Eurasia Press & News
The muhajirin file, or foreign fighters, has become a thorny issue for the new Syrian state, caught between loyalty to the fighters who formed a “hard core” within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the external interests of the state over which HTS came to hold sway, and between honoring its commitments to Western and Eastern powers.
The fighters who once stood shoulder to shoulder with Syrians against the regime over the past 14 years have now become the subject of political tug -of -war and demands from foreign states, both European and Asian, to close this file, remove them from leadership positions in the new state and, in some cases, hand them over for prosecution.
On the other hand, Syrians are calling for “loyalty” to these foreigners, some of whom have distanced themselves from combat, turned to trade and married into local communities, while others have become civil servants or enlisted in the state’s regular army.
This Enab Baladi report examines the case of these fighters, the impact of their presence on Syrian foreign policy and the possible scenarios for their future in Syria, amid talk of integrating 3,500 of them into the Syrian army. It also explores how Syria might benefit from their combat experience, in light of other countries’ experiences.
Trump card or test?
The issue of foreign fighters in Syria returned to the fore after Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani visited China on 17 November of this year.
The Beijing trip carried a Syrian commitment that Syrian territory would not become a theatre for “any activities that threaten China’s security or interests.”
The foreign fighters file is a concern not only for China, which has repeatedly demanded that Syria meet its obligations in the framework of combating “terrorism” and take decisive measures to confront terrorist acts and the threat posed by foreign fighters, including the Uyghurs, but also for European states.
European capitals have informed Damascus that their top priority is eliminating “jihadist fighters” and warned that international support for the Syrian government could evaporate if it fails to take decisive action on this file.
Who are they and where did they come from?
With the fall of the former regime on 8 December 2024, states began warning about foreign fighters in Syria and about integrating them into the army. However, a US green light in June approved the integration of around 3,500 foreign fighters into the Syrian army, most of them Uyghurs from China and neighboring countries. They will join the newly formed 84th Division, which also includes Syrian fighters.
Foreign fighters began flocking to Syria in 2011, joining different sides of the conflict. Those described as “jihadists” took the side of the Syrian revolution and armed opposition forces “in support of the oppressed,” while some joined the Islamic State group. The former regime, for its part, brought in fighters from Iraq, Iran and other nationalities.
The activity of foreign fighters has gradually become concentrated in the northwest of the country, in areas under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra).
Although there are no precise statistics, their total number, including families, does not exceed five thousand people. They come from at least 15 countries, including Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Kosovo, Albania, Chechnya, Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, East Turkestan (Xinjiang in northwestern China) and France, according to a study by the Jusoor for Studies Center.
Their impact on foreign relations
Syrian researcher and academic Samir al-Abdullah considers the foreign fighters file in Syria to be one of the most sensitive issues of the transitional period, given its “security and political repercussions that affect the interests of many regional and international powers.”
According to what al-Abdullah told Enab Baladi, Russia fears the return of Caucasian, Uzbek, and Tajik fighters, while China looks with “deep concern” at the file of Turkistan and Uyghur fighters. France and other European countries have similar anxieties regarding fighters of European origin.
The same applies, the Syrian researcher adds, to regional states, foremost among them Iraq and Egypt, which fear that a victory by the Syrian opposition would “bolster the fighting spirit of these fighters and turn Syria into a potential launchpad toward their home countries.”
Coinciding with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s visit to China on 17 November, Agence France-Presse (AFP) quoted two Syrian sources as saying that the Syrian government would seek to hand over 400 Uyghur fighters to China, a claim the Syrian Foreign Ministry later denied.
These states, al-Abdullah explains, tend to prefer keeping the fighters inside Syria under understandings with the new government, on the condition that they are not empowered with any political or administrative role and that they are prevented from becoming a source of threat to those states’ national security.
In recent months, foreign fighters have also become a sticking point for Western governments. Three European envoys made clear during a meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani in Damascus that their top priority is eliminating “jihadist fighters” and warned that international support for the Syrian government could evaporate if it fails to take decisive action on this file.
American, French, and German envoys have likewise warned Syria’s new administration that appointing “foreign jihadists” to senior military positions would be “a serious security concern and damaging” to its image at a time when it is seeking to build relations with foreign states.
Neither the Syrian government nor the countries of origin of these fighters “have a clear vision to resolve this issue,” according to Syrian political analyst and writer Firas Alawi, who noted that foreign fighters are present not only within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) but also among forces that fought alongside the former regime and with the Islamic State group.
