Eurasia Press & News
The U.S. Office for Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) has allowed the Belarusian airline Belavia to purchase parts and new aircraft on September 11, which will open Russian companies the opportunity to purchase parts for their aircraft bypassing sanctions through Belarus. Russian civil aviation was seriously damaged due to sanctions, and it is not only and not so much in the shortage of spare parts (how Russian aviation managed to establish parallel import of aircraft parts). Pilots and engineers working in Russian airlines told The Insider that after 3.5 years of the war, pre-flight calculations are often made literally manually, the weather is checked by public web services, and due to GPS problems, crews have to fly with the failed system of conflict protection with other aircraft.
Paper maps
Since the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine, Russian airlines have been left without the aeronautical charts and diagrams supplied by Western companies. Pilots were forced to fly using paper charts. Russian developers quickly created their own equivalents of Western aeronautical software, but these proved either inconvenient or contained numerous errors.
Ivan, a former pilot for one of the Russian airlines:
There are several major providers of aeronautical charts and diagrams worldwide. The most commonly used systems are either the American Jeppesen system or the German LIDO. They support a global update standard: the navigation database is updated simultaneously across the globe every 28 days.
Aeroflot switched to LIDO ten years ago. But with the imposition of sanctions, aeronautical information was banned from being transmitted to Russia. Aeroflot was left without charts. But no one stopped flights—everyone continues to fly, violating all regulations.
Vasily, Boeing 737-800 pilot:
We flew using maps from the American company Jeppesen. When Crimea was transferred to Russia in 2014, navigation there changed—there were no approach charts, and the air traffic controller frequencies changed. But by 2015, Simferopol Airport was completely based on our maps. Everything was done for money back then.
When Boeing and Airbus left the Russian market in 2022, aeronautical support was still being supplied for a month. No one knew what to do next. The option was to switch to paper charts. Each country publishes its own aeronautical information collection. Sanctions are impossible to impose on this. This means that any country can request charts, routes, and airfield approach charts and their data from another.
And we did fly with paper maps for a while. We had a big suitcase with maps for every country. All the data that you can now easily access on a tablet was on paper. It took six months to a year for Russian equivalents of American and German apps to appear. At first, they were very flawed, but now they’re quite functional.
We now fly using [electronic] tablets. Essentially, the maps on them are no different from paper ones. But legally, we were obligated to use paper ones because they are the only ones that are 100% up-to-date.
Ivan, a former pilot for one of the Russian airlines:
[After the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine], Aeroflot began frantically searching for a new aeronautical information provider and found a small company in St. Petersburg called Aeromap , which developed the SkyBagPro app . This company has grown rapidly. But the problem is that it’s impossible to produce high-quality maps quickly. There were many errors—for example, in approach charts. Relying on these maps, an airplane could end up in the wrong place altogether.Ilya, co-pilot of the Airbus A330/A350:
iFly and Rossiya Airlines handle calculations for Aeroflot. But this is all very complicated because the routes are different, the calculation formats are different, the crews aren’t accustomed to them, and it’s unclear who did them. The reliability of this data is also highly questionable. The calculation format is specified in the airline’s documents; it can’t be changed or omitted altogether. But now, if you resist and argue that your own rules don’t allow it, you’ll likely be fired.
So, now everything is possible: flying without flight documents, without calculations, without hazard maps, without maps of restricted areas, including those where air defense systems operate. We simply add fuel by eye, knowing roughly how much we’ll need, plus five tons more to make sure we have enough.
Manual flight calculation
Navigation isn’t the only problem facing Russian airlines. Pre-flight calculations are now often done literally by hand, and weather information is checked using publicly available web services. All of this violates international aviation standards.
Mikhail, commander of the Airbus A320:
Following a hacker attack (in July 2025 — The Insider), Aeroflot lost almost all of its databases, including navigation data, as well as the ability to calculate flights. Flight calculations are highly complex, which is why there’s a job title called an air traffic controller—an employee who typically manages multiple flights.
Calculations begin approximately three hours before departure, sometimes earlier. The dispatcher monitors the entire flight. If something goes wrong, they can re-arrange the route on the fly. Any route is coordinated with the countries through which it passes. If even one of them doesn’t approve, the flight is impossible. This system is now dead; everything is done manually.
