Eurasia Press & News
The rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has erupted beyond subtle divergences into a more overt and consequential rivalry.
While it started with an emerging proxy war over southern Yemen, it has now shifted to the Horn of Africa. But while efforts to smooth their differences have recently pointed to a quiet compromise, their underlying competition may take longer to dissipate.
“There are a great many interests that both countries share in the region,” Cameron Hudson, a former US government official who previously served with the State Department and National Security, told The New Arab.
“The question is whether they can focus on those shared interests to create a more cooperative and coordinated approach to the region, especially as regards security and political stability. That is not clear.”
In the Horn, the Saudi-Emirati rivalry comes from a fundamental divergence in strategic vision, extending from Yemen but now reaching Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Libya.
Out of both countries, Abu Dhabi clearly has the most embedded influence, with its engagement led through ports, local proxies, and sub-state actors, particularly along key maritime corridors.
A breakthrough came in 2016, when Dubai Ports World invested around $442 million in Berbera port in Somaliland and in Bosaso, Puntland. Somaliland’s contested status has made these investments politically sensitive ever since.
Abu Dhabi also built strong ties with both Ethiopia and Eritrea, brokering their 2018 peace deal. In Ethiopia, it invested heavily in key sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. In Eritrea, its engagement was primarily logistical, including the establishment of a military base. These ties boosted Emirati leverage in the region, positioning Abu Dhabi as a critical Western interlocutor on diplomacy and trade.
Emirati-backed factions have prioritised financial networks linking Libya’s Khalifa Haftar to Somaliland via Ethiopia and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. This alignment helps sustain Abu Dhabi’s gold trade and cross-border commercial networks tied to Dubai.
Sudan’s war has placed the UAE under intense scrutiny for its support for the RSF. Abu Dhabi views the group both as a safeguard for its gold investments and as a counterweight to Islamist forces it fears.
In contrast, Riyadh has put greater emphasis on upholding state sovereignty, ensuring border security, and supporting strong central authorities. This stance has put it in alignment with Egypt, given a shared concern for stability in the Red Sea region, which would threaten their own political and economic security.
Although Riyadh has less embedded influence in the Horn compared to Abu Dhabi, it has sought to catch up and is now putting pressure on Emirati influence in the region.
Yemen as a catalyst
Yemen remains the epicentre of UAE–Saudi tensions. For much of the war, Abu Dhabi’s support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and southern secessionist forces sat uneasily alongside Saudi Arabia’s stated commitment to Yemen’s territorial unity and its own border security priorities.
That tension came into sharper focus in late 2025, when STC forces made rapid advances in southern provinces, including Hadramawt and al-Mahrah. Saudi Arabia responded with airstrikes on UAE-linked shipments in Mukalla on 30 December, marking a rare kinetic escalation between nominal allies.
Within days, Riyadh pressed for a reversal: demanding Emirati withdrawal, the termination of joint defence arrangements, and the dismantling of STC command structures.
While Saudi-backed forces moved to reassert control over key areas and the UAE avoided direct confrontation, their ties remain fragile.
Without addressing the deeper strategic divide, namely Abu Dhabi’s maritime-centric influence versus Riyadh’s state-centric model, Yemen risks becoming merely the first theatre in a wider regional struggle.
From Yemen to the Horn of Africa
The Yemen fallout has broader implications across the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to dismantle UAE-backed networks beyond Yemen, particularly in Sudan and Somalia, where Riyadh views Emirati support for sub-state actors as a direct threat to Red Sea stability.
Here, Saudi Arabia’s position has converged closely with that of Egypt. Both states face acute vulnerabilities tied to Red Sea security. Cairo depends on Suez Canal revenues, while Riyadh prioritises secure maritime routes for oil exports and pilgrim traffic, with both now seeing Emirati fragmentation-driven strategies as destabilising.
Somalia, in particular, has emerged as a key fault line.
“The UAE has important economic ties with Somaliland, especially port facilities in Berbera, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt support Somalia’s territorial integrity. These differences over Somalia/Somaliland will inevitably increase the tension between the UAE and Saudi Arabia/Egypt,” David Shinn, former US ambassador to Ethiopia and adjunct professor at George Washington University, told The New Arab.
Although Somalia’s federal government voided UAE agreements in January 2026 over sovereignty concerns following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, DP World’s operations in Berbera persist, and Puntland and Somaliland do not recognise Mogadishu’s decision.
Security cooperation between the UAE, Somaliland, and Puntland also continues. This sets the framework for what analysts like Andreas Krieg refer to as the ‘Axis of Secessionists’, a key pillar of Emirati influence and commercial networks in the Horn.
