Eurasia Press & News
In recent weeks, there has been a noticeable warming of relations between Syria’s new regime, led by President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, and Russia. This rapprochement has met with criticism from many Syrians, given that Russia was a key ally of the Bashar Al-Assad regime. During Syria’s civil war it took brutal action against Assad’s opponents,[1] and today it provides asylum to the ousted president himself, his family and senior officials of his regime, while refusing to extradite them.[2] Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the organization led by Al-Sharaa before he became president,[3] was frequently a target of these Russian attacks. But despite this, since coming to power in December 2024 Al-Sharaa has taken are not to alienate Russia and has not acted to remove its remaining military presence in Syria. This approach has also been evident in statements by Al-Sharaa and senior members of his regime, who have consistently taken a neutral, and at times even positive, tone towards Russia.[4] In addition, there have been mutual visits between the two countries: a senior delegation of Syrian ministers headed by Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani visited Moscow on July 31, 2025, and a Russian delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak visited Damascus on September 9, 2025. On both occasions the sides expressed a mutual desire to “turn over a new leaf of genuine cooperation.”[5] The highlight was Al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow on October 15, 2025 and his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which lasted about two and a half hours and during which both sides emphasized their desire to strengthen the friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries.[6]
This Syrian-Russian rapprochement serves the interests of both parties. Russia views it as a means to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the West and as an opportunity to maintain its two large military bases in Syria, Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia and the naval base in Tartus, which are its only bases on the Mediterranean coast. Syria, for its part, is mainly interested in receiving military and economic assistance from Russia, given that the Western openness toward it has not translated into significant aid for its reconstruction. In particular, the Syrians hope to receive weapons for their new army; oil and wheat, to make up for shortages in the country; support in the UN Security Council; assistance in curbing Israeli military activity in Syrian territory, and help mediating with the Kurdish and Druze minorities, which oppose the Al-Sharaa regime.
However, as stated, this Syrian-Russian rapprochement has sparked resentment and criticism among Syrians, even among officials and supporters of the regime itself, who emphasized that Russia will continue to be an enemy of the Syrian people because it committed crimes against them and assisted Assad in oppressing them. Some even accused Al-Sharaa of dishonoring and betraying the Syrian people and the memory of their martyrs.
This report presents the motives of the Al-Sharaa regime in its rapprochement with Russia, as well as the criticism of this policy among Syrians.
Military, Political And Economic Motives In Strengthening Relations With Russia
Syria’s bid to draw closer to Russia stems largely from its political, economic and military weakness as it seeks to rebuild the country following the fall of the Assad regime.
Counterbalancing Relations With The West
Apparently, one of the reasons for the regime’s turn toward Russia is the shift in the West’s discourse and the decline in its support following the deadly events in which Al-Sharaa’s forces were involved in atrocities against minorities: the Alawites on the Syrian coast in March 2025 and the Druze in Al-Suwayda Governorate in July 2025. Realizing that Western support for him will not be unconditional, Al-Sharaa has chosen to cultivate the relations with Russia as a counterbalance to Syria’s relations with the West.[7] Moreover, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia could promote aid to Syria and the lifting of the sanctions on it.
Economic Assistance And Involvement In Syria’s Reconstruction
In addition, the Syrian regime seeks to obtain economic assistance from Russia, particularly the supply of oil and wheat, as well as Russian participation in Syria’s reconstruction.[8] Russia has expressed its willingness to directly take part in rebuilding Syria’s vital infrastructures – chiefly in the energy, transport and other sectors – in response to Syria’s demand that it pay compensation for the damage caused by its bombings during the civil war.[9] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated that the meeting between Putin and Al-Sharaa addressed ways in which Russia could support Syria’s reconstruction, and that Russia was prepared to participate in developing the oil, gas and other energy sectors.[10] In fact, according to the London-based daily Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, the fall of the Assad regime did not halt the economic relations between Syria and Russia, and Russia continued supplying oil to Syria’s power plants.[11] Tanker Trackers reports that, during 2025, the Al-Sharaa regime secretly received 15 million barrels of Russian crude in exchange for granting Russia permission to maintain its naval base in Tartus.[12]
Russian Weapons And Assistance In Military Training
Another key Syrian interest is to renew the supply of Russian weapons to Syria and to obtain Russian assistance in training Syria’s armed forces, building on the long history of military cooperation between the two countries. Al-Sharaa’s communications advisor Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaidan admitted in an August interview with Al-Arabiya that, despite Russia’s crimes against the Syrians, at present there was “no choice” but to rely on it for spare parts and weapons.[13] This is because many countries, including the U.S. and E.U., are still imposing an arms embargo on Syria, despite the easing of the sanctions on it since the advent of the Al-Sharaa regime.