Mostly medium-haul aircraft fly within Russia. Their crews use outdated calculations and pretend they’re up to date. In reality, of course, they’re not: wind conditions change, route restrictions shift, but the crews know absolutely nothing about it. They get navigation data from the internet, and weather information from open sources. What’s the weather like in Surgut? They fly in and see, “Oh, the weather’s fine. Okay, let’s fly.” This is completely at odds with any international standards.
Crews use old calculations and pretend that they correspond to the current situation
Information can only be obtained from an official source. Every figure in the weather forecast is a legally significant parameter, which the crew relies on when making decisions about takeoff and landing. Naturally, safety is compromised because the fundamental principle of operation—separation of responsibility from official sources of information—is violated.
Ivan, a former pilot for one of the Russian airlines:
Previously, flight fuel calculations were also done using computer software. They primarily used the SABRE system, which is used by airlines worldwide. For each flight, they calculated wind conditions, routes to avoid hazardous weather conditions, danger zones, conflict zones, and so on. The load on each flight varies: the heavier the aircraft, the more fuel it naturally requires.
But now all these calculations are done manually because the systems no longer work. And to calculate the fuel needed for a flight, many factors must be taken into account: the aircraft’s load and the nominal fuel consumption. This varies from plane to plane, and can vary by hundreds of liters. If there isn’t enough fuel, the flight may not be completed.
It’s the same with weather. Meteorological data is collected for every airport and every aviation station, which is used to create actual weather forecasts—short-term, for the next two hours, and long-term, for 24, 36 hours, and so on. Everything is specified: cloud height, density, temperature, pressure, dew point, and the likelihood of wind gusts. After the hacker attack on Aeroflot, this system works in some places, but not in others, so people simply look up aviation weather online.
“Nobody knows who’s flying where.”
Due to the war over Moscow and other Russian regions, GPS signals are being distorted. As a result, aircraft instruments incorrectly determine coordinates, forcing pilots to make false maneuvers to avoid obstacles. Due to GPS issues, crews are forced to fly with their collision avoidance systems turned off, which could cause military systems to identify civilian aircraft as a threat and attack them.
GPS problems force crews to fly with the aircraft collision avoidance system turned off.
Yuri, Airbus A320 captain:
GPS problems are enormous. A very unpleasant phenomenon for aviation has emerged: GPS spoofing, which occurs when equipment on the ground not only jams the satellite signal but distorts it. And this isn’t just happening over Moscow; it’s happening over a significant portion of Russia. As a result, the aircraft receives a false signal and locates itself in a different location. This is extremely dangerous.
There are also systems for separating aircraft from each other and from ground obstacles. For example, if taking off toward the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the aircraft will warn the crew of a possible collision a certain distance away. Currently, Russian pilots are instructed to turn off this system and ignore its recommendations. Due to GPS spoofing in Moscow, some pilots turn it off even at low altitudes, where it is most effective.
Russian pilots are being ordered to turn off their ground obstacle recognition systems due to GPS signal distortion across the country.
We’re also disabling the air-to-air collision detection system. All civil aviation aircraft use the TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System). Because GPS coordinates are constantly erratic, a situation could arise where the onboard systems think the aircraft is dangerously close not only to the ground but also to another aircraft. Then TCAS will begin issuing commands to avoid collisions.
On most Aeroflot aircraft, it won’t interfere with the controls—it’ll simply prompt maneuvers in low-visibility conditions. And if another aircraft is below, above, or behind you, it’s impossible to see. You simply need to follow the evasive maneuver. But now we’re forced to abandon decades-old civil aviation systems and fly using old navigation patterns that offer a much lower level of precision and safety.
And then there’s the military sector, which, if unaware of a civilian aircraft, might perceive it as a threat. The crash of the Azerbaijani airliner near Grozny isn’t a unique situation, especially in the current chaos.
With manual flight approvals, no one actually knows which aircraft is flying where. Around the world, this system works like this: each aircraft is assigned a unique code, visible to air traffic services and the military in all countries through which it flies. Currently, this is done manually. Codes continue to be issued, but whether they are recorded correctly and who is responsible for all this is a very big question.
