The Psychological Confrontation Between Washington and Tehran: From Oman to the 10–15 Day Countdown

Officials keep channels open even as rhetoric expands targets and consequences, turning uncertainty into a strategic tool while publicly conditioning audiences for escalation

Since the public protests that began in Iran in late December 2025, the confrontation between the United States and Iran has unfolded along two parallel and carefully managed tracks: a diplomatic channel formally intended to prevent escalation, and a public communication campaign that continuously prepares domestic and international audiences for the possibility of escalation. These two tracks do not operate in contradiction. Rather, they function in tandem, reinforcing one another and shaping the broader strategic environment in which negotiations take place. In political messaging, every word counts.

From the initial diplomatic contacts in Turkey to the talks in Oman, followed by the Geneva round in mid-February and the compressed American deadline rhetoric of the past week, official statements and posts on the social media platform X illustrate a recurring pattern: negotiations are framed as fragile, time horizons are narrowed, and deterrence language is expanded—often at the same moment.

From Turkey to Oman: Diplomacy Under Public Doubt

In the weeks preceding the Oman round, both governments publicly lowered expectations regarding the likelihood of progress. US officials signaled that meaningful breakthroughs were unlikely, while Iranian officials maintained that talks would proceed as planned.

This dynamic became visible ahead of Muscat. On Feb. 4, 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote on X: “Nuclear talks with the United States are scheduled to be held in Muscat on about 10 a.m. Friday.”

Nuclear talks with the United States are scheduled to be held in Muscat on about 10 am Friday.

I'm grateful to our Omani brothers for making all necessary arrangements.

— Seyed Abbas Araghchi (@araghchi) February 4, 2026

The language was procedural and institutional, emphasizing time and venue rather than substantive outcomes. Shortly thereafter, US officials confirmed attendance, underscoring that despite public pessimism, coordination remained intact.

Following the session, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs English-language account on X reported that negotiations had lasted “from 10 a.m. until nearly 6 p.m.” The duration itself was incorporated into the public narrative. The process was documented, and engagement was made visible.

This coexistence of public doubt and operational coordination reflects what Anita Gohdes, professor of international and cyber security at the Hertie School in Berlin, described as characteristic of coercive diplomacy rather than evidence of diplomatic breakdown.

World leaders have always said one thing and then done another, especially when it comes to coercive diplomacy

“World leaders have always said one thing and then done another, especially when it comes to coercive diplomacy. In the past, they often used speeches (e.g., on radio or TV) to make grand announcements,” she told The Media Line.

The distinction today, she argued, lies not in the presence of threats but in their expanded audience.

“Social media has similarities but is also different, as leaders know that they are not only being followed by their own people, but also by people in the country whose government they are threatening. So, for example, Trump knows that Iranians at home and abroad are reading what he says, and US Americans are likewise following what members of the Iranian leadership post,” she said.

In this environment, public messaging shapes interpretation before negotiations can be objectively evaluated.

Irina Tsukerman, national security and human rights lawyer and president of Scarab Rising, emphasized that this projection is not only directed outward but inward as well. “It’s about projecting strength. Neither side wants to appear weak, especially not in front of domestic audiences,” she told The Media Line.

Her point suggests that rhetorical escalation serves a dual function—deterring the adversary while stabilizing domestic political perception.

Geneva: Progress Without Concession

The Feb. 17, 2026, Geneva talks added a further layer of structured ambiguity to the diplomatic track.

After the meeting, Araghchi told Iranian state media that the parties had reached a “general understanding on a set of guiding principles.” The phrase is deliberately abstract. It signals forward movement without delineating concrete commitments or concessions. It allows both sides to project progress while retaining strategic flexibility.

Yet even as this abstract diplomatic language circulated, escalation rhetoric was not suspended. Negotiations continued alongside pressure, rather than replacing it.

What emerged was not classic brinkmanship in which diplomacy seeks to halt escalation, but a more complex mechanism in which negotiations operate as political preparation. Each side communicates strength publicly to ensure that participation in talks cannot be interpreted as weakness, while the continuation of talks enables any subsequent escalation to be framed as a final measure rather than an initial step.

Iran’s messaging followed the same logic. Even amid negotiations, Tehran emphasized deterrent capacity and military readiness by showing missile stockpiles and images of defeated American and Israeli forces on national TV, and by intimidating the protestors in the streets.

Gohdes cautioned against interpreting such rhetoric as a direct precursor to immediate action. “Members of the Iranian leadership have also engaged in aggressive online rhetoric. It is difficult to know to what extent these online messages are followed by actions, especially when it comes to the US and Iran. They should mainly be seen as part of public diplomacy and as a way to test the waters of different types of messaging, both at home and abroad,” she said.

Tsukerman echoed this caution from a security law perspective. “Not every aggressive statement should be read as an imminent operational move,” she noted.

She also highlighted a structural asymmetry that affects how pressure tactics are received. “Iran has historically shown a great deal of patience in negotiations. They are very adept at waiting out pressure tactics,” she added.

This observation introduces an important dynamic into the analysis: compressed time windows may resonate differently in Washington than in Tehran.

February 19: The ‘10–15 Days’ Window

The rhetorical trajectory tightened on Feb. 19, 2026.

