Eurasia Press & News
Russia is engaged in a deliberate, sophisticated, and systematic campaign to repopulate occupied areas of Ukraine with Russian citizens as part of a broader effort to consolidate control and forcibly integrate these territories into the Russian state. This campaign has accelerated over the past year as the occupation has become increasingly formalized through administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms. Russian authorities are pursuing repopulation through several pseudo-legal pathways — most notably the selective weaponization of Russian property law, “ownerless” housing seizures, and state-backed financial incentives designed to make relocation attractive and legally frictionless for Russians looking to relocate. Repopulation is also an economic instrument: Moscow is relying on imported Russian labor, civil servants, and private investment to operate institutions, fill staffing shortages, and sustain occupation-led development projects throughout occupied Ukraine. Russia’s overarching strategic objective is to engineer a demographic reality in occupied Ukraine by making occupied territories appear intrinsically Russian, thereby entrenching occupation governance and complicating any future reintegration into Ukraine.
Overview
Russia has now occupied about 20 percent of Ukraine for over four years. These four years have granted Moscow time and space to solidify its control over occupied territories using a variety of military, social, economic, political, legal, and bureaucratic mechanisms. Perhaps one of the most tangible examples of Russia’s occupation strategy in Ukraine is the apparent intensification of the campaign to repopulate occupied areas of Ukraine with Russian citizens from Russia. This campaign is critical to Moscow’s effort to “Russify” occupied Ukraine — forcibly remaking occupied areas in Russia’s own image.
The practice of Russification through repopulation was first enacted following Russia’s 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea.[1] Estimates of how many Russians have moved to the occupied peninsula since 2014 vary, but the true number likely falls between 500,000 and one million.[2] Russian census data from September 2014 additionally shows that the overall population of Crimea decreased following the invasion and annexation, but that the portion of the Russian population increased by 65 percent, whereas Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar populations fell to 15 and 10 percent respectively.[3] The increase in the Russian population is likely a result of dual, mutually-reinforcing factors — deliberate Russian repopulation efforts and the widescale passportization campaign, which aimed to forcibly grant Russian citizenship to the majority of occupied Crimea.[4] Russian media most recently estimated that over 200,000 Russians moved to occupied Crimea between 2014 and 2026.[5]
The Crimean repopulation model followed a clear template. Russian officials used a combination of Crimea’s desirable coastal location and offers of affordable housing, attractive social benefits, and employment opportunities to encourage Russians to relocate to the peninsula after 2014. Occupation officials in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics (DNR and LNR) similarly attempted to attract Russian relocation to Donbas following the 2014 occupation, mainly relying on Russian immigrants to staff military and law enforcement bodies and positions within local-level occupation administrations.[6] Russia was unable to paint the DNR and LNR as destinations as attractive as Crimea, however, since these areas were predominantly landlocked and much closer to the frontline of the 2014-2022 conflict. Russian repopulation statistics in Donbas therefore paled in comparison to Crimea in the years leading up to the full-scale invasion.
Russia’s 2022 invasion, occupation, and annexation of Ukraine provided Moscow with significantly more Ukrainian land to repopulate, including several densely populated coastal areas on the Azov and Black seas such as Mariupol, Berdyansk, Henichesk, and Skadovsk. Russia has clearly been implementing a refined Crimea-type repopulation model in territories occupied since 2022, using an integrated combination of housing policy and real estate law, employment and economic opportunities, and supplementary demographic manipulations to forcibly change the population makeup of occupied Ukraine in Moscow’s favor. The Russian plans to effectively import Russians to occupied Ukraine are clear, even in the open source. The Russian federal Unified Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP) and Russian development corporation VEB.RF, for example, developed joint plans in March 2026 to resettle roughly 114,000 Russians in occupied Ukraine by 2045, and highlighted the development of residential and economic infrastructure as catalyzers of such a significant scope of Russian migration to occupied Ukraine.[7]
Housing policy, real estate law, and property development