Alawi believes, in his interview with Enab Baladi, that the foreign fighters file has a clear impact on Syrian foreign policy, as it has been raised in meetings Syrian officials held in those states. This has generated a series of questions about how the file will be resolved, “whether it will be in the fighters’ countries of origin or on Syrian territory, whether they will be deported or integrated, all of which are questions imposed on Syrian policy,” the Syrian analyst said.
China abstained from voting in favor of the UN Security Council resolution lifting sanctions on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa on 6 November of this year, justifying “its position by saying the resolution does not meet the principles and considerations it deems necessary to achieve stability in Syria and combat terrorism.”
China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Fu Cong, said in a statement after the session that Syria must fulfill its obligations within the framework of combating “terrorism” and take decisive measures to confront terrorist acts and the threat posed by foreign fighters, including members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) present inside Syrian territory, most of whom are Uyghurs from China.
Three scenarios
The fate of foreign fighters, after the fall of the former Syrian regime on 8 December 2024, remains unknown, with the Syrian authorities yet to make a decision, despite signs pointing to an intention to settle them.
The fighters who came to Syria either alone or with their families, some of whom formed new families with Syrian or foreign wives, and some of whom moved from the battlefield into trade and business, are waiting to learn their fate. Some are demanding citizenship, others have become part of the Syrian government, particularly within the Ministry of Defense, while others may not intend to stay.
During his meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron on 7 May, Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa addressed the future of foreign fighters, noting that they came to Syria as individuals, not in organized groups, to support the Syrian people during the revolution.
Al-Sharaa added that the Syrian government guarantees to all countries that the foreign fighters who have remained in Syria will not pose a threat to any neighboring state and will not harm the countries from which they came.
Regarding the possibility of granting citizenship to foreign fighters, President al-Sharaa said that the Syrian constitution, once drafted, would determine who among the foreign fighters and their families would be entitled to obtain Syrian nationality.
Syrian researcher Samir al-Abdullah believes that the foreign fighters file is particularly complex for the Syrian government, as some of these fighters were considered part of the “hard core” of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which makes abandoning them or handing them over to any party a choice fraught with the risk of “angry internal reactions.”
He adds that some fighters outright reject the idea of Syrian naturalization, as they view their presence in Syria as a temporary phase before returning to their home countries.
On the other hand, some foreign fighters who took part in the fighting in Syria during the war years have submitted requests to obtain Syrian citizenship, according to a report published by Reuters on 15 August.
The request, which Reuters said it had seen, was submitted by Bilal Abdul Kareem, an American actor working as a war correspondent in Syria, to the Syrian Interior Ministry. The petition argued that granting citizenship would allow these foreigners to settle, own land, and obtain a Syrian passport.
We have shared bread, shared sorrow, and shared hope in a free and just future for Syria (…) Yet our situation as muhajirin remains uncertain.
We respectfully appeal to the Syrian leadership, in wisdom, vision, and brotherhood, to grant us full Syrian citizenship and the right to obtain a Syrian passport.
Letter from Bilal Abdul Kareem to the Syrian government
Reuters, 15 August 2025Abdul Kareem told Reuters that the petition aims to help thousands of foreigners from more than ten countries, including Egyptians, Saudis, Lebanese, Pakistanis, Indonesians, and Maldivians, in addition to Britons, Germans, French, Americans, and Canadians, as well as people of Chechen and Uyghur origin.
Reuters said it had confirmed with three foreigners in Syria, a Briton, a Uyghur, and a Frenchman, that they had signed the petition.
What is their fate?
The fate of foreign fighters requires a comprehensive pathway to address it, one that balances the requirements of national security with the Syrian state’s obligations toward fighters who are integrating into the social fabric, according to jihadism researcher Orabi Abdulhay Orabi.
According to Syrian researcher Samir al-Abdullah, the most realistic scenario consists of “forging a multi-party settlement that reassures the fighters’ home countries they will not return, and reassures Syrian society that their movements will be controlled and that they will be prevented from influencing the political or security scene.”
Success in this file will remain contingent on the transitional Syrian government’s ability to impose effective oversight on the activities of these fighters, provide security guarantees to the concerned states, contain the sensitivity of local factions toward the foreign fighters who fought alongside them, and prevent any independent political or military presence for them inside Syria.