During remarks at the inaugural Board of Peace meeting in Washington, President Donald Trump stated that it would become clear within “probably 10 days” whether a deal was possible, warning that otherwise “bad things” would occur. Subsequent comments referred to 10 to 15 days as a maximum timeframe.

Both sides are playing chicken

The linguistic structure introduced a compressed horizon. Tsukerman characterized the dynamic as calculated brinksmanship. “Both sides are playing chicken. Basically, it’s a game of brinksmanship, and both Donald Trump in particular, and Iranians historically, have excelled at using the tools to gain psychological advantage. However, I would say that by far Iran has the tougher diplomats and the more experienced practitioners on the ground in terms of perceiving the other side’s intentions and reading the room,” she said.

She further emphasized the pattern behind numerical deadlines. “It is not the first time Trump has used that technique. He has actually used specific numbers to pressure Russia during negotiations on Ukraine as well,” she noted.

Tsukerman cautioned that repetition carries strategic risk. “If you threaten constantly and nothing happens, eventually the other side stops taking it seriously and thinks to have the upper hand. The more time passes, the less credible all of this becomes,” she added.

The deadline, therefore, operates within a narrow bandwidth. It can intensify pressure in the short term, but its effectiveness depends on whether credibility is sustained.

Tehran’s Countersignal: Expanding the Target Field

On the same day, Iran’s UN mission warned that if attacked, bases, facilities, and assets of the “hostile force” in the region would be considered “legitimate targets,” and that Iran would respond “decisively.”

The rhetorical contrast remains notable.

The US language framed consequences without specification. The Iranian language categorized potential targets such as American bases, Israel, and even European assets.

Tsukerman framed Iran’s leverage in psychological rather than purely military terms. “They understand how to create uncertainty and anxiety. That can be more destabilizing than a direct confrontation,” she said.

In this interpretation, uncertainty itself becomes a strategic instrument—shaping expectations, markets, alliances, and domestic political discourse without requiring immediate escalation.

Social Media as Audience Conditioning

The confrontation has not been confined to formal statements.

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Araghchi has used X both to confirm negotiation scheduling and to challenge contested narratives. In one post, he wrote: “If anyone doubts the accuracy of our data, please speak with evidence.”

Steven Terner, an American political analyst at Terner Consulting, viewed the broader pattern as strategic preparation. “If the US is interested in negotiating in good faith with the Iranian state, then now is an optimum time to do it because the Iranian state is in a weaker position currently than it has been in many years. Increasing the American military presence in the region further enhances its leverage. However, the US may simply be interested in striking Iranian strategic sites,” he told The Media Line.

“It’s not clear that the United States is interested in diplomacy at all. This administration has never acted in good faith in negotiations with Iran, so there is little reason to believe that it is doing so now. Its involvement in negotiations in Turkey and Oman may simply be a tactic to buy time and claim that it has attempted to negotiate before striking Iran militarily,” he added.

The Shadow of June 2025

The Oman talks unfolded under the shadow of June 2025, when negotiations were ongoing shortly before US strikes, alongside Israeli strikes, targeted Iranian nuclear sites.

Terner interpreted procedural inconsistency as significant. “The inconsistency implies that the sides are not serious about negotiations, and does not bode well for a constructive outcome,” he said.

The relevance of June 2025 lies in sequence. Negotiations were active. They did not prevent military action; they framed it.

Diplomacy and Coercion Advancing Together

Across the timeline—from the December protests to Turkey, Oman, Geneva, the “10–15 days” window, and the “legitimate targets” warning—diplomacy and escalation have advanced concurrently.

Tsukerman’s assessment encapsulated the structural dynamic. “Trump will do something since the protests in Iran resumed, the US assets in the region are the same amount as 2003, and the waiting seems to have reached its breaking point, but still, everything can happen. Even Iran can surprise us by attacking before, or Israel may decide to go solo, everything here can change the equation being written currently,” she concluded.

On Saturday, the rhetorical exchange continued, reinforcing the pattern of public positioning that has accompanied each diplomatic step. In an interview on Fox with Lara Trump, the president’s daughter-in-law, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff noted that President Trump said he was surprised that Iran had not “capitulated,” framing the lack of immediate concession as unexpected given the level of pressure exerted. The term itself introduced a language of surrender rather than compromise, shifting the tone from negotiation to submission.

Iran’s foreign minister responded directly on X, writing, “Curious to know why we do not capitulate? Because we are IRANIAN.”

On Sunday morning, the Tehran Times amplified that framing with a front-page cover featuring a picture of President Trump and the headline “Eight Presidents, One Failed Playbook: A history lesson for Trump on why Iranians have not ‘capitulated.’” The cover explicitly placed the current standoff within a longer trajectory of US–Iran tensions, suggesting continuity across American administrations and presenting the present confrontation as another iteration of an established pattern.

The psychological confrontation does not replace diplomacy. It accompanies it and conditions its interpretation.

Whether the next phase yields agreement, stalemate, or military confrontation may depend less on what is decided in negotiation rooms than on how both governments have prepared their audiences to interpret the outcome once it materializes.

For now, negotiations continue alongside calibrated rhetorical pressure.

The countdown language remains in circulation. The deterrence categories remain articulated.

Uncertainty—structured, deliberate, and publicly performed—remains an integral component of the strategy itself.