Occupied Mariupol has been the epicenter of the repopulation campaign and a microcosm of Russia’s wider occupation strategy since 2022. Its coastal location on the Sea of Azov, as well as its robust residential and industrial infrastructure have made it a prime location for Russia’s Crimea-type repopulation model. Ukrainian partisans claimed to have gained access to Russian development documents in 2023 that showed that Russia intends to increase the population of occupied Mariupol by at least 300,000 by 2035 using migration from Russia — underscoring the scale of Russia’s intended repopulation in the city.[8]
Housing policy and real estate law have been driving factors in Mariupol’s repopulation. Russia’s 2022 siege and occupation of the city massively changed its demographics and left it particularly vulnerable to Russian repopulation efforts. Mariupol had a pre-war population of 430,000 to 450,000 according to various estimates, and hundreds of thousands fled in the first months of the full-scale invasion.[9] Human Rights Watch (HRW) conducted a satellite and video analysis of grave sites near occupied Mariupol and concluded that at least 10,284 people died during the first year of the war alone, but Ukrainian sources estimate that the number of civilian casualties is well over 20,000.[10] Russia’s siege of the city destroyed thousands of apartment buildings and private homes and left thousands of others empty after their owners were killed or fled.[11]
Abandoned private homes and apartments provided Mariupol’s occupation administrators with a massive bureaucratic boon, on which they capitalized with the weaponization of the legal prescription of property as “ownerless” or “abandoned.” Russian officials began the process of identifying and prescribing properties in Mariupol as ownerless on a smaller and less formalized scale in early 2023 but had significantly intensified and legalized the process by 2024.[12] The Donetsk Oblast occupation administration set legal criteria for deeming property ownerless in 2024, defining indicators of abandoned property as failure to pay utility bills or a lack of registration with Rosreestr (Russia’s Federal Service for State Registration, Cadaster, and Cartography).[13] Ukrainian sources have noted, however, that in practice the criteria for identifying abandoned property can be as nebulous as weeds or overgrowth occurring near the property.[14] As a result of escalated and more formalized efforts to identify ownerless property, there were 13,000 apartments and houses deemed ownerless in Mariupol as of March 2026.[15]
The “ownerless” prescription for properties grants occupation authorities the right to essentially seize, nationalize, and redistribute such properties at will, as has been a particularly prevalent issue in Mariupol. The Donetsk Oblast occupation government’s 2024 law states that once a property is marked as ownerless, it is transferred to municipal ownership after three months, after which the municipal occupation administration can allocate or sell it to whomever they choose.[16] The Mariupol occupation administration has consistently privileged Russian citizens from Russia or occupation regime loyalists when re-allocating housing from the municipal stock of “ownerless housing.”[17] Former Ukrainian Mariupol mayoral advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that as of December 2025, the Mariupol occupation administration was adding 100 to 200 apartments to the stock of ownerless housing per week and handing over these apartments to Russian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as civil servants.[18] The clear bias of occupation courts and officials towards the allocation of housing to Russian immigrants supports the wider repopulation campaign.
The process of seizing and redistributing properties deemed abandoned to Russian immigrants has also been occurring at scale beyond occupied Mariupol. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on December 15, 2025 that codified and federalized the practice of seizing and nationalizing “ownerless” property throughout occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[19] ISW has observed and reported on multiple instances of local occupation administrations throughout all four occupied oblasts seizing and redistributing abandoned property, mostly to Russian citizens, Russian immigrants, and those loyal to the occupation regime.[20]
Russian officials are offering preferential mortgages to Russian expatriates to stimulate relocation to occupied Ukraine.[21] A December 2022 Russian government decree granted every Russian citizen the right to a two percent preferential mortgage for real estate in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.[22] Six Russian banks are participants in the preferential mortgage program — Sberbank, VTB Bank, Promsvyazbank, RostFinance, Kuban Credit, and Center-Invest.[23] Occupied Donetsk Oblast has been at the forefront of preferential mortgage issuance, likely because of the housing market in occupied Mariupol. The Russian Ministry of Construction claimed in January 2026 that occupied Donetsk Oblast had issued over 5,000 preferential mortgages totaling 26.6 billion rubles ($354 million) since the launch of the preferential mortgage program in early 2023.[24] While residents of occupied areas could feasibly participate in the preferential mortgage program, it requires full Russian documentation (including a Russian passport and individual insurance account registration number [SNILS]) to acquire — a likely disincentive for the majority of residents of occupied areas.
