Eurasia Press & News
Cultural facts and latest developments
If we study the culture of individual peoples and set out to see how they differ from each other, even ethnically and within the same country, we can easily understand what centrifugal forces are at work and, if necessary, prepare remedies to prevent the collapse of the state. This phenomenon can be observed today in Europe with the populist forces that are slowly reshaping it: forces that are, however, foolishly defined by the elitist media as “far right”, as well as “influenced” or even “directed” by Russia (having a bogeyman always serves to divert attention from the real responsibilities of the European political and administrative class). This trend can also clearly be observed in North Africa.
Between 2019 and 2020, the Algerian political regime remained in power thanks to the intervention of COVID-19 , as was the case with Macron and the yellow vests, who were “frozen” by the pandemic. Something similar is happening in that elusive country known as Libya. Take a look at the map I have drawn up for this note (fig. 1), which uses data from open sources such as Libya Security Monitor, to see how many and which ethnic groups it is fragmented into.
Compare this map with another one showing foreign presences in the country. This second map (fig. 2) was drawn six years ago by researchers at Virginia Tech (taken as an example and only as an open source, assuming that there are other things that cannot be seen). What is striking is the more prominent role played until a few years ago by Qatar, while now it is Russia.
Compared to the pre-COVID era, the situation in Libya has unravelled and became clearer. According to Defense Mirror, Russia deployed 1,000 troops and 6,600 tons of military equipment to Libya in 2024. The same media outlet highlighted the scale of the air force presence at the three bases in Brak al-Shati, Al-Qardabiyah, and Al-Jufra.
More recent developments show that today’s configuration is relatively more homogeneous than in the past. At least, the situation is clear between west and east: refineries and oil depots aside (they are more widespread in Cyrenaica), the current distribution of power between two blocs seems to exemplify Libya as it was a hundred years ago. However, a striking difference compared to the late 19th century is the absolute void left by the Italian presence alongside the incursion of Turkey, especially near Al-Watiya, Tripoli, and Misurata in the west.
Meanwhile, other scenarios close to Libya have entered a state of imbalance. Sudan, which has been pouring migrants into Egypt since early 2023, is the scene of a proxy conflict between “rebel” forces in the southwest protected by Turkey and “conservative” ones in the northeast under the aegis of the United Arab Emirates. Russia, meanwhile, does not exclusively support either side.
A low-profile meeting between the western and eastern factions of Libya had just been held in Rome under the auspices of the United States to consolidate the peace process. It would be arrogant to assume that results will be achieved in the short term: the ancient Greeks, with their wisdom, founded colonies and would never have thought of culturally reuniting the eastern part of the country, which they called Cyrenaica after their settlement, Cyrene, with the western side where Tripoli stands today. Not to mention other ethnic groups such as the Tubu in the southeast of the country, where Russia is present in the city of Sarra (as well as, of course, in Tobruk, Al Khadim, Benghazi, and Al-Jufra).
Predictions (with a tolerable margin of error)
The questions that arise regarding Libya are as follows:
1) Why does Europe insist on considering both Russia and Turkey as rivals, when Russian and Turkish interests are fundamentally and historically opposed to each other? Due to strategic ignorance and a lack of any common thinking on foreign policy, old Europe is destined not to understand the simple adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Historians know a lot about this subject, (The work of a renowned Italian historian, Franco Cardini, about both Syria and Libya titled Il sultano e lo zar, was published in an interesting year, 2018, as they were the first to understand that the entente cordiale between Russia and Turkey, especially in Libya, had no common objectives and was a flash in the pan to distract a few high-ranking Spanish bureaucrats in the EU’s so-called “foreign service.”
2) How long will French support for Cyrenaica continue? On this point, it is useful to bear in mind the ideas expressed by US Democratic or liberal think tanks, which always dictate policy to Europe. For example, we read in the European Council on Foreign Relations: “European governments with existing shared interests in Libya–such as the UK, Germany or Italy with Turkey, and France with the UAE–should convene working groups … to discuss how to secure relevant interests, how to untangle Turkey’s and the UAE’s cooperation with Russia … in the case of Turkey this might involve new cooperation on Black Sea security.” The Leitmotiv of the self-styled European foreign policy proposal is apparently focusing on a convenient solution for the Black Sea. But it remains to be seen if and how slow and tardy Europe will manage to avoid being overtaken by a healthy imperialist division between Russia and the United States.
In conclusion, it is conceivable that Europe will invest in the slower horse (Turkey) to reach the Black Sea, France will disappear from Cyrenaica, and Russia will step into its place in eastern Libya, interrupting the Turkey-Tripolitania connection. We are waiting to see how many and which mercenary groups will descend on Libya, which could serve as a litmus test, or rather as an experiment in corpore vili (“in a vile body” as the doctors would say in the past as opposed to “noble body”) to understand what has still to be accomplished with Ukraine.
