Eurasia Press & News
As negotiations begin for the second phase of Trump’s ceasefire plan in the Gaza Strip, the two-year-old war is entering a new phase that could bring unexpected shifts. While attention is focused on the major issues on the negotiating table, it seems that the finer details in the more complex files may be the decisive factor in drawing the features of a different field reality, and perhaps a political and security reality that is not in line with the expectations presented or with the terms of the announced plan.
On October 14, 2025, US President Donald Trump announced the launch of the second phase of his comprehensive ceasefire plan in the Gaza Strip, and the achievement of a long-term peace between Israelis and Palestinians, after Israel and Hamas approved the plan, and its entry into force on October 10, and then the implementation of the first phase, which included a ceasefire and the liberation of detainees on October 13. Despite the agreement of Israel and Hamas to the plan, the implementation of the bulk of the first phase, and the commencement of negotiations on the second phase, the discussion of the multiple issues most complex in the plan, puts the negotiating framework in front of a set of scenarios that may lead to broad understandings, upcoming clashes or long-term field stalemate.
Context of the second phase of negotiations
The announcement of the launch of the second phase of negotiations on the “Trump plan” came after the parties partially implemented the first phase, which included the handover of Hamas and Palestinian factions to the Israeli detainees alive, and a number of the remains of Israelis in the Gaza Strip, while the Israeli army retreated according to the plan, to the “yellow line”, which is the first withdrawal line from Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza, Beit Lahiya, Gaza City in the center, Al-Bureij, Deir al-Balah, and even Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, and kept its spread in areas of Rafah, Beit Hanoun and the Philadelphia axis.
However, the implementation of the first phase was confronted with a problem represented in the “crisis of the bodies,” which Israel confirmed that the success of the second phase or the continuation of negotiations on it depends on the handover of Hamas to all the bodies of the Israelis, whose number is estimated at 28 bodies, of which 9 were handed over. In particular, Israel doubts the statements of Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip, not knowing where these bodies are located, and that they need teams, vehicles and equipment to search for them.
Where the American pressure was added to overcoming that problem, and moving to the second stage, it means that the file of the bodies, has been linked to the issues of the second phase, especially with the recognition of the need for international teams and specialized equipment to search for them, which means on the one hand; Israel maintains a role in the places within the “yellow line”; intelligence and operational, while maintaining a continuous window of pressure on Hamas throughout the course of the second phase. On the other hand, this thorny file is added to other issues that are no less complex, especially: the multinational force, the disarmament of the Gaza Strip, and the Interim Governing Body, especially since the statements, whether American, Israeli or Palestinian (Fatah and Hamas), indicate the area of difference observed among them.
Complexities of the negotiating framework and the positions of its parties
Entering the second phase of the negotiations, and in parallel with the “crise of the bodies” gap, which Israel quickly employed to slow the transition to the second phase, there are other gaps, part of which is due to the complexity of the files presented, and another part engineered by the parties to the negotiating process.
On the one hand, despite the agreement with Israel on the objectives of the war, it is pushing for non-renewal, or Israel’s adoption of any decisions that are considered an encroachment of the status quo, and therefore US officials flock to Tel Aviv in a continuous and simultaneous manner. On October 23, US Vice President J.D. Vance concluded his visit to Israel, with the arrival of Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the same day. On October 20, U.S. envoys Steve Whittoff and Jared Kushner visited Israel.
In fact, US visits and actions indicate that Washington has become a guarantor of the agreement and a direct actor in the course of events in the Gaza Strip, on the one hand, Israel, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) established, on October 10, an international military headquarters in the (Kiryat Ghat) area in southern Israel, which included about 200 US soldiers and others from other countries, which Israel views as a kind of “direct control” over Israeli actions and decisions and may disrupt them if necessary. On the Hamas side, Washington directly addresses the movement and warns it of the consequences of its excesses, as it addressed Centcom, headed by Admiral Brad Cooper, for the first time since the outbreak of the war, and called on it to strictly adhere to the Trump plan and stop violence against civilians in the Gaza Strip, while US President Donald Trump threatened military action against Hamas if it continues to violence. This may indicate that US guarantees have been provided to Israel, prevented from any unilateral action that may threaten the conduct of negotiations, and clarified the complexities imposed on Hamas, as the current scene is managed beyond the history of its conflict with Israel.