Sudan and proxy conflicts
Sudan represents the most acute and destabilising expression of Gulf rivalry in the Horn, and the rivalry could exacerbate its devastating civil conflict, which began in April 2023.
Initially, Saudi Arabia and the UAE shared similar views on Sudan after the 2019 revolution that ousted dictator Omar al-Bashir, each supporting military rule and offering assistance to the transitional military council. However, as divisions arose among Sudan’s military authorities, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also became divided.
While both are members of the US-led Quad, set up in September 2025 to push for a political solution to Sudan’s war, Riyadh had signalled quiet dissatisfaction with Emirati backing of the RSF. But in alignment with Cairo, Riyadh appears to now be shifting from a mediatory role towards more backing for the SAF.
Shinn notes that “Saudi/Egyptian support for the Sudan Armed Forces and UAE backing of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is another area of disagreement that has and will continue to divide the two sides”.
Riyadh and Cairo have effectively formed a de facto pro-SAF alliance. Cairo provides direct military and logistical support, while Riyadh offers diplomatic backing and financial investment focused on economic and reconstruction efforts in SAF areas, aiming to contain RSF advancement.
Pressure on Abu Dhabi has intensified as Saudi and Egyptian coordination has sought to restrict RSF logistics. One focal point has been Libya, where Khalifa Haftar, long a UAE ally, has facilitated RSF supplies via al-Kufra airport.
Cameron Hudson argues that this coordination is already producing tangible effects.
“We are already seeing the effects of the deepening Saudi-Egyptian alignment with the closing of the Kufrah airbase in Libya by Khalifa Haftar, who has traditionally been a client of the UAE,” he said.
Although the closure was temporary, reports indicate that weapons continued to be supplied, underscoring Haftar’s vulnerable situation between rival sponsors and the challenges associated with completely interrupting Emirati supply channels.
Increasingly, analysts characterise these developments as components of a wider effort to restrict RSF logistics throughout the region.
A Saudi–Egyptian bloc
The UAE’s growing alignment with Ethiopia has added another source of friction, particularly with Egypt. Abu Dhabi provided political and material backing to Addis Ababa during the Tigray conflict and has invested heavily in Ethiopia’s economy.
Addis Ababa also pledged to recognise Somaliland in early 2024 as a platform for its Red Sea access, while Abu Dhabi had previously facilitated ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland.
But for Cairo, these ties intersect dangerously with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Addis Ababa inaugurated in September 2025 after commencing its construction in 2011.
Ethiopia’s unilateral operation of the Nile dam has renewed Egyptian fears over water security and regional leverage, given the Nile provides almost all of Egypt’s water supplies.
Moreover, Egypt had built ties with Somalia’s central government, including sending troops in 2024 at the height of tensions, to deter Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions via Somaliland. That has placed it in further alignment with Saudi Arabia, which has supported the territorial integrity of Somalia, a fellow Arab League state.
While Ethiopia temporarily stepped back from its Red Sea ambitions in early 2025, the tensions remain on hold. Cameron Hudson suggests that the GERD may be the next arena where Gulf tensions surface most clearly.
“I think we will see it next play out over the negotiations around the GERD that Washington seems prepared to get involved in. It is unclear how the UAE will respond.”
Based on past behaviour, he adds, “in the past, when they have been boxed in, the UAE has doubled down and fought their way out”.
In the near term, a deeper Saudi-Egyptian alignment appears likely, given their shared concerns over state fragmentation, proxy warfare, and Red Sea security.
Joint statements increasingly emphasise sovereignty and state cohesion, while initiatives such as a proposed Saudi-Egypt-Somalia security framework point towards a more exclusive bloc that sidelines Abu Dhabi.
Yet this alignment may not bring stability. Hudson warns that “we are long past competing over contracts and investments. Gulf states are picking their own political winners and subverting the others’ efforts”.
Ultimately, analysts note that replicating UAE-style embedded influence in the Horn is “far more complex” for Riyadh due to Abu Dhabi’s head start and entrenched networks. But Saudi pressure looks set to extend beyond its recent gains in Yemen.
In weak states with histories of instability, that dynamic carries further risks.
“The result of their competition could be more wars like Sudan or, even worse, inter-state wars that engulf the entire region,” Hudson warns.
Shinn offers a similarly bleak assessment, noting that “they all seem to be seeking short-term political advantage, which will not serve any of the parties well and will be especially destructive for the countries in the Horn of Africa”.
