Eurasia Press & News
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has positioned itself, through its latest political discourse, to the left of the country’s ruling elite. It presents a version of “political Islam” in its newly issued document, Coexistence in Syria, signalling a potential rhetorical, political and ideological confrontation that could either enrich Syria’s public political sphere or provoke a repressive backlash—deepening polarisation within the Sunni community. The direction this dynamic takes ultimately lies in the hands of decision-makers at the summit of power in Damascus.
While some observers downplay the significance of the Brotherhood’s document—arguing the group lacks popular support and suffers from outdated leadership, tools and tactics—others cite the sharp response from Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaidan, the president’s media adviser. In a controversial article published on Al Jazeera Net on 22 August 2025, titled When Will the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria Dissolve Itself?, Zaidan’s rhetoric reflects the regime’s recognition of the Brotherhood’s symbolic weight. That weight may yet crystallise into an organised political force capable of challenging the regime’s dominance over Syria’s “Sunni political space.”
Since February 2025, the Brotherhood has repeatedly denied any adversarial stance towards the ruling authorities or the president personally. Instead, it describes itself as a “supportive and honest advisor” committed to building a modern, civilian state grounded in an Islamic framework, as outlined in a statement from the group’s Shura Council on 7 August 2025.
Sectarian Rhetoric and the Brotherhood’s Response
While certain religious figures and clerics aligned with the regime have propagated exclusionary and sectarian rhetoric, inflaming tensions among Syria’s diverse communities, the Brotherhood’s Coexistence document addresses this vulnerability in the regime’s performance. Senior figures in the ruling elite may project moderation and centrism, but they have failed to curtail the divisive language and practices of lower-ranking or affiliated individuals. This inconsistency is precisely the gap the Brotherhood is attempting to exploit.
Although criticisms of the regime—particularly its alignment with foreign powers—have occasionally emerged from Brotherhood-linked sources, their impact has remained minimal. Nevertheless, in the wake of unrest in Suweida in mid-July 2025, the Shura Council issued a statement advocating for the “inclusive participation of all Syrian components in state-building through a pluralistic political programme” and encouraging a “coexistence rhetoric” devoid of sectarian provocation. This statement laid the groundwork for the Coexistence in Syria document, articulating the Brotherhood’s broader vision for national reconciliation and civil peace.
Regime’s Reaction and Symbolic Shifts
Two weeks after the Shura Council’s statement, Zaidan’s article advocating the Brotherhood’s dissolution appeared—though not formally representative of state policy, it was closely aligned with the regime’s internal messaging. This came shortly after remarks attributed to President Sharaa during a meeting with an Arab media delegation on 24 August 2025, in which he distanced himself from both the “Arab Spring” uprisings and “Islamic parties, whether jihadist or the Muslim Brotherhood.”
In March 2025, the appointment of Osama al-Rifai as Syria’s Grand Mufti and head of the Supreme Fatwa Council signalled a symbolic recalibration within the spectrum of “political and doctrinal Islam.” Al-Rifai, who maintained personal ties with the Brotherhood dating back to the 1980s—a connection that led to his decade-long exile under Hafez al-Assad—is seen as ideologically sympathetic, even if not organisationally affiliated. His appointment underscores the Brotherhood’s lingering symbolic relevance in Syria’s urban Sunni communities, despite longstanding criticism that the group’s past miscalculations drew the Sunni mainstream into a costly confrontation with the Assad regime in the early 1980s.
The Brotherhood’s Potential and Challenges
The Brotherhood’s institutional experience, a historically urban support base more amenable to moderate Islamic politics than to Salafist currents, and the regime’s persistent failure to bridge sectarian divides, all provide the group with tools to regain a tangible presence. It may also find natural allies among traditional Sunni clerics frustrated by the rise of Salafist ideology and its attendant restrictions.
Nonetheless, critics—including opposition figures who collaborated with the Brotherhood during the uprising against Bashar al-Assad—have accused the group of inconsistency between its rhetoric and behaviour, and of persistent strategic failings. While these criticisms merit serious reflection by the Brotherhood’s leadership, they do not negate the group’s potential to re-emerge as a meaningful political actor capable of challenging the regime’s control.
Opportunity or Conflict?
This potential should be viewed as a constructive challenge—provided Damascus acknowledges the need to allow ideological and political plurality in Syria’s public sphere. Meeting this challenge requires the regime to improve its performance by curbing sectarian provocateurs among its affiliates in both discourse and action. The alternative—reverting to repression and security-driven solutions—risks exacerbating polarisation within the Sunni mainstream, with potentially grave consequences for the entire country.
