Eurasia Press & News
It is clear that the counterterrorism focus of the past two decades has become deprioritized in favor of great power competition, reflected in the dwindling resources for kinetic and non-kinetic counterterrorism and prevention efforts and shifting of personnel and bandwidth to other national security priorities.
In 2026, al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State (IS), as well as their various global franchises and provinces respectively, will continue to exploit conflict zones and ungoverned spaces to expand their geographic scope and operational tempo.
In 2026, cartels and gangs targeted by the Trump administration after their Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) classification could seek to engage in horizontal escalation and commit attacks in the United States.
2026 could be the year when drone expertise migrates to a Western country, where terrorists seek to incorporate unmanned aerial systems into their operational planning, either for surveillance and reconnaissance or for an attack on a densely populated gathering or soft target.
The year 2026 commemorates the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 and catalyzed the Global War on Terrorism, a two-decade-long counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaeda and then the Islamic State, as well as their branches and regional affiliates. Looking ahead to what terrorism trends may materialize in 2026, it is clear that the counterterrorism focus of the past two decades has become deprioritized in favor of great power competition, reflected in the dwindling resources for kinetic and non-kinetic counterterrorism and prevention efforts and shifting of personnel and bandwidth to other national security priorities, from Venezuela to Ukraine. Additionally, the U.S. National Security Strategy indicates a return to a hemispheric security paradigm.
Assessing the past year of terrorist plots and attacks, however, indicates a global and ideologically heterogeneous terrorist threat landscape that has grave national security ramifications: (1) Salafi-Jihadist terrorist organizations in conflict zones, primarily on the African continent, are highly lethal and successfully expanding their territorial presence and operational tempo; (2) external operations remain within the capabilities of many Salafi-Jihadist terrorist groups, including through inspiring and directing individuals remotely, as recently occurred in Sydney, Australia; (3) non-ideological, ideologically diffuse, and niche single-issue-inspired violent acts are on the ascent globally, often resulting from online radicalization; (4) political violence and domestic extremism have become increasingly normalized and downplayed by some prominent individuals in government and the media; (5) the reclassification of drug cartels and gangs as terrorist organizations has led to a radically altered counterterrorism strategy in the United States and beyond.
In 2026, al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State (IS), as well as their various global franchises and provinces respectively, will continue to exploit conflict zones and ungoverned spaces to expand their geographic scope and operational tempo. The primary theater where this trend is accelerating is the Sahel, where conflict and political instability have combined to produce an expanding coup-belt. Diminished counterterrorism pressure will easily be further exploited by groups that have proven highly capable. Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian-affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), which has effectively conducted an insurgency while building shadow governance structures, will likely continue to expand with only minimal state resistance. Russian mercenaries operating in Mali and other Sahelian countries have exacerbated the terrorism problem through a draconian counterinsurgency approach, which is pushing locals into the arms of the jihadists.
But the Sahel is far from the only region where geopolitical events are impacting terrorism-related dynamics. IS and al-Qaeda affiliated groups ebb and flow in strength around the globe in response to counterterrorism pressure and local and regional dynamics, including governance. While jihadists in Libya, the Philippines, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula have been somewhat muted compared to their contemporaries in sub-Saharan Africa, that could change in the year ahead, as volatility contributes to further grievances in these territories could help Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates recruit and raise money.
Another conflict on which Salafi-Jihadists could capitalize is in Syria. Specifically, militants could seek to exploit sectarian violence, especially in the coastal provinces of Tartus and Latakia, the central government’s ongoing, continued conflict with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the inadequate counterterrorism support from external partners at a time when the United States and Europe have other foreign policy priorities. The Islamic State remains active in Syria, and there are concerns about jihadist militants within the Syrian security services, hardliners who could choose to break ranks and join with IS or other jihadist groups. Prisons and detention centers in Syria also remain highly vulnerable and have been targeted numerous times in recent years.
The Arabian Peninsula is yet another region that could witness an increase in terrorism-related activity in the coming year. Yemen is currently a battlefield for external actors, and the instability wrought in the country could end up empowering both the Iran-backed Houthis and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Over the course of the past two years, the Houthis have wreaked havoc in the Red Sea and beyond and largely remain undeterred. For its part, AQAP is among the most potent al-Qaeda franchise groups and has recently begun increasing its propaganda output, which includes threats against China for Beijing’s treatment of the Uighurs.
In addition to the Sahel and Syria, conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and continued conflict in Sudan can easily be exploited by non-state armed actors, including Salafi-Jihadist terrorist groups. Whether this materializes will depend on whether external sponsors of the Sudan conflict halt their patronage of the warring factions. In Central and South Asia, Pakistan stands out as a country to watch. According to the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, Pakistan experienced its deadliest year in over a decade in 2025, with 3,413 fatalities, most of which were militant deaths linked to the state’s increasing pressure on Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP). Last April, a terrorist attack in Kashmir brought Pakistan and India to the brink of conflict, a nightmare scenario that served as a painful reminder of the impact that terrorism can have on interstate conflict and conventional warfare, in this case, involving two nuclear-armed rivals.