The development of new and modern housing in occupied Ukraine, particularly in Mariupol, explicitly privileges Russian settlers at the expense of Ukrainian residents of occupied areas. The Russian government is advertising wide-scale residential development projects in occupied Mariupol, prioritizing the restoration and reconstruction of high-end apartment buildings that are likely to be predominantly occupied by Russian expatriates.[25] Construction on the Leningradsky Kvartal apartment complex, for example, began in 2023 with the support of Russia’s Leningrad Oblast (a patron region to occupied Mariupol).[26] Leningradsky Kvartal brands itself as a high-end, modern housing option in central Mariupol, and will ultimately be comprised of 15 apartment buildings ranging from 12 to 15 stories.[27] The average price per square meter in Leningradsky Kvartal is 146,000 rubles ($2,000), and the project is notably part of the Russian state preferential mortgage program — offering a 2 percent special mortgage rate to any buyer. Former Mariupol mayoral advisor Andryushchenko noted that the average salary in occupied Mariupol is now about 18,000-20,000 rubles ($240 to $267) per month, which makes buying housing in projects such as Leningradsky Kvartal effectively impossible for the average Mariupol resident.[28] Russian independent investigative outlet Bumaga concluded in April 2025 that “none” of the apartments in Leningradsky Kvartal are intended for Mariupol residents — suggesting that the occupation administration intends to use the project to resettle Russians in the city.[29] Leningradsky Kvartal is notably being constructed on the site of housing that was destroyed or demolished in the occupation of Mariupol, leaving tens of thousands of Ukrainian residents homeless.[30] Other high-end, expensive apartment projects are also underway in Mariupol under the same 2 percent preferential mortgage program, such as the Mirapolis, Mari, and Ametist apartment complexes.[31]
Russian occupation authorities have provided either new or recently-seized housing in occupied Ukraine to Russian immigrants who work in economic sectors currently facing labor shortages in occupied areas. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated in September 2025 during a meeting with Putin that his administration handed over 64 newly built apartments to doctors from Russia in an effort to fill medical personnel shortages in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[32] The LNR occupation government amended a law in September 2025 to allow medical and civil servants priority access to properties deemed ownerless.[33]
Recent Russian real estate statistics highlight how heavily Russian housing policies are influencing Russian relocation to occupied areas. The EIPP reported on April 20 that three quarters (75 percent) of apartments in occupied Mariupol have been purchased by Russian immigrants.[34] EIPP Director Dina Sattarova reported that the majority of these buyers come from Moscow City and Moscow Oblast, as well as various other central, northern, and southern Russian regions. Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin reported in March 2026 that out of housing throughout all of occupied Ukraine, locals (residents of occupied areas) only purchase 30 percent of said housing, while Russian workers, military personnel, and other immigrants from Russian regions purchase the remaining portion of housing stock.[35] These statistics are likely reflective of the holistic impacts of Russian housing policy, real estate law, and housing development, all of which explicitly privilege Russian expatriates while disenfranchising Ukrainians.
Employment opportunities and economic incentives
Russian occupation officials are using a wide array of employment and economic incentives to supplement the campaign to attract Russian relocation to occupied Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created a significant labor shortage in several economic sectors, due simultaneously to population outflows caused by the invasion, deaths suffered as a result of the invasion and occupation, and a reticence to collaborate with occupation administrators. Russian officials have exploited these labor shortages to facilitate broader resettlement efforts. Russian opposition investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported in April 2024 that employers in occupied Ukraine began offering higher salaries for positions in occupied areas than the equivalent positions in Russia.[36] Russia’s largest online job search platforms had posted nearly 7,000 job vacancies in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts as of March 2024, for example, compared to the total 12,000 jobs these sites posted for positions in occupied Crimea between 2014 and 2024. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported in September 2022 that Russian officials were promising high salaries and career advancements for Russian civil servants to staff positions within occupation administrations following the first few months of the full-scale invasion.[37] The Russian government also has provided generous one-time signing bonuses to Russian specialists, particularly medical professionals, for taking positions in occupied areas.[38]
The Russian “Zemstvo” ecosystem is also actively encouraging Russian professionals to move to occupied Ukraine. Zemstvo (literally translated to “rural”) programs provide Russian medical, educational, and cultural professionals who relocate to settlements with a population under 50,000 in occupied Ukraine for at least five years with a generous one-time 2 million-ruble ($27,000) bonus and steady salary.[39] These programs include the profession-specific variants of Zemsky Doctor, Zemsky Teacher, Zemsky Trainer, Zemsky Postal Worker, and Zemsky Cultural Worker, amongst others.[40] Russian occupation officials have consistently reported on participants in various Zemstvo programs relocating to, and working in, occupied areas, although the numbers remain relatively small. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that three Russian teachers from Voronezh, Volgograd, and Saratov oblasts began working in schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast at the start of the 2025-2026 school year.[41] LNR occupation Minister of Health Natalia Pashchenko reported that 50 Zemsky Doctor medical workers from Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, and Voronezh oblasts, Krasnodar Krai, and the Republic of Dagestan will join the medical workforce in occupied Luhansk Oblast in 2026, joining the 46 Zemsky Doctor workers who have been deployed to the oblast since 2023.[42]
