Eurasia Press & News
Since December 2024, Syria has undergone radical transformations that have redrawed the geopolitical landscape, as regime change has led to Russia losing its closest ally, but it has not ended its influence, as Moscow has maintained its military presence in Hmeimim and Tartus. In return, the interim government seeks to balance its relations between Russia and the West, but its violations in the Sahel and in Sweida have raised international suspicions. As the West links its support to political reforms, Russia offers unconditional security cooperation, making it a potential partner for the new authority.
The regime change in Syria in December 2024 led to a radical – and also chaotic – rearrangement of the Syrian geopolitical scene, and the most prominent questions raised at the time were about Russia’s acceptance of the scenario, its abandonment of the former allied regime, and the face of the possibility of losing its strategic and vital bases on the shores of the Mediterranean, which it has long maintained. In the wake of the change of the previous regime, there was a near-total consensus that this change was not possible without tacit Russian acceptance, in exchange for another opinion that does not exclude that Moscow’s position will be a strategic concession, especially in light of directing its strategic momentum to confront the West in Ukraine. However, it is objective to say that the Russian role in establishing future arrangements for the Syrian scene will not end. Russia has lost its most reliable ally and guaranteed economic privileges, as evidenced by the termination of the Tartus Port Contract, but it retains its core strategic influence through its continued military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Naval Base, vital to maintaining its global influence. The Syrian geopolitical landscape is still taking shape and can be transformed from time to time.
The Complex Dynamics of International Powers in Syria
The new phase in Syria has revealed a complex reassessment of the dynamics of power inside Syria and in its international engagement. It can be said that one of the most prominent developments in Syria in the recent period is the shift in the “precision” relationship between Russia and the transitional authority in Damascus led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This shift reflects broader strategic calculations of Moscow, balancing its interests with its regional influence with its long-term goals in its existing strongholds on the Syrian coast.
Despite the high expectations that Western countries have shown about their relations with the interim government, it is not clear that the country is going to meet the aspirations of the Western pattern, as much as the interim government shows a pragmatic aspect that seeks to balance the competing external influencers. Since last December, regional powers—notably Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states—have moved quickly to fill the vacuum in Syria, each in its own way: Israel has expanded its military operations to disarm in southern Syria, and the destruction of the heavy weapons held by the former military, while Turkey has signed a comprehensive defense cooperation agreement with the interim government aimed at securing its borders. The Gulf states have begun to re-engage widely, considering their investments as a means to support the interim government, in the face of other regional and international rivals.
The West is facing a reality of internal security chaos and human rights abuses, creating a strategic impasse that limits its involvement. The interim government’s reliance on the logic of force, its inability to control armed factions within the frameworks and institutions of the state, and its inability to implement its reformist discourse on the ground, indicates that this government is not a radical shift from the past, but rather a new repetition of a centralized system that is driven only by the motives of remaining in power. The visit of a high-level Syrian delegation to Moscow in late July 2025 indicates Damascus’s intention to use the relationship with Russia, whether as a military barrier to Israeli strikes or as an alternative ally to Europe and the United States, if relations with the West reach a dead end, to repeat the scenario of the former regime itself.
Russia’s Interest in Syria: A Strategic Reorganization
Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015 was crucial to the Syrian regime’s steadfastness, and a savior of the imminent collapse. Moscow’s stated goals were to “establish the legitimate authority in Syria” and create the conditions for a “political settlement.” However, Russia’s long-term geopolitical goals have been to use its involvement in expanding its influence in the Middle East and challenging the U.S.-dominated unipolar order. The intervention has succeeded in securing key strategic military assets, including the Hmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Naval Facility, which are Russia’s only official military sites outside the former Soviet Union, and in positioning Russia as a major and active actor in the Syrian file regionally and internationally.
However, the collapse of the Syrian army and the regime’s handover of power in the country without much resistance, and the limited Russian intervention in the face of the “deterrence of aggression” process, indicate that Moscow has likely waived its previous policies in protecting the regime, and has presented its priorities in protecting its interests and military presence in Syria, while keeping the door open to establish its position as a potential partner of the interim government, especially since it has previously been linked to contacts with opposition forces in the framework of its role as a mediator in several settlements between the former regime and the opposition.
The visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Moscow is a clear example of Russian policy, as this is the first official visit to the interim government in Damascus, during which al-Shaibani clearly stated that Syria wants Russia “on its side,” despite the complex history between Moscow and the opposition forces that currently rule Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded to this positive tone, stressing Russia’s readiness to provide “all possible assistance” in post-conflict reconstruction, while reaffirming its support for Syria’s territorial integrity.
Al-Shaibani’s visit included the launch of a review of existing bilateral agreements signed under Assad to determine whether they “serve the interests of the Syrian people,” suggesting that both parties are negotiating the terms of their renewed relationship rather than simply returning to previous arrangements. This not only signals a diplomatic breakthrough, but also lays the foundation for deeper security, political, and economic cooperation.
The emerging rapprochement appears to be based on common interests rather than ideological consensus. For Russia, maintaining its military bases in Syria remains the most important issue: these facilities represent their only strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and a major resource for extending their influence throughout the Middle East and the African continent. As for the Syrian Interim Government, gaining international legitimacy and securing support for reconstruction is an urgent priority, while confronting Israeli military operations is a more pressing security concern.
Russian Presence: Performance of Pressure and Influence
Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former leader of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham, presented a public photo of the leader of “Pragmatic”, with a reformist orientation. He used a theoretical discourse on “modernization, transparency, inclusion” and the integration of minorities, human rights, women’s rights, and transitional justice. This speech was mainly in an effort to show the differentiation between the new authority and the former regime on the one hand, and an attempt to motivate Western countries to explore the new authority, especially since the United States and Europe have put in their requirements to deal with the interim government and lift sanctions, a set of requirements related to human rights, minorities and women.