Against this backdrop, several military visits have taken place between the countries in recent months. For example, a Syrian military delegation led by Chief of Staff Ali Al-Naasan visited Russia in early October. During the visit, the Syrian Defense Ministry’s media director, Assem Ghalyoun, posted a photo on his Facebook account showing himself standing next to a Russian S-400 air defense system, and wrote: “Today in Russia and soon in Syria.”[14] During the visit of the Russian delegation to Damascus on September 9, 2025, Syrian and Russian sources reported that the Syrians had expressed an interest in purchasing Russian weapons.[15]
The issue of Russian arms supplies is also linked to the question of Russia’s future military presence in Syria. This is a key issue for Moscow, since, as noted, Russia’s bases in Syria are its only access to the Mediterranean Sea. According to reports, the status of the Russian bases was discussed by Al-Sharaa and Putin during their October 15, 2025 meeting in Moscow, but a final agreement has yet to be reached. Nevertheless, Al-Sharaa has so far allowed the Russians to maintain their military presence in his country.[16] According to the Saudi magazine Al-Majalla, Russia hopes that, by offering the Al-Sharaa regime favorable terms for purchasing Russian weapons, it can secure Syrian consent to maintain its bases in Syria.[17] It should be noted in this context that, during his meeting with Putin, Al-Sharaa pledged to “honor the previous agreements with Russia,” namely Assad-era agreements, including the ones that established the Russian bases in Hmeimim and Tartus.[18]
Seeking Russian Assistance In Stopping Israeli Military Action In Syria
Yet another Syrian consideration in strengthening ties with Russia is the desire to enlist its help in dealing with Israel, which has expanded its military operations in Syria since the advent of the Al-Sharaa regime. This Israeli activity stems from its security concerns, given the jihadist background of the Al-Sharaa regime and the instability in Syria under its rule.
In order to prevent the weapons and gear of the Assad army from falling into the hands of extremist elements that could threaten it, either within Syria or outside it, such as Hizbullah in Lebanon, Israel carried out a series of strikes after the fall of the Assad regime, destroying most of the country’s military infrastructure. In addition, IDF forces deployed in a buffer zone in southern Syria, in areas that, under Assad, housed militias subordinate to Iran and Hizbullah.[19] Today, one pro-Iranian organization, the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, operates there, and has declared its intention to act against Israel, though its size and the scope of its military capabilities are unclear.[20] In recent months, talks between Syria and Israel, brokered by the U.S., have taken place with the aim of reaching a new security agreement between the two sides.
The Al-Sharaa regime believes that Russia too can act as mediator in its dealings with Israel. In this context, there have been reports that Russia may renew its military presence in southern Syria, near the border with Israel, and conduct patrols there in order to limit the Israeli military activity. In the absence of official statements on this matter, conflicting reports have appeared in the media regarding which side made the request; some claimed that it was President Al-Sharaa who proposed this.[21]
Russian Mediation Between The Al-Sharaa Regime And The Kurdish And Druze Minorities
The Al-Sharaa regime also seeks Russia’s help in dealing with its internal rivals in Syria. According to numerous reports, in the past several months there have been Syrian-Russian talks regarding possible Russian mediation between the regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). These forces, comprised mainly of Kurds, maintain an autonomous administration in northeastern Syria and have so far resisted the attempts to integrate them into the Syrian state under Al-Sharaa’s rule. Russia has maintained relations with the SDF since the Assad era, partly due to its presence at the airport in the city of Qamishli, an SDF stronghold in the Al-Hasakah Governorate in northeastern Syria.[22]
Similarly, the Al-Sharaa regime seeks Russia’s mediation with the Druze-majority Al-Suwayda Governorate in southern Syria, which is eying separation from the Syrian regime following the deadly clashes in July 2025, during which Bedouin tribes backed by Al-Sharaa’s forces massacred Druze locals. Al-Sharaa hopes that Russia will help to prevent this secession and allay Druze fears of further violence against them.[23] During his visit to Syria on September 9, 2025, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak alluded to the possibility of such mediation, stating that “Russia maintains contact with Israel and with all ethnic groups in Syria, and proposes to make use of this to promote stability in Syria.”[24]
Resentment Among Syrians: Russia Helped Assad Kill And Oppress Us; Al-Sharaa’s Meeting With Putin Is Treason
The Al-Sharaa regime seeks to portray its rapprochement with Russia as part of a pragmatic approach and a desire to maintain balanced relations with all the world’s countries. But as mentioned, many Syrians, including some of Al-Sharaa’s own supporters, found this difficult to accept, given Russia’s record as a major ally of Assad in his war against his opponents.