For Israel, the intensive US intervention may meet its requirements, but not necessarily in a consensual formula, where the gaps in the application of the items are visible from the moment, while Washington considers Turkey a partner in the peace process, and perhaps part of the multinational force, Israel rejects this, and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar announced on October 27, explicitly, and Israel has previously prevented a Turkish rescue team from entering the Gaza Strip on October 16. Moreover, the gaps between the two sides are reflected in the order of priorities; where Israel links the delivery of weapons by launching reconstruction operations, deploying international forces and withdrawing full military from the Strip, Washington prefers the supervision of international forces over the disarmament process, and initiating a reconstruction plan
Moreover, there is a difference between the assessment of both Israel and the United States of violations and breaches of the ceasefire, where Israel considers that Hamas’s delay in handing over the bodies is a violation of its obligations under the agreement, the United States does not see this, and on October 19, Israel accused Hamas of shooting and responded with a series of strikes, while Trump pointed out that the attack came from a rebel group within the movement and not on the orders of its leaders, and on October 28, the United States intervened again to prevent escalation after Israel returned to launch raids on the Gaza Strip, after accusing Hamas of attacking Israeli forces stationed east of the first line of withdrawal called the “yellow line.”
Hamas, whose response to Trump’s “plan” refers to its position on the issues of the second phase, has in turn created gaps in its handling of its terms. On the one hand, Hamas’s positions are vague and vague towards the handover of its weapons, as reflected in the statements of its officials, including the statements of Hamas political bureau member Mohammed Nazzal to Reuters that “Hamas intends to maintain security control in Gaza during a transitional period,” and the statements of Hamas’s negotiating delegation leader Khalil al-Hayya that “Hamas’s weapon will be handed over after the establishment of the Palestinian state,” not before, despite the fact that the establishment of a Palestinian state is not explicitly included in the terms of the plan.
On the other hand, the movement referred the issues of governance and administration to the post-war Gaza Strip to the Palestinian national position, including the Palestinian Authority, in a move that seeks to distribute responsibility to all Palestinian forces, including Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, but at the same time, it puts new obstacles, foremost of which is the difficulty of achieving that national consensus.
Moreover, what the Palestinian forces agreed on in Cairo, such as the formation of a temporary Palestinian committee of independents to manage the affairs of the Gaza Strip, and the assertion that “security in the Gaza Strip is the responsibility of the official Palestinian security services, and that any international force must be on the border and not within the Strip,” constitute very controversial issues in itself, because it represents:
First, one of the points of disagreement between Hamas and the rest of the Palestinian factions, and may also come in the context of the movement’s attempts to prevent the organization’s armed groups in the Gaza Strip, such as (Yasser Abu Shabab, Ashraf al-Mansi, Rami Halas, and Hossam al-Astal) from gaining popular or tribal legitimacy, which is trying to use the decline of Hamas’s influence to expand its roles and areas of control.
Second, Israel rejects any presence of Palestinian forces affiliated with the PA or any attempt to unify the West Bank and Gaza Strip under a single administration, and Israel may prefer Hamas to remain weak and exhausted and in a state of fighting with its anti-Palestinian factions to reach a stage during which the Palestinian discourse is unified under an inclusive national administration.
