Eurasia Press & News
The assassination of Haitham Ali Tabtabai, Hezbollah’s top military commander, deep inside Beirut’s southern suburbs has dramatically reshaped Lebanon’s internal security scene.
Hours after the strike, Israel’s Alma Center published an updated chart of Hezbollah’s command structure that included senior political figures such as Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyed, head of the party’s political council, and Mohammad Yazbek, head of Hezbollah’s Sharia (Religious) Council, alongside military and security commanders.
Experts in Beirut viewed the move as a clear attempt to expand the “target map” and reinforce the image of Hezbollah as a single, unified system with no separation between its political and military wings.
A new trajectory
Although not officially announced, the inclusion appeared to mark a shift in Israel’s messaging.
After years of focusing its operations on Hezbollah’s Jihad Council, Israel is now presenting the political leadership as part of the military decision making circle.
Analysts say this opens the door to a new phase of confrontation that reaches beyond the battlefield into Hezbollah’s top organisational hierarchy.
A historic moment of vulnerability
Political writer and analyst Ali al-Amin said the images published by Alma carry security implications that go far beyond media messaging during an open war.
He said they reflect an unprecedented level of exposure for Hezbollah after the assassination of its highest ranking military commander in the heart of the southern suburbs.
“Any image or signal at this moment cannot be separated from a wartime environment. We are facing direct targeting of the first tier, and with Tabtabai’s assassination, the possibility of strikes against others, whether security or political leaders, becomes plausible,” al-Amin told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“The breach that led to the killing of someone at this level shows Israel’s ability to reach anyone inside Hezbollah’s structure.”
He added: “In an entire year, no contemporary group has been subjected to daily strikes and assassinations without being able to respond. This is not a normal scene, it is an indicator of profound weakness and exposure inside the party.”
Al Amin said the latest assassination was notable because Israel targeted Tabtabai and four people around him with precision and without killing civilians.
“This reveals the level of Israeli intelligence and its effort to keep the confrontation confined to Hezbollah’s ranks,” he said.
“This tactic embarrasses the party’s leadership because it proves day after day that Israel can eliminate its members and commanders at little cost.”
A deal or a final card
Al-Amin placed current developments within two possible trajectories: “Either this is part of a gradual sell off of Hezbollah’s security and military infrastructure on an American table, or Tehran wants a disaster in Lebanon to use as a delaying card against any potential threat to Iran.”
He warned that a possible Israeli war on Lebanon could, in some ways, serve Iran at a moment of weakness.
“There is no point in talking about a military recovery for Hezbollah today,” he said. “Its security and military structure has been severely damaged. Missiles and stockpiles do not make power when the leadership is exposed and Israel can penetrate every circle.”
He argued that the period after Tabtabai’s killing will not resemble what came before it, saying all scenarios are now open, from new assassinations to wider escalation amid what he described as a complete strategic vacuum inside Hezbollah.
Historic fragility
Tabtabai’s killing does not appear to be an isolated military episode, but a turning point that has reopened the file of Hezbollah’s decision making circle.
If Tabtabai represented the most sensitive node in the group’s operational system, the inclusion of political leaders suggests an Israeli desire to move the confrontation from the front line to the level where decisions are made and wars are managed.
According to analysts, this shift places Hezbollah in one of the most complicated moments of its history: security fragility, leadership exposure, international pressure and internal division between a public political facade and a concealed military cadre.
A deceptive sense of safety
Retired Brig.Gen. Naji Malaeb offered a complementary reading.
He said Hezbollah has effectively split into two groups after the ceasefire: a public group of politicians, lawmakers and ministers who serve as the public voice, and another that has disappeared from view, abandoned all forms of technology and communication, and continues quietly working to rebuild the party’s military structure.
He said Israeli strikes over the past year had largely failed to reach first and second tier commanders.
“Most of those killed were school directors, municipal employees or lower level members who were not decision makers,” he said, arguing that Hezbollah had maintained some internal security discipline but “misjudged its safety inside the southern suburbs, which allowed the latest breach.”
Success after failure
He said Israel possesses enough technical capabilities, from satellites to drones, to track any target that remains within surveillance range.
The exceptional level of political and military celebration in Israel after the operation, he added, signals a domestic need in Tel Aviv to showcase a major success after a long period of setbacks.
Malaeb said Alma’s publication of names and photos of Hezbollah officials is not an official position, but a form of psychological and military pressure by hinting that political leaders could also be targeted.
“The problem for Hezbollah is that it has not acknowledged defeat and continues to resist doing so. The longer this denial lasts, the higher the level of Israeli escalation.”
He warned that upcoming pressure will not be military only.
According to Malaeb, a United States Treasury delegation preparing to visit Beirut indicates a new phase aimed at drying up Hezbollah’s funding sources.
He described the phase of blocking funds as a threat more serious for the group than the weapons issue itself.