However, the conduct of the interim government has been characterized by a bit of chaos, and it has entered the country amid a security vacuum and reprisals and abuses against minorities by the authority itself have been repeated. Following the Sahel security operation of March 6-10, 2025, the interim government’s security and military forces committed widespread and systematic abuses, including “extrajudicial killings and torture” of civilians in Alawite-majority areas. The government’s investigation confirmed that some members of the military had committed “large-scale and serious violations against civilians.” This behavior was repeated in the wake of the intervention of the army and government forces to disengage from clashes in Sweida during the period 12-14 June 2025, in a way that reinforced questions and concerns about the ability of the interim government to represent the various Syrian components, especially among Western countries that have previously expressed openness to the government.
As a result of this behavior, Western countries faced a strategic impasse. On the one hand, it is trying to support the interim government to avoid the collapse of the state, which could create chaos that will re-empower terrorist organizations and Iranian militias, and on the other hand, there are caveats to support a government that is reproducing a history of human rights violations. This has led to a conditional support policy, where sanctions are “thoughtfully” eased rather than “uploaded.”
But that policy has prompted the interim government to seek possible alternative partnerships, including a return to Syria’s traditional allies, led by Russia, to win against Europe and the United States. In addition, Russia’s pragmatic approach is proportionate and able to adapt quickly and easily to centralized, and even authoritarian, to which the interim government is moving. In doing so, the interim government is likely to push toward Russia, in parallel with growing Western demands for human rights and minorities.
On the other hand, the West is currently adopting a neutral position towards the rapprochement between the new Syrian leadership and Moscow, especially since its clear features have not yet crystallized. While the West wants to achieve relative stability in Syria, it is required to be far from reviving the model of the former regime supported by Russia. To be sure, the growth of Syrian-Russian relations will reinforce Western fears that it may confuse the cards in the region and Russia’s strengthening of its military and political influence, at a time when Western countries are working to reduce Russian influence beyond their borders, especially after the Ukrainian war.
From this perspective, Western countries will seek to obstruct the return of Russia as a powerful state in the military and political spheres in Syria, similar to its attempts to obstruct Chinese influence, especially in the field of reconstruction and strategic sectors in Syria such as ports, airports, communications, and others.
Russia and the Minority Paper in Syria
The rapprochement between the Syrian Interim Government and the Orthodox Church is a step with clear political connotations. Shortly after the visit of the Syrian delegation to Moscow, Maher al-Sharaa, the president’s brother, visited Patriarch John X Yazigi to offer condolences on the church bombing. It was a public gesture towards the Christian community, which has previously criticized the government’s weak and formal reaction to the bombing of St. Elias’ Church on July 22, 2025.
This visit is of particular importance because Russia has long placed itself in the position of pastor and protector of the Middle East Orthodox Church. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, is considered close to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The visit of Maher al-Sharaa to Patriarch John X Yazigi, and before that the visit of the Syrian Foreign Minister to Moscow, may indicate that relations between the two parties are entering a new phase, and a clear sign of the maneuvers of Russian soft power to strengthen the legitimacy of President Ahmed al-Sharaa inside Syria.
In a parallel context, there are increasing indications and data about Russia’s adoption of a quiet strategy to push for the reintegration of the Alawites into the new military and security structure in Syria, especially in the strategic coastal areas where this minority is concentrated, especially since the Alawites, who represent between 9 and 12% of the Syrian population, have serious concerns about the transitional phase that the country is going through. Moscow’s long-term goals are likely to include maintaining its influence within the Alawite-majority coastal region, where Russia’s strategic military bases are located. By positioning itself as the protector of this minority, it can achieve significant positive results in this context as it grows in influence with both the Alawite community and the Syrian government
Confronting the Israeli threat
Israel’s ongoing military operations in Syrian territory pose a security challenge that could push the country toward Russia despite Western support. Since regime change, Israel has significantly expanded its military activities in Syria and seized control of the United Nations buffer zone, carried out regular airstrikes against what it calls security threats, and Israeli strikes have reached the heart of the capital Damascus and targeted the army’s staff headquarters building. For Russia, it condemned the Israeli attack on the army staff headquarters, considering it a violation of the country’s sovereignty and international law, while the Western reactions were conservative. In doing so, Moscow leaves the door open to playing the role of diplomatic weight that balances Israeli actions, and presents itself as a counterweight to Israel – and an intermediary between Damascus and Tel Aviv – especially since Moscow played a pivotal role in the security equations in southern Syria during the Syrian crisis.
As for the interim government, Western support may come on unacceptable terms related to political reform, human rights protections, and power-sharing arrangements that may limit its control and centralization. The United States has expanded to link sanctions relief to progress in normalizing relations with Israel and fighting terrorism, conditions that could be difficult to fully meet.
In return, Russia offers security cooperation without political preconditions, including potential support in restricting Israeli operations, and making this divergence of approach, Russia is a more attractive partner for the interim government, especially if Western demands conflict with its consolidation of power.
Finally, Russia’s approach to Syria in the wake of regime change demonstrates strategic flexibility and a clear pursuit of interests. Instead of sticking to a former ally, Moscow appears to have focused on the transition toward preserving its most important asset—military bases and regional influence—while cementing its position as a potential partner of the interim government. The emerging rapprochement between Russia and the Syrian Interim Government reveals the calculations of both sides: for Syria, Russia offers security cooperation without demanding political reforms; and Russia allows it to maintain its military assets in the Mediterranean and remain a player on international issues