“The plane was changed four times before departure.”
Since 2022, cases have become more frequent where airlines have replaced aircraft immediately before departure due to malfunctions. Defective aircraft are dismantled for spare parts. Nevertheless, Russian airlines have managed to establish parallel imports of parts through third countries—albeit at several times the cost, according to airline employees.
Andrey, Boeing 747-400 pilot:
When a pilot boards an aircraft, he opens the technical log, where all malfunctions are recorded. Some are acceptable, others not. Often, aircraft with system failures are replaced just before takeoff. One pilot told me he had a case where the aircraft was replaced four times.
If a plane is unable to take off due to defects, it’s left at the airport, either waiting for its turn or used as a spare parts donor for other aircraft. At the airline where I used to work, 19 planes are idle like this. When I arrive at Sheremetyevo, I see them. It’s a common occurrence now.
Foreign companies choose Madrid for aircraft storage because the climate there is dry, with humidity levels as low as 10%—a far cry from Moscow. If an aircraft isn’t flying, it quickly becomes unusable. Repairing it is then very difficult, if not impossible. Our climate simply isn’t conducive to keeping aircraft in good condition for long. Aircraft need to be in constant use.
Dmitry, engineer:
Predictions of global aircraft “cannibalism,” meaning that they would be dismantled for spare parts, have not come to pass, because shadowy supply chains are still in place. Some components are difficult to find on the market, but ultimately, it all comes down to price. If you pay three times more, even reputable countries will start selling illegally.
Vasily, Boeing 737-800 pilot:
There’s a list of acceptable defects that allow an aircraft to fly. For example, if the weather radar isn’t working, the plane can fly without it. But only under certain conditions—if there are no hazardous conditions along the entire route, no rain, and good visibility. But if the engine’s lifespan has expired, there’s nothing to be done except replace it.
We had a plane that had this happen. It was heavily dismantled for parts, and by 2023, it was already parked without an engine. Then, when new parts were purchased, it was slowly reassembled, and it flew again. Aeroflot is often guilty of such things. They have a lot of planes, and they were very active in this kind of “cannibalism.”
There are major problems with the new Airbus A320 aircraft. They have extremely finicky new-style engines. They are fuel-efficient, but extremely difficult to maintain.
Dmitry, engineer:
Aeroflot’s Airbus aircraft, of which it has over a hundred, feature both CEO and NEO engines. CEO is the classic engine option, while NEO is the new engine option. The new engines are 10-15% more fuel efficient and utilize more advanced technology. Aeroflot cannot repair these engines, so it saves money. NEO-powered aircraft are used only on long-haul flights, which CEOs cannot reach.
The same applies to the A350 aircraft. Very few facilities have the capacity to repair them. Of the five aircraft Aeroflot has, only four are actually in service—the fifth is in poor condition, partially dismantled so the others can fly.
Parts supplies have decreased threefold
According to customs data, imports of foreign aircraft engines and parts into Russia fell threefold from 2021 to 2024 (from $152 million to $43 million). While these funds previously went toward purchasing finished aircraft engines, spare parts now account for the majority of these supplies. Meanwhile, Russian companies continue to purchase parts from the Ukrainian company Motor Sich, with the figure exceeding $12 million in 2024.
While previously purchases were made directly through manufacturers or European companies, parts are now sourced from China, Dubai, Qatar, the Cayman Islands, Uganda, and even Afghanistan. A significant portion of supplies are sourced from Turkish companies, such as the Istanbul-based Natak Havacilik . Some suppliers, such as the Turkish company Gareks Havacilik, are located literally in Istanbul’s industrial zones and, according to official data, sell auto parts.
Aircraft breakdowns that don’t result in serious incidents occur regularly. According to Novaya Gazeta Evropa, a record of over 200 incidents was recorded in 2024. In 2021, the number of breakdowns on civilian aircraft was at least three times lower.
Dmitry, engineer:
Every aircraft has a fixed maintenance schedule. There’s a daily inspection, which is performed every 36 hours, a weekly inspection, and so on. The most complex aircraft maintenance schedule is Form D, which is performed every 12 years. Maintenance crews at every company, including Aeroflot, adhered to this schedule both before and after the sanctions were imposed. The problem is that some parts cannot be replaced.