Scenarios of the second phase of negotiations
In fact, the three main parties: Israel, the United States, and Hamas, in addition to the Palestinian Authority, seem to be walking in independent and parallel tracks that may not intersect and do not correspond, and this applies to their general vision, especially on the most detailed issues, which puts the fate of the second phase of negotiations in front of a set of scenarios, as follows:
Scenario I: Overcoming the obstacles of the second phase of the agreement
Overcoming the obstacles of the second phase begins with progress towards negotiations that seem slow or pending until the moment, and the United States maintains its position on not violating the agreement and returning to war again, and its success in controlling violations in three cases so far. However, given the clear differences and differences in the interpretation of the terms of the agreement and the perceptions of all parties of what is coming, engaging in negotiations does not mean overcoming obstacles, as Israel insists on withdrawing the weapons of the factions, Hamas’s actions against the armed groups reveal their intention to maintain their influence and weapons, at least within the areas from which the Israeli army withdrew.
On the other hand, the first phase explained the extent of the complexity on the ground in the “crisis of the bodies”, and will reveal in the future wider complexities, especially towards issues such as: reconstruction itself, and its priorities in the areas after the withdrawal line or before, as well as in the complexities of the mandate of the Transitional Authority, in a geography shared by different parties, and overlapped by ideology with tribal criminal organizations and armed groups, and in the middle of an explosive society due to the loss of the foundations and features of contemporary life and its total dependence on aid. It is the same geography in which international forces will be active, making it a potentially hostile or unstable environment for its safety.
All of this illustrates some of the actual complexity on the ground to implement Trump’s plan, and Israel and Hamas are supposed to be aware of this; and from the moment they are working to prepare each other for their own fields, pending the failure or deadlock of the plan.
Scenario II: Entering into a non-consensual long-term negotiating framework
The direct American intervention, and its continuous pressure on the parties to the agreement, is the main factor in its cohesion until the moment, and where the next goal is to start the second phase of negotiations, and not to return to war again, it means that the negotiating framework is protected, perhaps by the will of the United States, and that is a guarantee of its cohesion and not its success. During this stage, the major issues, the fine details, and the agreement of the parties to the war on them call for a long-term negotiating framework similar to what the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations have faced since 1993, which led to their stalemate despite the change in their field, and this hypothesis is strengthened and the opportunities to implement them are increased in view of the interests, objectives and controls of the three parties.
For Hamas, it may achieve a deadlock in maintaining its influence and weapons within the “yellow line” and directing its military momentum against anti-Hamas groups and clans, contrary to what it means to advance in the negotiations from the actual end of the movement and its military structure. This may intersect with Israel’s long-term goals, as Hamas’s preservation of its influence in the Gaza Strip – controlled and limited by force – closes the way for the Palestinian Authority’s attempts to unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under its future administration, and empties the international trend to recognize the Palestinian state from its contents, without direct interference from it, in addition to the survival of its control over large areas of the Gaza Strip in line with its declared vision for the next day of the war. As for the United States, its main goal is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, especially as it considers the future of the Gaza Strip a small part of its broader plan for peace at the regional level, and therefore the stalemate in negotiations without the return of war may not pose any problem to Washington, but may correspond to its idea of peace between Russia and Ukraine, which restricts it to a ceasefire while maintaining the geography of Russian control as it is at the moment of the declaration of a ceasefire.
The third scenario: the collapse of negotiations and the return to war
The collapse of the negotiations is unlikely in the near term, with the United States insisting on its cohesion, but the likelihood of a return to war increases in certain cases, including the launch of repeated attacks by Hamas, or dissident groups and rejecting the agreement, repeated attacks or a major attack on Israeli forces after the “yellow line”, or Israel’s military response is not equivalent to action, and in a way that restores the war to its first square, which Israel has done three times so far, and in an unequal way according to the assessment of the United States, which means that its desire to return to war is present and strong.
Moreover, the possibility of renewed war in the medium and long term is high, especially if the second scenario is achieved, which may be followed by the emergence of ambitions on either side to change the reality on the ground where the negotiations stopped, and where Hamas aims in the near term to maintain its authority and influence and neutralize its rival groups. In the future, its objectives may expand towards the withdrawal of Israel from the entire Gaza Strip, which means launching unilateral attacks or through groups on Israeli forces after the “yellow line”, or through the branching of militant groups from Hamas and other Palestinian factions, placing this among its objectives, all of which are contained in post-conflict environments.