Dr. Samir al-Abdullah
Director of the Policy Analysis Unit at the Arab Center for Contemporary Syrian StudiesThe Syrian researcher believes that the outcome of this file will form “a real test” of the new Syrian administration’s ability to manage “complex balances” that bring together the requirements of national security, the need to ensure internal stability, and the duty to honor its commitments.
For his part, Syrian political analyst Firas Alawi sees the foreign fighters file as a “trump card” in the hands of the Syrian government, which could use it for “bargains” that will be shaped by its own calculations. He expects these bargains to relate more to foreign fighters who were part of the Islamic State group than to those who fought with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, for ethical reasons and because of the latter’s influence within the Syrian government.
Three possible outcomes
Jihadism researcher Orabi Orabi believes that the fate of foreign fighters will vary according to security and legal tracks, international relations, and state policies.
Their fate will be determined by a set of parallel and intersecting tracks, he explains, through three types of interaction, namely the policies of the fighters’ countries of origin, the legal and security arrangements of the future Syrian state, and the individual and social factors specific to each fighter and his family.
Orabi believes that those who do not wish to remain in Syria will be allowed to return to their countries in coordination with them, or to leave through other channels.
As for those who want to remain in an organized way in Syria, their stay will be conditioned on citizenship and adherence to Syrian state policy.
The researcher outlines the likely fate of the muhajirin in three scenarios:
The first scenario concerns detained Islamic State fighters. This file, he says, requires cooperation from the countries of origin, whose policies vary between repatriating women and children or refusing to receive male fighters and instead putting them on trial.
The second scenario would allow foreign fighters to remain in Syria as Syrians eligible for citizenship under clear conditions, especially those who do not have a “dangerous extremist” record.
The third scenario would leave the file unresolved, as is the case with Islamic State fighters held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and in al Hol camp (northeastern Syria), which would recreate environments of extremism and threat.
He points out that this option could produce new generations of potential violence, entrench a parallel economy and smuggling networks, and perpetuate continued security fragility.
Technical and combat expertise, how can Syria benefit from foreign fighters?
Some foreign fighters have managed to integrate into Syrian society. During their time in Idlib province, some of them worked in different professions, and these fighters enjoy a degree of social acceptance there, owing to their behavior, which local residents interviewed by Enab Baladi described as “respectful.”
Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS, which has since formally dissolved itself) previously benefited from the academy founded by “Abu Salman Belarus” together with fighters who came from Russia and former Soviet republics. The academy, known as “Malhama Tactical,” trained HTS’ special forces, known as the “Red Bands.”
After the fall of the regime, the Syrian Ministry of Defense integrated 3,500 foreign fighters, most of them Uyghurs under the banner of the Turkistan Islamic Party, into the 84th Division, which is based on the Syrian coast, in addition to others within the 82nd Division stationed in Idlib.
Mohammad al Suleiman, a political analyst and researcher at the Jusoor for Studies Center, believes that some states do not see the foreign fighters file as a real threat to their security, given the fighters’ discipline, their adherence to the orders of their leaders, and the Syrian government’s assumption of responsibility for controlling them, which keeps them away from causing domestic or external trouble.
Other states, however, fear that some of these fighters might turn into a source of incitement that could influence their citizens and push them toward adopting patterns of thought or behavior that threaten those states’ security and interests, according to al Suleiman.
Turning them into technical experts
Foreign fighters have proven that they possess a disciplined combat ethos and “special forces” style tactics that local factions, which now form the backbone of the Syrian army, lack. To make proper use of them, their role should be transformed from “ideological fighters” into technical experts, according to the vision of retired Colonel Khaled al Mutlaq, a researcher in military and security affairs.
This would happen through knowledge transfer and by using these fighters as trainers in specialized military colleges, drawing on their experience in guerrilla warfare, such as sniping and night raids, like those carried out by the Red Bands.
These academies could be institutionalized to graduate a new generation of Syrian officers and turned into official training centers under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense, to ensure that the combat doctrine serves the state rather than any single faction.
Al Mutlaq added that small, highly equipped units could be formed, similar to the French Foreign Legion, to carry out specialized missions, including counterterrorism, dismantling Islamic State sleeper cells and others, and securing difficult borders such as those with Lebanon and Iraq.
