Eurasia Press & News
Since June 2025, Ukrainian forces have been conducting a nearly continuous series of strikes against fuel and energy facilities in Russia, primarily oil and gas refineries and petrochemical plants. Unlike previous campaigns, not only the frequency but also the depth of drone strikes, as well as their effectiveness, have increased. Apparently, US intelligence support plays a significant role in the success of Ukraine’s DeepStrike strategy. If the Russian fuel and energy sector continues to suffer from attacks at the current rate, then in 2026, systemic problems with the domestic fuel supply—and the operation of the oil refining industry as a whole—are quite possible, not just temporary and limited to specific regions.
The current campaign of strikes
From March to June 2025, Ukrainian troops did not strike fuel and energy facilities in Russia after the parties, with US mediation , agreed to a moratorium on attacks on energy infrastructure, including oil refineries, oil and gas storage facilities, oil and gas transportation infrastructure, power grids and power plants, nuclear power plants, and hydroelectric dams.
According to The Insider’s calculations, in the three months from January 1 to March 31, 2025, at least 18 successful attacks (resulting in some kind of damage to production) were recorded at 11 oil, gas refining, and petrochemical facilities in Russia. Meanwhile, in all of 2024, there were only 24 such attacks, at 15 facilities.
The low intensity of the strikes is not the main difference of the 2024 campaign. Almost half of the affected refineries were located within 500 km of Ukraine, and a significant portion of them were relatively small, export-oriented facilities whose operations have little impact on the domestic market. Furthermore, less than half of the affected refineries were subject to repeat attacks, with only one—the Slavyansk Oil Refinery in the Krasnodar Krai—being struck less than a month after the previous one.
In 2025, attacks on Russian oil refineries are regularly occurring at much greater distances from Ukraine and with greater intensity. The Insider recorded only 45 successful strikes on 22 facilities (18 strikes from January 1 to March 31 and 27 strikes from June 1 to September 30), and by the end of the year, if the current trend continues, this figure could increase to 60–70 strikes. Moreover, this time, the majority of attacks occurred on facilities located 500 km or more from the Ukrainian border.
Furthermore, attacks on the same refineries have become more frequent—during the summer and fall, eight refineries were subjected to a series of raids, with some (Afipsky Refinery, Novokuibyshevsky Refinery, Syzran Refinery) experiencing intervals between strikes shortened to weeks instead of months. This tactic negates repair and restoration efforts and forces production facilities into extended downtime. For example, at the Syzran Refinery, an ELOU-AVT-6 unit was damaged during an attack on February 18, 2025. Repairs to the facility were being completed on March 4 when the facility was struck again.
Judging by visual evidence , Ukraine is currently making extensive use of Firepoint FP-1 UAVs, which have a warhead weight of up to 120 kg and a range of 1,500 km. According to some estimates , they account for up to 60% of all strikes deep into Russian territory. The FP-1’s key advantage over Lyutiy-type UAVs and others is its cost of $55,000 per unit and the possibility of relatively large-scale production. Also noteworthy is the significant improvement in target acquisition for UAVs. Most of the known successful hits on Russian oil refineries have been on atmospheric vacuum tube (AVT) systems and processing racks.
Ukrainian DeepStrike strategy
The failed counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the summer of 2023, followed by an offensive by the Russian Armed Forces in the fall of that year, which continues to this day, forced Ukraine’s military and political leadership to develop a military strategy that, while remaining on the defensive almost continuously, would nonetheless increase the costs of the war for Vladimir Putin and thereby bring about at least a temporary ceasefire. This strategy included strategic strikes (Deep Strike) against military-industrial complex facilities, the fuel and energy sector, airfields, ammunition depots, and so on.
Ukraine’s DeepStrike strategy aims to raise the costs of war for Putin.
The oil and gas industry plays a key role in DeepStrike’s strategy—not only refining facilities, but also pipeline infrastructure, oil depots, and export terminals. This is unsurprising, as oil and gas exports have generated over €850 billion in revenue for Russia during the war—several times more than the combined military, humanitarian, and financial aid provided to Ukraine by its allies.
The sensitivity of this issue for international energy markets is such that the United States repeatedly (under both the Joe Biden and Donald Trump administrations) requested a refrain from attacks on Russian fuel and energy facilities. However, the situation has changed since the summer of 2025. According to media leaks , the current campaign of Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries is being carried out with American support in terms of intelligence and the development of long-range weapons deployment routes, which, it is claimed, has increased the effectiveness and depth of the strikes.
Catastrophic consequences for the fuel market
The strikes on refineries coincided with the traditional seasonal high demand and scheduled maintenance at some plants. Taken together, this has created a severe crisis in the gasoline market. Supply disruptions are occurring in nearly 60 Russian regions, with the problem particularly acute in annexed Crimea. There, restrictions have been introduced —no more than 20 liters per purchase—leading to even greater panic buying, hours-long queues, and instances of gasoline theft from others. Local authorities are planning to freeze fuel prices for 30 days.
Gasoline prices are breaking records . Retail gasoline prices have been rising by an average of 0.3–0.4% per week since June 2025, outpacing inflation.
Retail gasoline prices have been rising by an average of 0.3–0.4% per week since June 2025, outpacing inflation.
“The situation is completely under control,” Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak calmly repeats to reporters, assuring that supply and demand in the country are balanced, and that problems in individual regions are being addressed manually. Specifically, the government has completely banned gasoline exports until the end of the year. Diesel fuel production is traditionally twice the domestic market’s needs, so only non-producers are prohibited from exporting it.