Syrian Army Commander: Russia Will Remain An Enemy In The Eyes Of Syrians
Among the critics of the tightening relations with Russia was Abu Khaled Al-Hassi, a commander in the new Syrian army and formerly a battalion commander in the Ahrar Al-Sham militia, an ally of HTS. In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Hassi emphasized that Syrians would continue to regard Russia as an enemy, saying: “We understand that the government is entitled to consider the country’s needs… but the Syrians will not forget what Russia did in previous years. Members of my family, like many other Syrians, were killed in Russian bombardments, when Russian aircraft attacked markets, residential areas and emergency services. We see Russia as nothing but an enemy; it was directly involved in our displacement, in suppressing the revolution, and in facilitating the barbarity of the [Assad] regime. Russia, like Iran, played a central role in the Syrians’ oppression, especially through its airstrikes, which continued for years… It would be better if we could someday negotiate with the Russians over the extradition of Bashar Al-Assad and several officers of his regime, who have fled to Russia, using the leverage of the Russian military bases in Syria. This is a legitimate right, but [even] this will not change the enduring fact that Russia will remain an enemy in the eyes of most Syrians.”[25]
Syrians On Social Media: Russia Murdered Tens Of Thousands Of Syrians And Is Responsible For Our Current Situation
Harsh criticism of Russia was also voiced on social media. For example, following President Al-Sharaa’s visit to Russia, Syrian activist Jisry Jamal commented on Facebook that “Putin is a war criminal and his hands are stained with our blood.”[26] On July 31, 2025, amid the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Al-Shaibani to Moscow, a Syrian activist known as “Circassian,” who identifies as a supporter of the Al-Sharaa regime, wrote on X: “Russia killed tens of thousands of Syrians. Russia destroyed half of our [country’s] infrastructure. Russia caused half of Syria to flee and become displaced. Russia shielded and defended Bashar [Al-Assad] and his associates. Russia is the reason for the siege on Syria and the theft of its resources. Every Russian veto [in the Security Council] caused the massacre in Syria and the endless cycle of pain to continue. Russia will improve nothing in Syria, literally nothing!!”[27]
The Euphrates Post Telegram channel, which covers Syria, posted on September 17, 2025: “The [Syrian regime’s] positive statements on Russia do not change the fact that the downfall of the [Assad] regime was a strategic defeat for the Russians or the fact that Russia played a destructive role in previous years.” The post was accompanied by a cartoon depicting Russia and Assad as a double-headed snake that has been struck down by Syria’s citizens.[28]
Criticism of Al-Sharaa: His Visit To Russia Was Treason Against The Syrians And The Blood Of Their Murdered Martyrs
Particularly harsh criticism followed Al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow and his meeting with Putin. Ahmad Mu’az, a Syrian from Idlib affiliated with Hizb Al-Tahrir, a Salafi organization opposed to HTS, posted a series of messages accusing Al-Sharaa of treason: “Al-Sharaa’s visit to Russia does not [reflect] practical wisdom or political [shrewdness]. It is a betrayal of the revolution, the rebels, the jihad fighters and the martyrs. [It is an act of] great insolence under the false pretext that we [Syrians] are weak and have no choice, so we can disregard the honor of our people and the sacrifices of its noble revolution. O [Syrians] who pander to the regime, [answer me this:] After visiting Russia and enraging the Syrian public, all of which supports the revolution, what prevents [Al-Sharaa] from also visiting Tehran and reconciling with it?!! A handshake with the criminal Putin will not cleanse [Putin’s] hands, which are stained with the blood of our people and our rebels, nor will it erase Russia’s crime.”[29]
Syrian activist Mustafa Arour wrote on Facebook: “Al-Sharaa is the greatest trader in blood. Today, he and his supporters fully deserve that title, since they rejoice and celebrate the red-carpet welcome he received [in Russia]… Has [Putin], the murderer of Syrians and the arrogant criminal, become your standard of victory? Where is your honor and [the honor of] our people’s blood?… What kind of ‘historic achievement’ is it to tread the red carpet in the home of your family’s murderer!!”[30]
- O. Peri is a research fellow at MEMRI.