He pointed out that these fighters often lack tribal ties or local patronage networks, which could make them stricter in enforcing the law against corruption or internal security disorder.
Political affairs and non -state armed groups researcher Ammar Farhoud told Enab Baladi that the Syrian state can benefit from the experience of these fighters in two main areas:
First, the technical field, by transferring expertise and localizing skills within the Syrian military institution, whether in training, management, cyber warfare, or other technical and military fields.
Second, through the leaders of these groups, by bringing them under control and integrating them into the military institution’s approach to tackling Syria’s core security challenges, foremost among them the Islamic State group and Iranian militias.
A ticking time bomb
Foreign fighters played a significant role in battling the army of deposed president Bashar al Assad, and it was an important role, according to Islamist movements researcher Mounir Adib, who says they produced a qualitative shift in confronting the regime, at least as far as the past is concerned.
As for the future, Adib believes these fighters are a “ticking time bomb,” because they did not fight for Syria as a homeland, but from an ideological background. They came with that ideology, continued fighting on its basis, and will not abandon it even if they are integrated into the Syrian army.
Integrating these fighters into a single division within the Syrian army could do more harm than good. While the idea of benefiting from their experience might strengthen the army and form an ideological core that could make it more powerful and more brutal when facing its enemies, it could at the same time have a negative impact because of the fighters’ ideological background, which may pose a threat to the country’s security, Adib says.
Political affairs and non state armed groups researcher Ammar Farhoud believes that the negative side of the foreign fighters issue is largely confined to certain individuals rather than to organized blocs. Some of these individuals may pursue paths outside the law, such as joining extremist organizations, weapons or drug smuggling networks, or kidnapping gangs and organized crime.
Although these threats are generally low level, there is still a possibility that some individuals will choose paths that run counter to those chosen by the Syrian government and its military institutions.
A crisis of legitimacy and sovereignty, who do they owe loyalty to?
The Syrian soldier fights for his land and his honor, while the fighter in the 84th Division fights for survival or for creed. This creates a gap in the combat doctrine of the national army, says retired Colonel Khaled al Mutlaq, a researcher in military and security affairs.
He adds that the presence of Uyghur or Caucasian fighters within a regular army will put the Syrian state in direct and constant confrontation with China and Russia, which will view Syria as a safe haven for “terrorism” and a source of threat to their national security. This could isolate the new Syria internationally and deprive it of investment and reconstruction projects such as the Belt and Road.
The existence of a military bloc that is foreign in language and culture, yet armed with the authority of the state, will create sensitivities with local communities. Any individual abuse by a foreign fighter against a Syrian citizen will not be interpreted as an isolated incident, but as a form of “veiled occupation,” according to al Mutlaq.
He turns to Islamic history to warn of the danger of “new Mamluks.” Islamic history, he notes, is full of examples of states relying on foreign fighters such as the Mamluks and the Janissaries to protect power, only for these fighters to end up seizing control and turning rulers into puppets. Over time, the 84th Division could similarly morph into a military force that dictates its own political terms to the government.
Dismantling the hard core
For the state to benefit from foreign fighters and avoid a clash with them, al Mutlaq recommends that Syria’s strategy be based on individual rather than collective absorption, through dismantling the hard-core blocs.
The 84th Division should not be allowed to remain as a single homogeneous bloc. It must instead be broken up and its members redistributed as individuals or very small groups within large Syrian brigades, so that they dissolve into the national fabric.
Al Mutlaq calls for benefiting from these fighters on the technical level, not relying on them to achieve strategic objectives, meaning they can be used in training and tactics but cannot be entrusted with the keys to security or the protection of the capital.
Those who refuse full integration and refuse to abandon their external agendas should have their departure facilitated or be neutralized, he argues, because the political cost of their remaining is far higher than their military benefit.
Foreign factions that fought alongside the Syrian opposition
The Turkistan Islamic Party
The Turkistan Islamic Party was first recorded as entering Syria in July 2013. It is designated as a terrorist organization by Russia, China, the United States, the United Kingdom and other states, although the United States removed the party from its list of terrorist groups in November 2020.
The party’s fighters number around 3,500, according to information documented by Enab Baladi in 2019, most of them Chinese Uyghurs who have been subjected to repression and attempts to erase their cultural and religious identity by the Chinese government.
The party dissolved itself in June of this year, announcing that it was joining the Ministry of Defense and coming under the umbrella of the 84th Division, committing itself to national policies and distancing itself from any external affiliations.