Russian authorities are also using the promise of land ownership in occupied Ukraine to incentivize military recruitment, accomplishing the dual objectives of maintaining force generation for the Russian military while ensuring the repopulation of occupied Ukraine with a loyal and militarized Russian veteran class. Occupied Crimea was the original model for this program, which has since expanded to occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in December 2022 requiring authorities of Moscow Oblast and occupied Crimea to provide for the free transfer of land plots to veterans of the war in Ukraine.[43] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov reported in December 2022 that the Crimea occupation State Council approved a law on the provision of free land plots to participants of the war in Ukraine, provided that the participant registered with a local government following February 24, 2022, in accordance with the December 2022 federal law.[44] Aksyonov reported that land plot distribution for veterans had begun by March 2023.[45] The Ukrainian Resistance Center claimed that in some cases, Crimea occupation authorities were seizing land from local residents in order to redistribute it to Russian veterans.[46] As of May 2024, 9,238 veterans had applied for free land plots in occupied Crimea, although it remains unclear how many of these veterans are Crimea natives or Russian immigrants, given the intensity of Russia’s illegal military recruitment in occupied Crimea.[47]
Ukrainian sources have additionally reported on the allocation of land plots to Russian veterans in occupied Mariupol, Berdyansk, and Primorsk, as well as in occupied Kherson Oblast, since 2022.[48] DNR Head Denis Pushilin reported in March 2026 that he gained Putin’s support for the proposed “Zemsky Veteran of the Special Military Operation” program, which will award Russian veterans 15 acres of land in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as well as preferential mortgages and employment assistance.[49] Pushilin noted that he designed the “Zemsky Veteran” program in order to improve the “demographic situation” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that this initiative has an explicit repopulation intent.[50] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo similarly presented the “Russian village” project in March 2026, which will provide interested individuals with plots of land and farming rights in occupied Kherson Oblast and specifically caters to Russian veterans.[51]
The Russian government is trying to create a friendly investment environment in occupied Ukraine, in part in order to attract Russian businesses and businesspeople to relocate to occupied areas in exchange for tax and other economic benefits. The Kremlin, for example, is introducing a “war risks” insurance program in order to encourage Russian construction and development companies to take up projects in occupied Ukraine.[52] The war risk insurance program seeks to assuage business’ concerns about operating within an active war zone, and therefore establishes monetary incentives for businesses and their employees to re-locate to occupied areas.[53] The Kremlin also established a free economic zone (FEZ) in occupied Ukraine in 2023 that is intended to last until 2050 and offers participants reduced taxes and insurance rates for operating in occupied areas.[54] The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in March 2026 in its first reading that simplifies Russian participation in the FEZ, making it even easier for Russian entrepreneurs to enter the market in occupied Ukraine.[55] FEZ participants can also lease land plots in occupied areas from the Russian Ministry of Construction’s Territorial Development Fund.[56] It remains unclear how many individual Russians have relocated to occupied Ukraine as a result of these financial incentives, but their existence strongly suggests that this is an avenue the Kremlin is prioritizing as a means of supporting its wider repopulation campaign.
Supplementary demographic manipulations
Russian repopulation efforts are supplemented by deliberate bureaucratic and physical demographic manipulations which have the ultimate intended effect of making occupied areas of Ukraine appear to be intrinsically Russian and support wider Russification efforts.[57] These manipulations include ongoing Russian efforts to passportize, or forcibly grant Russian citizenship, to residents of occupied Ukraine. Russian occupation officials are pursuing the passportization of occupied Ukraine using a variety of coercive and bureaucratic measures, including but not limited to threatening detention or deportation in the absence of a Russian passport; linking access to medical care and basic services to Russian citizenship; requiring Russian citizenship to register SIM cards or license plates; requiring Russian documents to prove ownership over seized property; and expanding passportization measures to children under age 14.[58]
Russia also continues to facilitate the physical deportation and forced relocation of Ukrainians from occupied areas to Russia, fundamentally shifting the demographic realities of occupied areas.[59] The widely documented deportation of tens of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia will impact the demographics of occupied areas in the longer term, as Russia is effectively denying Ukraine access to its future generations.[60] Russian military actions, such as the purposeful use of first-person view (FPV) drones to strike civilians near the line of contact, have the added effect of forcing Ukrainians living near the frontline to flee their homes — a reality that the United Nations has concluded constitutes a crime against humanity of forcible population transfer.[61]
Implications
Russia’s repopulation campaign contravenes its legal and moral obligations as a belligerent occupying power. The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War contains an absolute prohibition on an occupying power transferring “parts of its civilian population into the territory it occupies.”[62] Customary international law (practice-based rules and norms rather than treaty law) also prohibits this practice.[63] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) criminalizes this practice as a war crime.[64]
Russia’s occupation strategy in Ukraine is premised on the holistic Russification of all spheres of life in occupied areas. Repopulation efforts are core to this Russification objective, and aid Russian efforts to both physically and socioculturally remake occupied Ukraine in its own image. The success of the repopulation campaign, however, rests in part on Russia’s efforts to physically de-populate these areas of Ukrainian residents, whether that be by forcibly imposing Russian citizenship or deporting them from their homes and families. The longer that Russia occupies Ukraine, the harder these implications will be to reverse. The 12-year occupation of Crimea and parts of Donbas have greatly complicated the prospects of their eventual reintegration into Ukraine, largely because of the hundreds of thousands of Russians who have relocated to these areas.
