Eurasia Press & News
Key Takeaways
Iranian officials are simultaneously employing diplomatic outreach and military coercion to pressure regional states to support a new “regional security mechanism,” likely to advance Iran’s long-standing objective of expelling the United States from the Middle East. Iran is likely using this proposed regional security mechanism to encourage Gulf states to distance themselves from the United States in exchange for cooperation with Iran. Iran may be offering economic cooperation, guarantees against Iranian attacks, and access to the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for Gulf support for key Iranian demands.
Iranian officials continue to signal that Iran intends to maintain long-term control over the Strait of Hormuz despite apparent resistance from Gulf states.
Iran and Oman appear to have at least some disagreements over the strait’s management, but any arrangement, regardless of fees, that recognizes Iranian control over the strait would be extremely problematic to US and Gulf interests as well as global commerce. An Iranian official and an unspecified regional diplomat told the New York Times on June 30 that Oman recently presented the United States with a proposal under which shipping companies would pay service fees to transit through the strait. The regional diplomat stated that the fees would be voluntary, but the Iranian official claimed they would be mandatory, which suggests that Iran and Oman disagree on this issue.
Iran announced that it will send a delegation to Doha, Qatar, on July 1 to discuss the implementation of the US-Iran MoU, but Iran continues to reject direct talks with the US delegation in Qatar and any discussion of its nuclear program.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) will reportedly deploy ground forces to Israel and Lebanon to monitor compliance with the Trilateral Framework Agreement. CENTCOM’s on-the-ground presence would likely enable the United States to more quickly identify and address potential Israeli or Hezbollah ceasefire violations and thereby limit Iran’s potential advantage in the recently established “deconfliction cell.”Toplines
Iranian officials are simultaneously employing diplomatic outreach and military coercion to pressure regional states to support a new “regional security mechanism,” likely to advance Iran’s long-standing objective of expelling the United States from the Middle East. Iran has long sought to convince Gulf and other regional states to remove US military forces from their territory by claiming that the presence of US forces in their territory threatens their security.[1] Iran intensified this campaign during and after the recent US-Israel-Iran war. Iranian officials have repeatedly framed regional security as the responsibility of regional states rather than external powers, referring to the United States. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of establishing a regional security framework led by regional countries instead of foreign powers during a meeting with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Aboudi on June 28.[2] Araghchi also emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with Gulf states to establish such a mechanism.[3] Acting Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Seyed Majid Ibn al Reza similarly called Gulf security an “endogenous matter” that regional states should manage themselves during a phone call with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister Saoud bin Abdulrahman al Thani on June 30.[4] Iran is likely using this proposed regional security mechanism to encourage Gulf states to distance themselves from the United States in exchange for cooperation with Iran. Iran may be offering economic cooperation, guarantees against Iranian attacks, and access to the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for Gulf support for key Iranian demands, including the removal of US forces from the region and recognition of Iran’s control over the strait. Iran’s use of the strait as a bargaining tool further corroborates ISW-CTP’s ongoing assessment that Iran views control over the Strait of Hormuz as leverage it can use to extract concessions from other states. Iran has reinforced these diplomatic efforts with military threats and attacks on the Gulf states. Iran’s recent strikes against Bahrain and Kuwait may have sought, at least in part, to signal to the Gulf states that Iran may respond with force to Gulf opposition to Iranian control over the strait.[5] Iran also likely conducted these attacks to try to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor as part of its broader campaign to drive a wedge between the United States and its Gulf partners.
Iranian officials continue to signal that Iran intends to maintain long-term control over the Strait of Hormuz despite apparent resistance from Gulf states. Iranian officials have repeatedly described the strait as a strategic tool.[6] The US-Iran memorandum of understanding’s (MoU) fifth clause states that Iran will work with Oman to “define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz” in consultation with other Persian Gulf littoral states.[7] Iranian officials have emphasized that Oman and other Gulf states cannot prevent Iran from asserting control over the strait, however.[8] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi stated on June 29 that Iran would implement its “sovereignty and new policy” in the strait even if Iran and Oman failed to reach an agreement on the waterway’s future management.[9] Armed Forces General Staff-run outlet Defa Press similarly argued on June 30 that the strait is a “completely internal” matter that should not depend on the positions of regional states, including Oman.[10] These statements come amid Gulf opposition to Iranian control over the strait, including the publication of a Gulf Cooperation Council-US statement on June 25 that explicitly rejected any Iranian attempts to exert control over the strait.[11]
Iran and Oman appear to have at least some disagreements over the strait’s management, but any arrangement, regardless of fees, that recognizes Iranian control over the strait would be extremely problematic to US and Gulf interests as well as global commerce. An Iranian official and an unspecified regional diplomat told the New York Times on June 30 that Oman recently presented the United States with a proposal under which shipping companies would pay service fees to transit through the strait.[12] The regional diplomat stated that the fees would be voluntary, but the Iranian official claimed they would be mandatory, which suggests that Iran and Oman disagree on this issue.[13] Iran has repeatedly signaled its intent to impose transit fees as part of its broader effort to consolidate control over the waterway.[14] Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi stated on June 29 that Oman does not support transit fees but did not rule out “mechanisms related to maritime services,” such as “enhancing navigation safety,” and “combating pollution.”[15] Iran would likely attempt to assert sovereignty over the strait regardless of whether service fees for vessels were voluntary or mandatory. Iran could reward compliant shipping companies under a voluntary fee system by granting them priority transit through the strait. A senior Iranian official told CNN on April 18 that vessels that pay “security fees” and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols would receive priority transit through the Strait of Hormuz, while vessels that refused would face delays, for example.[16] Recognition of Iran’s authority over the strait, regardless of fees or not, would preserve Iran’s ability to selectively restrict maritime traffic and disrupt international markets whenever it serves Iranian interests.
