April 1988 that destroyed at least two Iranian oil platforms, sank at least three Iranian speedboats, and severely damaged or sank two Iranian frigates after an Iranian mine seriously damaged the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf.[6]

Notably, reports of Iran trying to lay mines have emerged three days after the last confirmed Iranian attacks on vessels in the Persian Gulf on March 7.[7] Iran attacked at least three vessels in the Persian Gulf each day from March 1 through March 4.[8] The first phase of the US-Israeli campaign and continued strikes on Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure have limited Iran’s ability to retaliate with ballistic missiles and drones, however. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on March 5 that US strikes have made Iran’s navy “combat ineffective.”[9] Hegseth stated on March 10 that Iran has fired its lowest number of missiles since the war began in the last 24 hours.[10]

Iranian efforts to mine the Strait of Hormuz will also likely further hinder Iran’s ability to export oil, including shipments to China, the largest importer of Iranian oil.[11] Mining is, therefore, an extreme option to which Iran has resorted and does not represent a desirable option for the country’s military officials. Commercial maritime data shows that only three tankers listed as part of Iran’s ghost fleet have crossed the Strait of Hormuz since March 2.[12] This marks a significant decline from the 24 vessels that crossed between February 22 and March 1.[13]

The combined force continues to conduct airstrikes targeting air offensive and defensive capabilities. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that the Israel Air Force (IAF) fighter jets dropped more than 170 munitions targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force in Tehran City, a missile production and storage site and several air defense systems in Esfahan City, and unspecified military infrastructure in Shiraz City on March 9.[14] The IDF also struck a missile launcher and Iranian military personnel in an unspecified location in Iran on March 9.[15] Anti-regime media reported on March 10 that an airstrike targeted a hidden missile launcher in Shiraz’s industrial area at an unspecified time.[16] An Israeli open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst also identified that previous combined force airstrikes destroyed several radars and Hawk missile batteries at the Shahid Sattari Rapid Reaction Air Defense site in Ghani Abad, southeast of Tehran City, on commercially available satellite imagery on March 10.[17] Israeli think tank Alma also identified damage to at least six support structures and two radar emplacements on satellite imagery on March 7.[18] Alma reported that this air defense site covers several key Iranian military sites, including the Khojir missile production and Parchin weapons complexes in northern Tehran City – both of which combined force airstrikes have targeted and damaged since February 28.[19] Israel previously targeted this air defense site in October 2024, when it targeted Iran’s three of Iran’s S-300 air defense systems.[20]

The combined force continues to strike industrial sites affiliated with Iran’s missile and drone program that aim to make it harder for Iran to reconstitute its missile and drone stockpiles. An OSINT analyst reported that combined force airstrikes on March 9 targeted the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which produces liquid-fueled ballistic missiles at a site west of Tehran City.[21] The Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group is a subsidiary company of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry’s Aerospace Industries Organization responsible for Iran’s missile and drone production program.[22] An OSINT analyst separately geolocated a target of IAF airstrikes on March 6 to a chemical industry complex in Shokuhiyeh industrial town in Qom Province on March 10.[23]

The combined force’s decapitation campaign has successfully targeted key figures in the Iranian armed forces’ command and control and logistics. Anti-regime media confirmed on March 10 that previous combined force airstrikes killed Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Basij chief Asadollah Badfar.[24] Iranian media has yet to confirm Badfar’s death at the time of this writing. Iranian media on March 10 announced the funerals of several senior Iranian commanders killed in combined force airstrikes since the start of the war.[25] The following list contains deceased commanders that ISW-CTP has not reported previously:

IRGC Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Unit Commander for Greater Tehran Brigadier General Hassan Hassanzadeh (operates under IRGC Ground Forces Sarallah Headquarters, which enforces internal security)[26]
AFGS Logistic head Brigadier General Hassan Ali Tajik[27]
AFGS Logistics and Industrial Research deputy Brigadier General Mohsen Darrebaghi[28]
AFGS Plans and Operations head Brigadier General Hosseini Motlagh[29]
Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization head Brigadier General Gholamreza Rezaian[30]
LEC Public Places head Brigadier General Khalil Helali (responsible for public establishments and businesses inspections)[31]
Brigadier General Davoud Askari (unspecified position)[32]

The Iranian regime is expanding securitization efforts amid the ongoing conflict, which likely reflects the regime’s paranoia about US-Israeli infiltration and signals a shift to prioritization of counterintelligence. Iranian security and intelligence services reported several arrests across Iran on March 10, including 30 individuals accused of acting as spies or “media operatives.”[33] Iranian media claimed that intelligence authorities arrested a foreign national in Khorasan Razavi Province, accused of spying for two unspecified Gulf countries by collecting Iranian military and security information.[34] Iranian media also reported arrests tied to alleged militant and anti-regime networks along Iran’s southeastern and northwestern borders.[35] Security forces separately arrested individuals accused of providing footage of strike sites to anti-regime media outlets and communicating with the Iran International network, including the arrest of 81 individuals accused of sharing information with an anti-regime outlet through social media.[36] The regime similarly prioritized regime security following the June 2025 Iran-Israel War and arrested hundreds of individuals in the days after the conflict as part of a broader effort to strengthen internal control and expand securitization measures.[37]

The following series of infographics tracks US and Israeli efforts to target key nodes of the Iranian regime’s internal security apparatus, including the IRGC Ground Forces, Basij, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC). These institutions are critical to Iran’s ability to maintain domestic stability and social control, particularly during periods of internal unrest. Many of the units listed below participated in protest suppression during the winter 2025-2026 protest wave, for example.

The combined force targeted Iranian internal security institutions in western and northwestern Iran. The IDF reported on March 10 that the combined force struck an LEC Special Forces Unit, the LEC Provincial Command headquarters, a police criminal investigation building, the Intelligence Ministry building, and a Basij compound in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province.[38] Regime-affiliated media also reported on March 10 that the combined force struck six other police buildings in East Azerbaijan.[39] The IDF stated on March 10 that it struck the LEC Provincial Command headquarters, the Intelligence Ministry, a Basij compound, and an LEC Special Forces Unit in Ilam Province.[40] The IDF said that it “dismantled most of the central assets” of the LEC and Basij in Ilam Province.[41] LEC Special Forces Units are the regime’s elite anti-riot police.[42] Anti-regime media and OSINT accounts reported on March 10 that the combined force also struck a Basij unit headquarters and an IRGC force headquarters in Kermanshah Province.[43]

Iranian Retaliation

Iran launched at least seven missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and 3:00 PM ET on March 10.[44] One Iranian ballistic missile landed in an open area of Beit Shemesh, Central Israel, on March 10 but did not cause casualties or damage.[45] A previous Iranian missile strike on Beit Shemesh killed at least nine people on March 1.[46] A separate Hezbollah rocket attack struck Beit Shemesh on February 9 but did not cause casualties.[47] The IDF estimates that Iran has fired approximately 300 missiles at Israel since February 28, which is about half the total number Iran fired during the 12-Day War.[48]

Iran continued drone and ballistic missile attacks on Gulf states on March 10. The UAE has detected fewer incoming projectiles since March 9, which suggests that combined force strikes on Iranian drone launch infrastructure have degraded Iran’s ability to sustain large-scale drone attacks. The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that Iran launched nine ballistic missiles and 35 drones at the UAE on March 10, which is consistent with the significantly lower rate the UAE reported on March 9.[49] The UAE recorded nine drone impacts on March 10, which killed two people.[50] The increase in drone impacts compared to March 9, when there was only one impact, likely reflects variability in interception rates or targeting rather than a recovery in Iranian launch capabilities.[51] Iranian drone launch rates targeting the UAE have declined from roughly 100 drones per day earlier in the campaign to fewer than 50 per day since March 9, likely due to combined force strikes on Iranian launch sites.[52] The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles launched remains relatively consistent with an average of around 13 a day since March 1, however. Iran also launched drones and ballistic missiles targeting Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait between 8:00 am ET and 3:00 pm ET on March 10, but the countries’ respective defense ministries reported that air defense systems intercepted all projectiles.[53]