Across the border, Afghanistan remains a safe haven for Islamic State Khorasan Province, which continues to signal interest in external operations. Al-Qaeda also maintains a presence in Afghanistan, and although the group has been relatively quiet, there is a serious risk that it could seek to resurge and slowly rebuild its ranks, including by working with al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) fighters. In addition to the threat posed by Salafi-Jihadist groups, state-sponsored terrorism remains a serious risk. While Iran is significantly weakened after the Twelve-Day War and amid expanding anti-government protests, Tehran has already signaled it will continue to use its proxies, including in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, as both offensive and defensive tools, especially in the case of U.S. strikes or operations against the regime in Iran.
State-sponsored terrorism can also manifest in external operations: Iran is known to use operatives within the United States and the West more broadly, in addition to local low-level petty criminals and youth it recruits online to execute operations. Tehran, in an effort to seek revenge on Israel and the United States, could also revert to its comparative advantage—old-school terror tactics, bombings similar to what the Iranians facilitated in Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Bulgaria, to name just a few examples. Russia, too, has recruited, primarily through the messaging application Telegram, third-country petty criminals to execute minor vandalism but also serious sabotage operations in Europe, some of which may rise to the level of a terrorist attack. Experts like Kacper Rekawek have argued that Russia’s tactics in Ukraine and Europe, and use of extremist actors domestically, may effectively rise to the level of a state sponsor of terrorism.
On the domestic front, the threat landscape is characterized by the increasing normalization of political violence and the growing trend of non-ideological violent acts and composite violent extremism, sometimes referred to as ‘salad bar’ terrorism. Over the course of this year, there could be a major uptick in left-wing terrorism domestically aimed at government and immigration enforcement targets. And, as the midterm elections approach, far-right groups may feel emboldened to act, in tandem with a rising acceptance of political violence, propelled forward by the concept of reciprocal radicalization. The upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup in North America may also be targeted, as this most likely would be significantly mediatized and will remain an attractive target for terrorist groups and other violent extremists. Globally, the rise of memetic and nihilist violent extremism will continue to lead to offline violence in 2026, with various online subcultures increasingly responsible for lethal attacks, often perpetrated by minors.
In 2026, cartels and gangs targeted by the Trump administration after their Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) classification could seek to engage in horizontal escalation and commit attacks in the United States. As The Soufan Center has previously predicted, cartel leaders may respond with attacks on American law enforcement officers and infrastructure, or, more feasibly, attack American civilians in shopping malls, on buses, at concerts, and in other crowded places. We are also foreseeing growing resistance to AI, with AI infrastructure and companies increasingly targeted for various reasons. An online survey by The Soufan Center shows that online threats against data centers rooted in political, religious, environmental, and economic reasons have surged.
2026 could see an unprecedented rate of drone adoption by foreign and domestic terrorist actors. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, at least nine African countries now have violent non-state actors in their territory using military drones in their operations. While terrorist groups on the African continent, including IS and AQ affiliates, have used drones for reconnaissance and propaganda purposes since at least 2020, there has been an uptick in the use of drones by groups like Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and JNIM for attack purposes, and signs that various non-state armed groups are learning from the battlefield in Ukraine-Russia to understand how to best weaponize a drone and avoid countermeasures are emerging. In 2026, terrorist groups in conflict hotspots will continue refining and learning how best to deploy drones for their missions and how to circumvent drone countermeasures implemented by overstretched security institutions across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. It could also be the year when drone expertise migrates to a Western country, where terrorists seek to incorporate unmanned aerial systems into their operational planning, either for surveillance and reconnaissance or for an attack on a densely populated gathering or soft target.
Various terrorist plots in the West featuring a drone have been thwarted in recent years, according to Militant Wire. Easy access to weaponization guides online and to cheap commercial drones may enable a successful attack in 2026, which would be highly mediatized and carry significant propaganda value. As numerous scholars have noted, the primary threat lies in the convergence of multiple, increasingly accessible technologies that collectively and radically enhance terrorist actors’ operational capabilities. For instance, 3D printing enables rapid drone weaponization when paired with AI agents that can generate precise Computer-aided Design (CAD) files for Improvised Explosive Device (IED) delivery mechanisms. Another important trend to watch is how AI-powered chatbots may increasingly feature in attack planning, rather than mere propaganda generation and diffusion. This trend is colliding with a climate of fast deployment of new models, bound to lead to security and safety gaps readily exploited by violent extremists.