US-Iran Negotiations
Iran announced that it will send a delegation to Doha, Qatar, on July 1 to discuss the implementation of the US-Iran MoU, but Iran continues to reject direct talks with the US delegation in Qatar and any discussion of its nuclear program.[17] A senior Qatari official said that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met with Qatari officials in Doha on June 30 but added that there are currently no high-level US-Iran meetings scheduled.[18] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on June 30 that the Iranian delegation will not meet with US officials but will meet with Qatari officials in Doha to discuss MoU clauses, including the release of frozen Iranian assets.[19] ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran will likely use these talks to try to secure the implementation of provisions in the MoU that help advance Iranian objectives, including the provision about the release of Iranian frozen assets.[20] Iran has insisted on the United States releasing Iran’s frozen assets and implementing other provisions in the MoU before Iran agrees to discuss nuclear issues. Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, have not signaled any willingness to meet key US demands on Iran’s nuclear program, which include addressing the status of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and ability to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.[21]
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
See topline section.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
ISW-CTP has observed a slight increase in Kurdish anti-regime activity along Iran’s northwestern border. It is possible that this activity is a response to Iranian internal security operations. Regime media reported on June 26 that an unspecified number of unidentified fighters killed two Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers and injured two others in Baneh, Kurdistan Province.[22] Regime media also reported on June 30 that “terrorists” killed two Iranian security personnel in Paveh, Kermanshah Province, on June 29.[23] A Norway-based human rights organization claimed that a newly formed armed group called “Xori Hiwa,” or Sun of Hope, claimed the attack in Paveh and that the group targeted IRGC personnel responsible for suppressing protests during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protest wave.[24] Regime media separately reported on June 30 that IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base forces killed four Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) members in the vicinity of Mahabad and Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province.[25] This recent uptick in attacks could be a response to regime efforts to enhance internal security on Iran’s northwestern border. The regime has historically accused Kurdish armed groups of inciting anti-regime unrest in Iran. Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-run media reported on June 20 that the regime is closely monitoring fighters in Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, and Kermanshah provinces and has replaced “purely defensive reactions” with an “active deterrence” doctrine.[26]
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
US Central Command (CENTCOM) will reportedly deploy ground forces to Israel and Lebanon to monitor compliance with the Trilateral Framework Agreement.[27] CENTCOM’s on-the-ground presence would likely enable the United States to more quickly identify and address potential Israeli or Hezbollah ceasefire violations and thereby limit Iran’s potential advantage in the recently established “deconfliction cell.” A US official told the Washington Post on June 29 that the United States will deploy ground forces to both Lebanon and Israel to monitor the implementation of the Trilateral Framework Agreement.[28] The official stated that the presence of US forces on the ground will enable US political leadership to engage with Lebanon and Israel and pressure both sides to uphold the agreement.[29] The official did not specify the scale or specific locations or timeframe of US deployments to Israel and Lebanon, however. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran would have an advantage in CENTCOM’s proposed “deconfliction cell” because the IRGC’s on-the-ground presence in Lebanon would enable Iran to more readily identify and report alleged ceasefire violations to the “deconfliction cell” and influence the narrative about those violations.[30] Israel is notably not part of the “deconfliction cell” and therefore would have to report ceasefire violations through the United States.[31] CENTCOM’s reported ground forces deployment to monitor the Trilateral Framework Agreement, if implemented, would likely reduce Iran’s advantage in the “deconfliction cell.” The presence of US military forces in Lebanon and Israel would almost certainly reduce the time it would take for US policymakers to receive tactical monitoring information and limit Iran’s current on-the-ground advantage.[32] CENTCOM representatives would also presumably be able to investigate and verify ceasefire violations with both the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Armed Forces, which would reduce Iran’s ability to influence the narrative over incidents in the “deconfliction cell.”[33]
The IDF continued to strike and engage Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon on June 29 and 30. Lebanese media reported that the IDF conducted two airstrikes on June 29 targeting likely Hezbollah positions near Qantara and Deir Seryan, Marjaayoun District.[34] Lebanese media reported that the IDF later struck another site near Touline, Marjaayoun District, on June 30.[35] Hezbollah fighters previously killed an IDF officer and wounded a soldier during a small arms engagement in Deir Seryan on June 28.[36] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated on June 30 that Israeli forces will not withdraw from southern Lebanon until Hezbollah disarms.[37] Netanyahu also called on the IDF to act against Hezbollah threats in southern Lebanon.[38]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Nothing significant to report.