Axis of Resistance Response

The combined force continues to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq to limit the ability of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States and Israel. The combined force reportedly conducted multiple rounds of airstrikes targeting the headquarters of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) near al Qaim, Anbar Province, on March 10.[54] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control brigades within the PMF.[55] Some of the airstrikes targeted the 18th PMF Brigade, which is affiliated with Saraya Talia al Khurasani, and injured 5 members of the brigade.[56] The combined force struck the 18th PMF Brigade headquarters in the same area on March 9.[57] The combined force also struck several unidentified locations on the Syria-Iraq border on March 10, according to a security source in Anbar Province speaking to Iraqi media.[58] Combined force strikes targeting a 40th PMF Brigade headquarters near Kirkuk City, Kirkuk Province, on March 10, killed at least four Kataib al Imam Ali members.[59] Kataib al Imam Ali controls the 40th PMF Brigade.[60]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to conduct and claim to conduct attacks targeting US forces and bases in Iraq and the region. US air defenses at Baghdad International Airport intercepted two drones on March 10, according to Iraqi media.[61] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to claim that the US occupies its former Camp Victory base at Baghdad International Airport, despite the United States withdrawing from the base in 2011.[62] Iraqi air defenses also reportedly intercepted a drone near Erbil Airport, which houses a US base.[63] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 9 that its forces conducted 37 drone and missile operations targeting US and “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region.[64] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed on March 10 that it intercepted a US MQ9 drone over northern Basra Province.[65] Iraqi media reported two separate instances of drone impacts in Majnoon oil field in northern Basra Province, but it is unclear if the Islamic Resistance of Iraq is connected to these events.[66] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front groups Saraya Awliya al Dam, Kataib Sarqhat al Quds, and Rijal al Bas al Shadid continue to claim attacks targeting US forces and US-affiliated sites in Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as US bases in other regional countries such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan.[67] ISW-CTP assessed on March 6 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be using front groups in an attempt to avoid US and Israeli strikes on militia positions and obfuscate culpability.[68] An OSINT account reported on March 10 that unidentified Iraqi militias conducted a drone attack targeting the UAE consulate in Erbil.[69] The Saudi Foreign Ministry condemned the attack targeting the Emirati consulate.[70]

A spokesperson for Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba told Axis of Resistance-affiliated media on March 10 that the Axis of Resistance is coordinating its efforts across Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen to strike US and Israeli military bases in the region.[71] Different Axis of Resistance members, such as the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis, have previously coordinated attacks, including during the October 7 War.[72] ISW-CTP has observed no indicators of coordination between Axis members or Axis members and Iran during the current conflict, however. The Houthis have yet to conduct any attacks or even threaten to do so in response to the combined force’s campaign in Iran or Israeli operations in Lebanon. The IDF Spokesman Brigadier General Effie Defrin reported that the IDF has no intelligence indicating that an attack on unspecified sites in central Israel on March 4, with concurrent fire from Iran and by Hezbollah in Lebanon, was a coordinated effort.[73]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military sites in Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against Israel. The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah rocket launch sites in Lebanon on March 9.[74] Israel also released evacuation orders for four additional towns, Yohmor, Western Beqaa District, and Arnoun, Yohmor, Zawtar El Charqiyeh, and Zawtar El Gharbiyeh – all in Nabatieh District – on March 10.[75] The IDF said that any residential site used by Hezbollah for military purposes could be targeted.[76]