Due to the fuel crisis, Gazprom Neft postponed scheduled maintenance at its Omsk Oil Refinery. The Ministry of Energy has asked all oil companies to do the same. “We’ve worked with them to adjust the refinery’s scheduled maintenance program to ensure that scheduled maintenance doesn’t occur during peak gasoline demand. We’re also working with Russian Railways to ensure that tankers carrying gasoline are quickly moved from production regions to regions with maximum demand,” said Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev.
Novak also proposed to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin that he allow the previously banned gasoline additive monomethylaniline (MMA) for six months. “Despite the measures taken to protect fuel and energy sector facilities, there are risks of a worsening supply of petroleum products to the domestic market,” Novak wrote .
Russia traditionally produces more fuel than is consumed domestically. About half of this is typically exported (primarily diesel and fuel oil). Therefore, the average gasoline produced nationwide is currently sufficient for everyone; the problem is getting it there on time.
Estimates of the exact loss to the refining market due to the attacks of recent months vary widely. At the end of September, 38% of Russia’s primary oil refining capacity was idle—approximately 338,000 tons per day, according to estimates by the Siala agency. Moreover, 70% of the shutdowns were due to Ukrainian drone attacks. However, this unprecedentedly high figure raises doubts among experts. The figure likely resulted from adding up the rated capacities of all refineries attacked since August 1, 2025, concludes Sergei Vakulenko, a senior research fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center. “Is this the correct calculation? It’s possible to obtain an upper bound, yes,” he reasons.
That is, if all the attacks were successful and the damage inflicted on the plants completely knocked them out of service, then this would be no more than 38% of all refining capacity in Russia. “To obtain a more realistic figure, we need to answer at least two questions and make adjustments for them. First, can we assume that all attacks damage the entire plant, so much so that it completely shuts down and its entire capacity is subtracted from the available capacity? Second, is it certain that at least some of the damage has not been repaired in the intervening period, and the damaged plant is still operational?” Vakulenko continues. In his opinion, the plants were partially damaged, and some were repaired, so some of the lost capacity has returned to service.
A more realistic estimate from JPMorgan Chase & Co. , reported by Bloomberg, states that Russian refinery capacity has fallen below 5 million barrels per day—a decline of approximately 500,000 barrels per day, or 10%. According to Reuters calculations, Russian refining capacity has declined by 17%, or 1.1 million barrels per day. While 10–17% doesn’t sound as dramatic as 38%, the dynamics are important: strikes on refineries are continuing and are disabling capacity faster than it can be restored, so the percentage will continue to rise.
The consequences of the attacks on the refineries will be felt both within Russia and abroad—Mongolia may begin purchasing gasoline from China. Private gas stations that are not part of the major oil producers are already suffering. Profitability is negative, and a number of independent gas stations are already closing, according to the Russian Fuel Union. Gasoline shipments are taking up to two months, and the export ban is not helping.
The consequences of the attacks on the oil refineries will be felt both within Russia and abroad.
All this, according to the union, “threatens independent gas station owners, who account for approximately 60% of the country’s total, to cease operations.” If the reduction in refining capacity is truly severe and prolonged, and Russian oil companies are unable to sell the freed-up crude oil, they will be forced to reduce production. This could reduce federal budget revenues and create financial problems for the Kremlin.
What are the risks of continued strikes on oil refineries?
While oil refining in Russia fell by only 3% to 267 million tons by the end of 2024, a much more significant decline is expected in 2025. In August-September 2025, at least 10 large refineries partially or completely shut down. In a conversation with The Insider, independent expert George Voloshin did not rule out the possibility that, if the current rate of impact on refineries continues, temporary downtime will escalate into a systemic capacity shutdown for several reasons.
Firstly, under sanctions, Russian enterprises have long been cut off from Western technology; therefore, replacing or repairing damaged components of the overall production process requires more time and even “cannibalization” of already installed equipment.
Secondly, there is a shortage of air defense systems, which are clearly insufficient to reliably cover all critical infrastructure facilities. This, in turn, leads to repeated strikes on the same oil refineries, creating a “cumulative effect” in terms of damage – increasing repair times and the use (as temporary) of solutions that reduce the quality of manufactured products.
In the medium term (6-12 months), Voloshin estimates that refinery downtime could reach 25% of total installed capacity. Over a time horizon of a year or more, the industry will begin to experience a general decline due to problems with replacing atmospheric and vacuum distillation columns (AVT units), followed by a stabilization of oil refining volumes at levels well below pre-war levels (approximately 200 million tons per year). This, in turn, threatens a significant increase in the market share of low-quality fuels and the rationing (i.e., administrative distribution) of higher-quality fuels.
George Voloshin believes that in some cases, repairs to refineries damaged by Ukrainian strikes will drag on until mid-2026. Experts from the International Energy Agency agree , predicting a recovery in refining volumes after June 2026 (obviously, they are not taking into account further Ukrainian strikes).
It’s worth considering that even significant and long-term damage to the oil refining industry will only impact the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war if it is accompanied by restrictions on crude oil exports—either through Ukrainian strikes on oil transportation infrastructure (pumping stations, pipelines, and export terminals) or through tightening sanctions against Russian oil on the global market. Recent actions by the Donald Trump administration and European authorities in this direction, particularly sanctions against Chinese buyers of Russian oil and major Russian oil corporations ( 1 , 2 ), make this scenario entirely realistic.