The French “Ghuraba Division”
The French “Ghuraba Division” was founded in 2013 and is led by French national of Senegalese origin Omar Omsen, 49, who is designated by the United States as a “global terrorist.”
The Ghuraba group includes around 70 French fighters and has a troubled history with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which detained Omsen for 17 months.
The Ghuraba Division is based in a camp near the city of Harem (in Idlib province in northwestern Syria).
In October of last year, clashes broke out between Internal Security Forces in Harem and French muhajirin following a security operation launched by the Interior Ministry after complaints from local residents, the latest of which concerned the abduction of a girl from her mother, an accusation the Ghuraba Division denied.
A ceasefire was reached between the two sides on 24 October, stipulating the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the group’s positions in the camp.
Ansar al Islam Battalion
The Ansar al Islam group established a branch in Syria in 2014 after its Iraqi branch pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group and merged with it, while other fighters refused the pledge and chose instead to operate in Syria.
The battalion’s numbers did not exceed 100 members as of 2020, most of them Kurds, including Syrians, Iraqis and Iranians. Previously, its manpower ranged between 250 and 350 fighters. It was known for strict discipline and for avoiding contact with civilians, as well as for being extremely poor and relying for funding on support from some local armed and other jihadist groups.
The Albanian Battalion
The Albanian Battalion began its activities in March 2013, with between 100 and 150 fighters in its ranks, most of them of Albanian origin from Kosovo, Albania, North Macedonia, the Presevo Valley (in southern Serbia), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.
It is led by Yesari Abdul (Abu Qatada Albani), born in September 1976 in Skopje, the capital of North Macedonia, who previously fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Chechnya, and who was appointed as an adviser to Hayat Tahrir al Sham in November 2016.
Chechen jihadists
Chechen jihadists are divided between two prominent groups:
Jund al Sham was founded by Muslim Shishani in 2017. He chose to operate independently from other armed groups. However, Hayat Tahrir al Sham moved to dismantle his group and forced him in November 2021 to man front lines with around 70 fighters at positions belonging to the al Fath al Mubin operations room, and to withdraw completely from the Kabanah area in the northern Latakia countryside in northwestern Syria and from Jisr al Shughur (in Idlib province in northwestern Syria).
Ajnad al Qawqaz (Soldiers of the Caucasus) is led by Rustam Azhiev, known as Abdul Hakim al Chechen, the group’s founder and one of the veterans of the wars in Chechnya against Russia.
The battalion numbered between 150 and 200 fighters and was deployed in areas of northern rural Idlib (in northwestern Syria), before leaving in stages between 2022 and 2023 to fight in Ukraine against Russia.
“Imam Bukhari Battalion”
The Uzbek “Imam Bukhari Battalion” consists of around 300 fighters. It was founded by Abu Muhammad al Uzbeki in 2013 and was active in northern rural Idlib and rural Aleppo, taking part in many battles in Aleppo and Latakia.
The battalion remained neutral in all infighting between armed groups in opposition held areas.
“Malhama Tactical”
The “Malhama Tactical” group was established in May 2016 by Russian speaking fighters, including Chechens, Uzbeks and Azerbaijanis, with the aim of providing voluntary military and tactical training services to opposition factions.
The group numbers around 200 members and decided to confine its work to military training and to stay away from factional disputes.
“Muhajirin Ahl al Sunna in Iran” movement
This movement was founded in 2013 by Mullah Abdulrahman Fathi. It fully came under the banner of Hayat Tahrir al Sham in August 2016 and fights alongside it on secondary front lines.
The number of Iranian Sunni muhajirin fighters reached 150, and the movement’s bases are currently limited to the Jisr al Shughur and Harem areas in northwestern rural Idlib (northwestern Syria).
Hurras al Din
The Tanzim Hurras al-Din, al Qaeda’s branch in Syria, was announced in February 2018. The group is estimated to have around 1,500 fighters, with Jordanians, Moroccans and Tunisians making up a large proportion, estimated at 400 members.
Throughout 2020 and 2022, the group was subjected to a systematic dismantling campaign by Hayat Tahrir al Sham, which arrested dozens of its members and leaders, most notably Abu Abdul Rahman al-Makki.
On 29 January of this year, the group announced in a statement that it was dissolving itself, attributing the decision to the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024.