Hezbollah claimed 29 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and 3:00 PM ET on March 10. Hezbollah’s 29 claimed attacks are the highest number of claimed attacks in a 24-hour period that ISW-CTP has observed since the start of the conflict.[77] Israeli media reported on March 9 that Israel’s security establishment told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz that Hezbollah will expand its rocket attacks “in the coming days,” striking deeper within Israeli territory at “significant facilities.”[78] Hezbollah has continued to attack IDF forces and positions in southern Lebanon, including launching rockets targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hamamis, Wadi al Asafir, and Khallet al Mahafir, Marjaayoun District.[79] Hezbollah has repeatedly targeted Israeli forces at these locations since the start of the conflict.[80] Hezbollah additionally claimed that it targeted two Israeli military positions on the Israel-Lebanon border, one Israeli military base in northern Israel, and a defense industrial site southeast of Acre, Northern Israel.[81]

Syrian media reported that Hezbollah shelled a Syrian town on the Lebanon-Syria border on March 10.[82] The Syrian Army told Syrian state media on March 10 that Hezbollah fighters shelled the Syrian town of Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on the Lebanon-Syria border.[83] The Syrian Army reported that it has observed Hezbollah reinforcements arriving on the Lebanon-Syria border.[84] The Syrian army said that it is closely monitoring the situation, assessing next steps, and in contact with the LAF.[85] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara had a phone call on March 10 to discuss coordination to strengthen Lebanon-Syria border control.[86] Syrian authorities have repeatedly interdicted weapons smuggling shipments in Serghaya, almost certainly bound for Hezbollah, in recent months.[87]
The IDF has continued to conduct “forward defense maneuver[s]” in southern Lebanon.[88] The IDF announced that soldiers from the 7th Armored Brigade (36th Division) conducted raids within southern Lebanon on March 9, in which they identified and killed an unspecified number of Hezbollah fighters who had entered a building near the Israeli force.[89] The IDF also said that 36th Division soldiers raided a weapons depot and a Hezbollah Radwan Force command post in southern Lebanon.[90] The IDF also reported that 769th Regional Brigade (91st Division) soldiers identified a Hezbollah cell and directed airstrikes targeting the individuals in southern Lebanon.[91] The 769th Regional Brigade (91st Division) has operated targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in southern Lebanon in recent months.[92]

Unspecified Lebanese sources told Reuters on March 10 that Hezbollah is employing lessons that the organization learned during the Fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[93] The four Lebanese sources “familiar with Hezbollah’s military activities” said that Hezbollah has appointed four deputies to each commander to ensure continued operations in the event of the commander’s death.[94] The IDF targeted numerous brigade, company, and platoon-level commanders in southern Lebanon during the Israeli campaign in Fall 2024, which ISW-CTP assessed may have diminished the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah units in organizing an effective defense against Israeli advances.[95] The Lebanese sources also told Reuters that Hezbollah is rationing the use of its anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM).[96] ATGMs are the primary munition that Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon have historically relied upon to defend against Israeli armor.[97] The fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon severely diminished Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles, and the IDF seized tens of thousands of ATGMs from Hezbollah warehouses in southern Lebanon during the campaign.[98]

Axios reported on March 9 that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Rodolphe Haykal has refused to enforce the Lebanese government’s decision to outlaw Hezbollah’s military activity.[99] The Lebanese Cabinet declared all Hezbollah military and security activity to be illegal on March 2 and demanded that Hezbollah hand over all of its weapons to the state.[100] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam called upon the LAF to take ”immediate measures” to implement the government’s decision.[101] The LAF has been historically reticent to confront Hezbollah with force. The LAF has not directly confronted Hezbollah as part of its recent efforts within the past year to disarm Hezbollah, for example, which is a significant barrier to any meaningful disarmament of the group.[102] Haykal’s unwillingness to deploy LAF units to confront Hezbollah fighters is reportedly fueling tensions with Salam.[103]