Let’s take brakes, for example. Aeroflot had a brake shortage. What solution did the company take? They issued instructions to their pilots: use them sparingly and clear the runway not in the middle, as before, but at the ends. This is bad because, firstly, leaving braking until the end of the runway is dangerous. If traction deteriorates, there’s a risk of oversteering.
Secondly, the aircraft takes longer to land, meaning airport capacity declines. The system begins to experience additional load, which it’s not always prepared for. A set of brakes, even with fairly heavy use, lasts about two months before they need to be replaced. The cost of a set easily exceeds that of a Mercedes X-Class. In other words, it’s very expensive.
A set of brakes, with fairly active use, lasts about two months, and it costs more than a Mercedes X-Class
Previously, brakes were purchased directly from the Airbus factory or from certified manufacturers who guaranteed compliance with safety standards. Now these ties have been broken, and Russian companies are forced to source parts from third-party suppliers whose origins are unknown. They may claim to buy from Airbus, just like some Turkish companies, who ostensibly purchase for themselves but actually sell to Russia.
It turns out that Aeroflot is paying two to three times more than the actual cost of these parts, but has no control over quality. If they’re sold brakes from some underground factory in China, they’re unlikely to even know about it. This is a safety hazard, of course. And that’s the case with any spare part.
Aeroflot pays two to three times more than the actual cost of spare parts, but cannot control the quality
Maintenance in Arkhangelsk
Due to the war, Russian airliners were no longer serviced at Western service centers, so Russia established its own—in Arkhangelsk, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. Specialists from American and European companies “unofficially” visit these centers for maintenance. Repair problems are compounded by data loss: for example, after a hacker attack, Aeroflot lost all information about the condition of its aircraft equipment and its flight logbook archives.
Vasily, Boeing 737-800 pilot:
Previously, all aircraft were serviced abroad: they were transported to Turkey and Europe. Now, huge maintenance centers have opened in Russia: one in Arkhangelsk , and others in Moscow and St. Petersburg. There, aircraft undergo a full cycle of maintenance, including any level of complexity, with the exception of engine repairs. Rumor has it that specialists from major companies—people from Lufthansa and American airlines—visit them unofficially. They explain what needs to be done.
Dmitry, engineer:
Every mechanism on an airplane has a lifespan and can break down. If you’re a pilot, you come on board and notice something isn’t working. What should you do about it? You open the so-called MEL and check whether the problem is still present and whether the plane can fly.
Officially, airlines are not allowed to ease MEL conditions. But with the outbreak of war, Aeroflot deviated from these rules. They rewrote internal documents, and now many malfunctions that previously prohibited flights are considered acceptable. Flights with expired databases were only allowed for 10 days, and even then, under very strict restrictions. Now, the databases have officially been expired for three years.
After hackers destroyed almost all of Aeroflot’s systems, we lost the ability to monitor the serviceability of onboard equipment. Every component, every light bulb on the plane, was certified; we knew where they were manufactured and their lifespan. This ensured safety for everyone. But now all of this is lost.
Not only was the equipment purchased under shady schemes, but now even that is unknown because the data has been erased. Some information can be recovered from the flight logbook archive, where everything was recorded by hand. It’s very difficult to decipher anything in such a logbook, especially if only a copy remains. Therefore, data recovery is a massive undertaking, almost impossible to do well.
Due to a hacker attack on Aeroflot, even data on the origin of previously purchased equipment was lost.
Naturally, we’re currently working in a frenzy, collecting all this information and trying to transfer it from paper to databases. This is a serious matter. Not only engine wear, but every single component needs to be accounted for. From a technical standpoint, Aeroflot has lost a great deal. Flying on the company’s planes has become much less safe than before the hacker attack, and even less so before the war.
Mikhail, commander of the Airbus A320:
There’s very little information about our cargo. It’s impossible to say what we’re carrying—not three tons of something specific, but three tons of material that, if it catches fire, requires landing immediately, otherwise there will be serious trouble. The Geneva Convention prohibits carrying weapons on civilian aircraft, but in reality, such items can now be on board; they’re just called something else. There’s this ridiculous category called “consumer goods”—theoretically, anything can be classified under it.
